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Facing Monstrosity in Goya's Los Caprichos (1799) 
Summary 
The aim of this thesis is to offer a re-evaluation of our cultural assumptions 
concerning the monstrous in the work of Francisco Jose de Goya y Lucientes (1746- 
1828), specifically his collection of etchings Los Caprichos (1799). In my study there 
are three closely related areas of investigation: the image of the monstrous body in 
Goya's work; the cultural aspects of monsters and monstrous forms in Western 
discourses and in the Spanish Enlightenment; and the theoretical encounter between 
the history of the sciences and deconstructive criticism. The interaction between 
these three areas provides a background against which to understand the Goyaesque 
body within the context of Spanish cultural practices. 
Through an examination of eighteenth-century Spanish reformist absolutism, this 
thesis explores the contradictions, limits, or insufficiencies of the Spanish Ilustraciön 
in order to establish the ideological, cultural and artistic context out of which Los 
Caprichos emerged. One of the central issues that runs through my study is to 
establish how far, and in what ways, Los Caprichos can be seen as an Enlightenment 
work. 
Traditional readings of Los Caprichos have paid very little critical attention to the 
monstrous human bodies depicted in the collection in the context of eighteenth- 
century discourses on monstrosity and corporeality. Los Caprichos invite a more 
complex, multifaceted consideration both of the body and the monster, of corporeality 
and monstrosity. By focusing on the Goyaesque body, the aim of this thesis is to open 
up a series of questions on the ways in which the monstrous body can be thought of in 
the critique of culture. 
This study therefore seeks to provide a cultural history of the monstrous body in the 
art of Goya, showing how his pictorial representations in the collection of etchings 
Los Caprichos offer a critique of reason and problematize the perception and 
treatment of (European and Spanish) Enlightenment configurations of the body. It is 
my contention that Los Caprichos can be read in Enlightenment ways yet there are 
elements of an ideological, cultural and artistic nature that problematize such 
credentials, pointing to the limits and contradictions of the Spanish Enlightenment 
itself. 
111 
List of Illustrations 
Figure 1. Goya, Capricho 43, ` El suer3o de la razön produce monstruos' 
Figure 2. Juan de Mandeville, ` Seres fantästicos', Libro de las maravillas del mundo y 
de la Tierra Santa (Jorge Costillo, Valencia, 1521) 
Figure 3. Relaciön verdadera de un parto monstruoso (Valencia, 1634), Madrid, 
Biblioteca Nacional 
Figure 4. Monstruoso Who que naci6 en la ciudad de Cadiz en 1767 (anonymous, 
C 18th), Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional 
Figure 5. Grandville, The Pursuit, 1844 
Figure 6. Goya, Capricho 42 `Tü que no puedes' 
Figure 7. Goya, Capricho 23 `Aquellos polvos' 
Figure 8. Goya, Capricho 4 `El de la Rollona' 
Figure 9. Goya, Capricho 39 `Hasta su abuelo' 
Figure 10. Goya, Capricho 50 `Los Chinchillas' 
Figure 11. Goya, Capricho 13 `Estin calientes' 
Figure 12. Goya, Capricho 79 `Nadie nos ha visto' 
Figure 13. Goya, Capricho 11 `Muchachos al avio' 
Figure 14. Goya, Capricho 18 `Y se le quema la casa' 
Figure 15. Goya, Capricho 29 `Esto si que es leer' 
Figure 16. Goya, Capricho 77 `Unos a otros' 
Figure 17. Goya, Capricho 24 `No hubo remedio' 
Figure 18. Goya, Capricho 52 `Lo que puede el sastre' 
Figure 19. Goya, Capricho 53 'i Que pico de oro! ' 
Figure 20. Goya, Capricho 55 `Hasta la muerte' 
Figure 21. Goya, Sepia Two, `Idioms Universal', 1797 
Figure 22. Goya, Portrait of Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, 1798 
Figure 23. Goya, Capricho 65 `ýDönde va mama? ' 
Figure 24. Matias de Irala, Modelos del cuerpo humano, 1730 
Figure 25. Goya, ` Farnese Hercules', ca. 1770-1785 
Figure 26. Goya, Capricho 63 `Miren que graves' 
Figure 27. Goya, Capricho 51 `Se repulen' 
Figure 28. Goya, Capricho 62 'i Quien lo creyera! ' 
Figure 29. Goya, Capricho 75 ` No hay quien nos desate' 
Figure 30. Goya, Capricho 49 `Duendecitos' 
Figure 31. Goya, Capricho 54 `El vergonzoso' 
Figure 32. Rubens, Immaculate Conception, 1628. 
Figure 33. Ribera, Virgin of the Immaculate Conception, 1635 
Figure 34. Murillo, Immaculate Conception, ca. 1665-1675 
Figure 35. Goya, Capricho 48 `Soplones' 
Figure 36. Goya, Capricho 64 `Buen viaje' 
Figure 37. Goya, Capricho 67 `Aguarda que to unten' 
Figure 38. Goya, Capricho 19 `Todos caerän' 
Figure 39. Goya, Capricho 20 `Ya van desplumados' 
Figure 40. Goya, Capricho 21 `Cual la descahlonan' 
Figure 41. Goya, Capricho 59 `Y aün no se van' 
Figure 42. Goya, Capricho 2 `El si pronuncian y la mano alargan al primero que 
llega' 
Figure 43. Goya, Capricho 14 1 Que sacrificio! ' 
iv 
Figure 44. Goya, Capricho 37 ` Si sabrä mäs el discipulo' 
Figure 45. Goya, Capricho 40 ` ýDe que mal morirä? ' 
Figure 46. Goya, Capricho 1 `Francisco Goya y Lucientes. Pintor' 
Figure 47. Goya, Capricho 73 `Mejor es holgar' 
Figure 48. Goya, `El resguardo del tabaco', ca. 1775-1780 
Figure 49. Goya, `San Fernando, icömo hilan! ', Madrid Album 
Figure 50. Goya, `La enfermedad de la razön', ca. 1797 
Figure 51. Goya, Capricho 70 `Devota profesiön' 
Figure 52. Goya, `Brujas a volar', Madrid Album 
Figure 53. Goya, `Bruja principiante', Suenos, 1797 
Figure 54. Goya, `Mirar lo que no ven', Album G 
1 
Introduction 
The cultural industry that has grown up around the sign `Goya' and around 
`Los Caprichos' is not the exclusive property of art historians and literary critics, 
cultural historians and philosophers; it is also an invaluable commodity in national 
and international art markets, producing an important part of institutionalized culture 
at national (Spain), regional (Aragon) and local (Zaragoza and Fuendetodos) levels. 
`Goya' produces numerous exhibitions across the globe; `Goya' is the precursor of 
Romanticism, Realism, or Surrealism, to name but a few 
-isms, 
' and, lately, of 
contemporary artists such as the Chapman Brothers; in the future, who knows? A 
brief overview of recent exhibitions of the graphic work of Francisco de Goya y 
Lucientes (1746-1828) and the collection of prints Los Caprichos (1799) in particular 
show how the artist's work still speaks to us. From opera to contemporary dance to 
traditional exhibitions, the end of the millennium offered numerous examples of the 
ways in which Goya's imagery is a source of inspiration or a pretext; since the 
beginning of my research, Goya has figured in the work of the Japanese `butoh' 
dancer Min Tanaka2 as well as in the British composer Michael Nyman's latest 
opera. 3 More traditional appropriations are those by museums and galleries: 'Goya's 
Drawings' (Hayward Gallery, London, 2001), `Goya. Personajes y rostros' (Fundaciö 
Caixa Catalunya, Barcelona, 2000), `Carnivalesque' (Brighton Museum and Art 
Gallery, 2000), `Estampas de la Biblioteca Nacional de la opoca de Goya' (Sala 
Ignacio Zuloaga, Fuendetodos (Zaragoza), 2000), `Monstruos y seres imaginarios en 
la Biblioteca Nacional' (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, 2000), `Los Caprichos: Mirar y 
leer' (Palacio de Sästago, Zaragoza, 1999 
- 
2000), `Rembrandt en la memoria de 
Goya y de Picasso' (Fundaciön Carlos de Amberes, Madrid, 1999-2000), `Del Sueflo 
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al Capricho' (Museo del Prado, Madrid, 1999) `Ydioma Universal: Goya en la 
Biblioteca Nacional' (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, 1996), or `Goya y el espiritu de la 
ilustraciön' (Museo del Prado, Madrid, 1988). Almost all of these exhibitions focused 
on Los Caprichos in one way or another: generically ('Estampas de la Biblioteca 
Nacional de la a poca de Goya', `Del Sueno al Capricho'), thematically ('Goya. 
Personajes y rostros', `Camivalesque') or in a more pedagogical spirit (`Los 
Caprichos: Mirar y leer'). Indeed, two of these exhibitions, `Goya y el espiritu de la 
ilustraciön' (1988) and `Monstruos y seres imaginarios en la Biblioteca Nacional' 
(2000), have been crucial for the formulations of this thesis. `Goya y el espiritu de la 
ilustraciön' presented and regarded Goya as an Enlightened artist. The aim of the 
curators, Eleanor Sayre and Alfonso Pdrez Sanchez, was to ground Goya's art firmly 
in the programme of the ilustrados (progressive statesmen and leading intellectuals of 
the Spanish Enlightenment); the exhibition, supported by the Spanish Ministry of 
Culture and other official institutions, commemorated the death of Carlos III and 
needs to be considered within the wider context of the cultural and political 
rehabilitation of a specific period of Spanish history carried out by the Socialist 
government of Felipe Gonzalez. `Monstruos y seres imaginarios en la Biblioteca 
Nacional', devoted to teratological material produced in early modern Europe, 
welcomes the visitor with Goya's most emblematic etching, Capricho 43 `El sueno de 
la razön produce monstruos' (fig. 1), the viewer's first vision of monsters and 
monstrous forms. The visitor then encounters monsters of the physical body, 
monsters of the political body, monsters of the supernatural body, monsters of the 
female body and monsters of the imaginary body. For the curators of this exhibition, 
Antonio Lafuente and Javier Moscoso, `El sueno de la razön produce monstruos' 
seemed to visually emblematize the significance of monsters to modern society and to 
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the modern imagination. 
This thesis takes issue with the 1988 exhibition's unproblematical location of 
Goya and Los Caprichos as an Enlightenment artist and an Enlightenment work, and 
the following question: `to what extent can we actually consider Los Caprichos as an 
Enlightenment work? ' is one of the central issues that runs through my study. The 
2000 exhibition begs, at first sight, a simpler question: why has his collection of 
etchings, and Capricho 43 in particular, come to epitomize monstrosity, a notion 
which is constantly invoked in discussions of Goya's etchings but which has not been 
sufficiently theorized. According to Tomlinson, Capricho 43 `has become the 
touchstone for a reductive narrative of an enlightened Goya' (1992: 6-7); it has also 
become an emblem of visual representations of the monstrous. My thesis will be 
exploring the relation of Los Caprichos with the Enlightenment and with monstrosity, 
two issues that need to be addressed and qualified rather than treated as received ideas 
and taken for granted. 
Aims and objectives 
My study departs from these cultural interpretations and, to a certain extent, 
re-appropriations, of the Aragonese artist: Goya the producer of monsters and Goya 
the Enlightened artist. The aim of this thesis is to offer a re-evaluation of our cultural 
assumptions concerning the monstrous body in the work of Goya, specifically his 
collection of etchings Los Caprichos. In my study there are three closely related areas 
of investigation: the image of the monstrous body in Goya's work; the cultural aspects 
of monsters and monstrous forms in Western discourses and in the Spanish 
Enlightenment; and the theoretical encounter between the history of the sciences and 
deconstructive criticism. The interaction between these three areas provides a 
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background against which to understand the Goyaesque body within the context of 
Spanish cultural practices. My aim therefore is to provide a cultural history of the 
monstrous body in the art of Goya, showing how his pictorial representations in Los 
Caprichos offer a critique of reason and problematize the perception and treatment of 
(European and Spanish) Enlightenment configurations of the body. To this end, I pay 
particular attention to the ideological, cultural and artistic context out of which Los 
Caprichos emerge in order to examine how far the collection was responding to the 
ideas, cultural policies and artistic tastes of Spanish Enlightened reformers. Thus my 
study is grounded in the following premise: that the collection of prints Los Caprichos 
can be read in Enlightenment ways yet there are elements of an ideological, cultural 
and artistic nature that problematize such credentials, pointing to the limits and 
contradictions of the Spanish Enlightenment itself. 
Methodology 
But, perhaps, the first question I should address is: why Los Caprichos? 
Described as a landmark in the world of art both in Goya's use of technique 
-a 
breakthrough in the art of printmaking, the first major graphic work- and in its 
meaning 
-'a symbolic watershed' (Wilson-Bureau, 1981: 15) separating the 
eighteenth century from the nineteenth century, a `crucial point in the history of 
image-making' (Licht, 1973: 15)-, Los Caprichos are central to our understanding of 
Goya. In a review of Juliet Wilson-Bureau's Goya: La decada de Los Caprichos 
(1992) published in Print Quarterly, Janis Tomlinson introduces the (un)certainties 
surrounding the series: `despite the seeming familiarity of Los Caprichos, our 
knowledge about the series is very limited. I would question Wilson-Bureau's 
opening statement (p. xxi) that "the circumstances that induced Goya to decide to 
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publish these etchings" are well-known: we in fact know very little about the artist's 
motives or intended audience' (1993: 188). How does one, then, start to frame a 
discussion where the question of knowing has created such disparate critical 
opinions? Furthermore, since any attempt to explain the inception and the later 
reception of the series is inextricably linked to the historical constructions of Goya as 
well as to the critical readings of Los Caprichos over the last two hundred years, how 
does one position oneself in relation to studies around the signs `Goya' and `Los 
Caprichos'? My own position will offer a theoretical and interdisciplinary approach 
to the analysis of Goya's collection of prints, while, at the same time, I will be 
reviewing and engaging with the main critical writings that have constructed Goya as 
an Enlightenment artist close to the circle of the ilustrados. 
My point of departure is the year 1793, generally regarded as a turning point 
in the work of Goya. Following his near-fatal illness the previous year, Goya's art 
assumed significant technical and thematic shifts as he embarked on what Paul Die 
describes in The Age of Minerva: Counter-Rational Reason in the Eighteenth Century 
as `an increasingly less rational and more demonically imaginative course of paintings 
and engravings' (1995: I, 122). In Los Caprichos, hybrid creatures and monstrous 
figures take the form of the unacceptable, of the incomprehensible. Goya worked on 
the prints throughout the second half of the 1790s until they were published on 6 
February 1799; these dates situate us at the end of a century and the beginning of 
another, a period of transition and change. The decade in which Goya worked and 
published Los Caprichos, as we shall see, was in many ways a microcosm of the 
tensions and conflicts shaping the Spanish eighteenth century. Produced on the cusp 
between the old and the new, Los Caprichos led me to explore the artist's work by 
paying particular attention to epistemological shifts and to the notion of transition 
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from a poststructuralist perspective and by thinking about the monstrous bodies 
populating the series in terms of disruption, deviation and displacement. 
The question posed by this study is the following: how can monstrosity and 
corporeality be thought together in the analysis of these etchings? The need for such 
a question arises from the surprisingly limited range of theoretical analyses of this 
work. Studies of Goya have been dominated by art historical approaches 
(iconographic, technical) and historical approaches (for instance, the conception of 
Goya as an unproblematically Enlightened artist). A general overview of the critical 
and historical writing that the collection of prints has generated shows that it ranges 
from an examination of contemporary literary influences (Edith Helman (1963), Rene 
Andioc (1984), Roberto Alcalä Flecha (1988), Eleanor Sayre and Alfonso Perez 
Sanchez (1989)) to an analysis of the art-historical and iconographic traditions 
available to Goya (Enrique Lafuente-Ferrari (1947), George Levitine (1955,1959), 
Folke Nordström (1962), Valeriano Bozal (1983,1994)) and to works focusing on the 
technical process used by the artist (Harris (1964), Enrico Crispolti (1963), Eleanor 
Sayre (1974), Garrido Sanchez (1988), Tomlinson (1989)). 4 More recently, our 
vision of Goya has benefited from interdisciplinary approaches, taking the study of 
the artist in general and Los Caprichos in particular beyond the traditional agendas of 
connoisseurship and opening up new perspectives. My study is closer to recent 
studies which foreground the insights of cultural history and late twentieth-century 
critical theories (Janis Tomlinson (1992,1994), Paul Ilie (1995), Victor I. Stoichita 
and Anna-Maria Coderch (1999)). 
As for studies that have focused specifically on monsters and Los Caprichos, I 
shall be referring to them throughout my chapters. Whether in the context of my 
historical narrative charting attitudes towards the monster throughout the centuries, or 
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in Chapters 4 and 5 where I analyze specific Caprichos, I shall be engaging with other 
critics who have dealt with the monsters depicted by Goya in the series. For 
introductory purposes, the equivocal significance of these monsters can be 
summarized thus: `the monsters could be Spanish Inquisitors, French Revolutionaries, 
corrupt public officials, or [... ] perpetrators of evil in diverse forms' (lie, 1995: I, 9); 
the latter meaning would interpret monsters as abstract embodiments of malice, 
prejudice, folly, superstition and so on. The monstrous character of the series 
- 
supernatural monsters, human monsters, grotesque figures- stands out. Moreover, its 
monstrous character can also be considered in terms of its generic unclassifiability, 
the visual refashioning undertaken by the Aragonese artist or the anti-classicism of the 
figures populating the prints, aspects which still invite the contemporary viewer to 
interpret and re-interpret these images. The monstrous bodies of Los Caprichos, 
therefore, can be read symbolically, allegorically, abstractly or generically, but it is 
my contention throughout this study that it is necessary to return to the issue of 
corporeality; that is to say, these monsters are also bodies, bodiliness is part of their 
existence (impulses and forces, needs of the human body, man's animal nature). 
Critical attention to corporeality and monstrosity will provide entry into the larger 
physical and institutional universe of late eighteenth-century Spain. 
The figurative element of the compositions is unavoidably visible for the 
human body commands the page; one cannot fail to notice the multiplicity of physical 
types or the dramatic physicality of the figures, in other words, the centrality given to 
the body. But, we may ask ourselves, how could a painter fail to put the body, and its 
materiality, on the canvas or, in Goya's case, on the plates? Moreover, wouldn't it be 
the case that pictorial bodies are generically predisposed to appear as material 
('really' there on the canvas or the plate), especially whenever the dominant aesthetics 
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is representational? A discussion of the body is inseparable from the art form or 
medium being treated in this thesis. As I have already indicated, these monstrous 
figures are normally read as embodiments of irrationality and superstition, as 
`personajes y rostros' representing the vices of eighteenth-century Spanish society. 
They are readily associable with an all too general notion of monstrosity which links 
physical and moral traits. However, traditional readings of Goya have paid very little 
critical attention to the monstrous human bodies depicted in the series in the context 
of eighteenth-century discourses on monstrosity and corporeality. During the 
eighteenth century the body was a contentious site whose boundaries were being 
investigated by many different disciplines; thinking of and representing bodies served 
eighteenth-century artists, reformers and writers not only to designate Enlightenment, 
but also to define and question cultural norms. Los Caprichos, I shall be arguing, 
invite a more complex, multifaceted consideration both of the body and the monster, 
of corporeality and monstrosity. By focusing on the Goyaesque body, my aim is to 
open up a series of questions on the ways in which the monstrous body can be thought 
of in the critique of culture. Dealing differently with the monstrous bodies of Los 
Caprichos will challenge traditional readings of the etchings. In this respect, my 
proposed theoretical framework and interdisciplinary approach will offer a re-thinking 
of reading protocols on the series. 
Procedure and Structure 
An etymological note on the word "monster" will enable me to situate the 
double focus of my research into the work of Goya. A reading of the etymology of 
the word "monster" immediately poses the question of the visual; the Latin monstrare 
- 
to show, to make known 
- 
as well as monere 
-to warn-, reminds us that monstrosity 
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exists only to be read. That is, what constitutes the monstrous is ever subject and 
subjected to the gaze, to an ideologically positioned and / or positioning viewer. As I 
shall be arguing, Goya's etchings can be seen consistently to complicate the viewing 
position. This relation of the visual to the ideological determines the modus legendi 
of my reading of Goya's artistic production at the turn of the nineteenth century. The 
modus legendi of this thesis involves, firstly, `a method of reading cultures from the 
monsters they engender' (Cohen, 1996: 3), and, secondly, an interrogation of social 
constructions of knowledge and practices of seeing. 
The first two chapters of this thesis engage with the notion of monstrosity in 
two different, yet complementary, ways. Chapter 1 looks at the historical dimension 
of monstrosity in order to identify the historical context out of which a particular 
naming of the monstrous emerges, while Chapter 2 explores the theoretical dimension 
of monsters and the monstrous, since the contemplation of Los Caprichos raises 
issues of theory and ideology as my etymological note has indicated. Chapter 1 
frames the textual generation of the monstrous as a movement from a narrative of the 
marvellous to a narrative of the deviant in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Such movement does not imply a progressive narrative whereby the monstrous is 
subsumed under modern, rational scientific discourse but rather points to `the 
polyvalent attitude of the Enlightenment towards monstrosity' (Stafford, 1997: 270). 
This chapter traces the manifestations of the monstrous in different discourses, 
ranging from theological interpretations to considerations of monstrosity as moral 
aberration to superstition-infused representations of monstrosity and to medical 
attitudes towards the monster. Manifestations of monstrosity vary from culture to 
culture and between different historical moments, thus this chapter pays particular 
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attention to the movement of culture, that is, the transformation of the nature of the 
social and cultural experience of the monstrous. 
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework and methodological approach 
for the analysis of Los Caprichos in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 2 examines 
constructions of monsters and the monstrous through the theoretical encounter 
between the history of the sciences (Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault) and 
deconstructive criticism (Jacques Derrida). The work of Canguilhem, Foucault and 
Derrida offers me a theoretical paradigm from which to tackle my analysis of Goya's 
art. Their work displays strategies with which to understand constructions of 
normality and monstrosity; their reading strategies are concerned with the critique of 
reason and the actual historicity of human knowledge; and their methods provide a 
mode of analysis from which to interrogate practices of seeing and reading protocols. 
As our analyses will show, monstrosity cannot be reduced solely to its `visible' 
manifestations. Like the collection Los Caprichos, the texts of these French thinkers 
must be considered as `new creations, which conform to no pre-existing genre, which 
observe few cultural or linguistic conventions, and which transform what they repeat' 
(Bannet, 1989: 1-2). 5 
The opening chapters provide the reader, therefore, with the historical (and 
changing) attitudes towards the monstrous available to Goya and his contemporaries, 
as well as with my theoretical position vis-ä-vis monstrosity. Once the function and 
the aims of the first two chapters have been established, the title of this thesis, Facing 
Monstrosity in Goya's Los Caprichos, and my approach to Los Caprichos themselves 
can be accounted for. A first possible explanation of my title is a meta-commentary 
on the purpose of this study: I as a critic facing the monsters created by Goya and 
engaging with previous critical encounters with the series as a fundamental part of the 
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process of reading the images. `Facing monstrosity' offers another meaning, since it 
may be interpreted as the action of giving monstrosity a face (and a body), of making 
the monster visible and eventually naming it. `Facing' a monster, we, as viewers, 
become aware of normativity, a gauge whereby normalcy comes into focus. In both 
cases, the notion of `facing' brings into play the binary monstrous / normal. There is, 
however, a further meaning which will be fundamental to my reading of Goya's 
monstrous bodies, and which emerges from my theoretical chapter: faced with the 
structural scandal of monstrosity, aware of its normalizing and arbitrary function, 
Goya's etchings propose a questioning of monstrosity and normality. This study, 
therefore, engages critically with monstrous bodies and shows how crucial they are to 
our conceptions of ideology and aesthetics and to constructions of monstrosity and 
normality. 
The historical location of Los Caprichos, a work rooted in a very particular 
Spanish time and place, is the aim of Chapter 3. The crucial question that structures 
this chapter, to what extent can we consider Los Caprichos as an Enlightenment work, 
has already been posed. The chapter focuses on three interrelated areas of the Spanish 
Enlightenment: ideology, culture and education, and the visual arts. The first part on 
ideology examines the politics of the Bourbon regime and describes the conflict 
between two different sociopolitical models and two different conceptions of culture 
(that of the Enlightened reformers and that of the traditionalists). The second section, 
culture and education, looks at the institutional practices of the Bourbon regime, 
above all in relation to education; this section is particularly interested in religious 
discourses and reformist discourses, and, by extension, received forms of cultural 
representation and new cultural forms, which will be fundamental for the analyses of 
the etchings in Chapter 4 and 5. The chapter closes with a discussion of the visual 
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arts in the Spanish Enlightenment which considers the artistic traditions within and 
against which Goya was working. 
As stated in my methodological remarks, central to Chapters 4 and 5 is Goya's 
depiction of monstrous bodies. The monstrous body is the site through which Goya 
explores the individual's relation to the political, religious and cultural contradictions 
and controversies of the Spanish Enlightenment. Individual, collective, institutional 
bodies, as well as bodies of knowledge, are inextricably linked in my discussion of 
Los Caprichos. In the final two chapters of the thesis, I explore Los Caprichos 
through two main strands of analysis: unruly bodies in Chapter 4 and institutional 
bodies in Chapter 5. The establishment of the Enlightened credentials of Los 
Caprichos in Chapter 3 lays the groundwork for the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 of 
the `limits' at which the series is more than or even stops being an Enlightened work. 
It is the aim of these chapters, therefore, to challenge received ideas about Goya and 
Los Caprichos. Traditionally considered as the visual reflections of the political 
ideology of the reformers, Los Caprichos do not fit squarely within an Enlightened 
didactic tradition. Los Caprichos are traditionally tied to a discourse of reform which 
supports Enlightenment constructions of a reasoned or reasonable subject. However, 
my contention is that Los Caprichos destabilize Enlightenment conceptions of reason 
and Enlightened configurations of the corporeal, as I argue in the final two chapters of 
the thesis. It is my contention that a more complex and polyvalent Goya shows the 
shortcomings of certain reformist institutional practices and ideals, and produces a 
radical critique of institutions during the Spanish Enlightenment. 
Chapter 4 argues how bodiliness, irrationalism, excess, hybridity, the fallibility of 
the senses and popular beliefs irrupt in Goya's images in order to call attention to the 
corporeal reality of the figures populating the series. I argue that Goya dissects the 
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Enlightenment way of looking at and explaining the body. In order to do so, the first 
half of the chapter examines Goya's reconfiguration of the classical body, as well as 
his depiction of hybrid bodies, as challenges to the Enlightened body-image of the 
singular, virtuous individual subject. The second half of the chapter looks at Goya's 
engagement with the classical physiognomical traditions that informed the promotion 
of Enlightened reforms. While physiognomical modes of reasoning anchor or 
stabilize a concept of normativity, my analysis of Goya's etchings reads monstrosity 
as, rather, a disruptive and displacing force which subverts Enlightened epistemic 
constructions of the body and questions received forms of cultural representation. 
The final chapter, `Institutional Bodies', explores the representation of the socio- 
political body: the clerical body, the nobility and the populace. The chapter examines 
the ways in which the Goyaesque body bears the marks of its cultural and institutional 
location. Thus the relation between individuals, institutions and discourse, and the 
construction of knowledge and practices of seeing, are central to my argument on 
institutional bodies. The chapter aims to show how the body is used to substantiate 
institutions and ideologies, and how social systems, systems of thought and 
institutional practices can be described as monstrous. In this sense, the Chapter will 
discuss whether Goya should be considered as an artist closer to the radical 
Enlightenment rather than the project of the moderate Enlightened reformers. 
1 See Glendinning in Goya and His Critics: `a model Romantic for the Romantics; an Impressionist for 
the Impressionists, Goya later became an Expressionist for the Expressionists and a forerunner of 
Surrealism for the Surrealists' (1977: 21). In his study, Glendinning masterly examines how different 
artistic movements have produced their own image of Goya, seeing him as a kindred spirit, and maps 
out `the major patterns in Goya criticism, chronologically and conceptually' (1977: 1). 
2 ` Pilgrimage with Goya', August 2000. 
3 
`Facing Goya', August 2000. 
4 See `The scientific and political reception of Goya since the 1930s' (Jutta Held, 1994: 249-253) for a 
review of key works in the interpretation of Goya's art. 
14 
5 In Structuralism and the Logic of Dissent (1989), Eve Tavor Bannet uses these words to describe the 
work of French post-structuralists Barthes, Derrida, Foucault and Lacan (1989: 1-11). 
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Chapter 1 
Historical Dimension of Monstrosity: The Textual Generation of 
the Monstrous 
Introduction 
This chapter traces the various historical manifestations of the monstrous across different 
discourses. Physical, religious, moral, political, medical monsters will parade throughout the 
following pages. My aim is to look at discourses on monstrosity in order to identify the historical 
context out of which a particular meaning of the monstrous emerges. The historical dimension of 
this chapter ranges from medieval considerations of the monster in bestiaries and theological works 
to eighteenth-century medical treatises on monstrous births and monstrous malformations. 
`Monsters', writes Margrit Shildrick, `show themselves in many different and culturally specific 
ways, but what is monstrous about them is most often the form of their embodiment' (2001: 9). The 
historical survey proposed in this chapter therefore shall be paying particular attention to monstrosity 
and corporeality; in other words, to how the wide and complex range of discourses of monstrosity 
relate to the body. Monsters, of course, are also an important part of our imaginary. Whether 
physical or metaphorical, the monster `came into focus against various orthodoxies at specific points 
in time and for specific reasons' (Curran, 2004: 245). My approach to monsters and monstrosity will 
therefore be sensitive to the movement of culture, that is, the transformation of the nature of social 
and cultural experience. The production of monsters interweaves a whole range of relations (social, 
material, cultural, textual). It is reconfigured in terms of its shifting relationship with the historically 
and culturally conditioned fears, anxieties and desires of the moment as well as of previous 
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moments. Always alive and returning to haunt us, `its contour could never be fully present except as 
the shadow of a "certain" monstrosity' (Derrida, 1995: 386). 
Questions that will concern me in the following pages are: how does our culture visualize the 
monstrous? How is it represented? Why do some images or objects act as representations of the 
monstrous, or why are some images, and not others, invested with monstrous qualities? Could 
images that in their extreme form warrant the label monstrous serve as an interpretative model for an 
understanding of how our culture is constructed? These general questions will enable me to engage 
in a more specific way with the historical period in which Goya produced Los Caprichos (Chapter 3) 
and with our cultural assumptions concerning the monstrous in this collection of etchings. My 
analyses of Los Caprichos in Chapters 4 and 5 will draw upon the different discourses on monsters 
and monstrosity examined in this first chapter. 
Monsters tend to appear at times of crisis and uncertainty. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen's Monster 
Theory (1996) reflects on this particular feature: `because of its ontological liminality, the monster 
appears at times of crisis as a kind of third term that problematizes the clash of extremes' (1996: 6). 
More recent studies on the subject of monstrosity emphasize this aspect: for instance, in Embodying 
the Monster. Encounters with the Vulnerable Self (2001), Margrit Shildrick observes that `a 
preoccupation with the monstrous seems to be a regular feature of periods of social and political 
uncertainty' (2001: 20); Laura Lunger Knoppers and Joan B. Landes in their edited collection 
Monstrous Bodies / Political Monstrosities in Early Modern Europe (2004), which charts the 
relationship between monsters, religious strife and political instability, note that monsters `reflect the 
felt upheaval and disorder of political revolution' (2004: 13). As I shall be arguing in subsequent 
chapters, the year in which Los Caprichos were published, 1799, came at the end of a decade of 
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political and social unrest. The French Revolution and its aftermath had immediate political and 
religious consequences in Spain, contributing to the polarization of contesting ideologies. The long 
eighteenth-century is also witness to a shift between paradigms of knowledge concerning science, 
religion, political ideology, and social organization. 
The chapter is organized as follows: it opens with an etymological note that establishes the 
semantic possibilities offered by the term that concerns us. Then I shall frame the textual generation 
of the monstrous as a movement from a narrative of the marvelous to a narrative of the deviant. 
Monstrare and monere 
Etymologically, the word monster is traditionally linked with two semantic fields: to show 
and to warn. In both cases, it discloses a pre-inscribed meaning. The Latin monstrare (to show, to 
display, to make known) sets before the beholder's eyes a being or thing to be seen 
-a prodigy, a 
marvel, a deformation, a hybrid, a monstrous example. The latter inform and instruct about nature's 
disorders: abnormal births, abnormal formations or unnatural conceptions relate with the idea of 
norm as departures from it. Its other meaning derives from the Latin verb monere (to warn, to 
admonish). The monster is a divine sign prophesying disasters. Endowed with religious 
connotations, it reveals the will of God. The monster as omen, divine portent or sign of God's 
displeasure will be used and reused in times of religious and political crisis across the centuries, as 
we shall see. An earthquake that shook the Iberian peninsula in 1755 provides us with an example in 
which the `monster' retains this religious meaning. On 1st November 1755 an earthquake destroyed 
the Portuguese city of Lisbon, affecting also some regions of the South of the Iberian Peninsula, in 
particular Seville. On such a commemorative Christian date, All Saints' Day, the local religious 
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authorities interpreted the earthquake as God's punishment and soon organized processions to ask for 
His forgiveness. For the canon Francisco Jose Olazäbal y Olaysola it was a `signo de la ira de Dios' 
(Sanchez-Blanco, 1999: 248) unleashed by the `inmoralidad de los hombres' (1999: 246). In 
eighteenth-century Catholic Spain such supernatural explanations were hardly contested, only a few 
voices attempted to explain the disaster in terms of natural causes. Medical and literary academies, 
as well as contemporary journals, accounted for the earthquake within a secular, rather than 
theological, framework (see ` El terremoto de 1755', Sanchez-Blanco (1999: 241-269)). The survival 
of early meanings attributed to the figure of the monster and of supernatural interpretations will be 
crucial for my discussion of the monstrous in Los Caprichos. 
The first attitudes towards monsters in the works of classical authorities 
- 
Aristotle, Cicero, 
Pliny, Augustine, Herodotus, Isidore of Seville, Solinus 
- 
are referred to in any popular or learned 
text that took monstrous births, prodigious events or related natural phenomena into consideration 
throughout the Middle Ages and the early modern period. The writings of Aristotle on generation as 
a whole and on the physiology of monsters in particular represent a first strain. Religious, 
philosophical and medical treatises relied on Aristotle's auctoritas and, as will be argued later in this 
chapter, the implications of his body of scientific writing were still being accepted by eighteenth-and 
nineteenth-century medicine. Cicero, Augustine and Isidore considered monsters as portents and 
divine signs intended for man's good. In De Divinatione Cicero establishes `monstra', `ostenta', 
`portenta' and `prodigia' as synonyms; what Cicero `firmly marks out', however, is `the tragedy of 
the monstrous as a supranatural signifier of coming social and political calamities, or as a 
commentary on contemporary mores' (Shildrich, 2001: 12). The earthquake of 1755, to which I 
referred above, can be understood within this tradition. In Isidore of Seville's Etymologies 
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XI), nature is controlled by the divine will and the whole of creation is a source of wonderment, a 
manifestation of the variety of creation: `portents are those things that are seen to be born against 
nature. But they are not against nature, because they are made by divine will, since the will of the 
Creator is the nature of everything made. [... ] But portents, wonders (ostenta), monsters (monstra), 
and prodigies are named such because they are seen to portend, display (ostendere), show 
(monstrare), and predict (praedicare) some future things' (cited in Wigginton and Stephen, 1989: 75). 
According to Isidore of Seville, monsters are designed and produced by God to show the future. 
Isidore's remarks on the word monstrum bring in the third traditional interpretation of monsters in 
the ancient, medieval and early modern period. The monster as an inhabitant of exotic places in 
African and Indian lands (Gigantes, Sciopods, Amazons, Cyclopes, or Blemmyae amongst others) is 
reported in the cosmographical and anthropological works of Pliny, Herodotus and Solinus and, later 
on, in the narrations of the discoveries in the New World by Western European travelers. In other 
words, alien races as the `monstrous other' (fig. 2). 1 The tradition of bestiaries also captured the 
Medieval popular imagination. These texts displayed monstrous races, hybrid creatures and, above 
all, animals, and invested them with allegorical meaning in order to instruct the Medieval man. 
Goya's bestiary, as we shall see in Chapter 4, engages with the didactic role of such catalogues of 
monsters by, on the one hand, drawing on popular representations of monsters, and, on the other, 
drawing attention to the epistemological and metaphysical questions posed by this monstrous 
imagery. These traditions provided both the stock of teratological iconography and the teratological 
and etiological interpretative stances that will appear and reappear in the centuries to come. 
From classical antiquity to what Foucault has defined as the (French) Classical Age, 2 the 
monstrous has been considered as a departure from the norm, a deviation from the normal type. 
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Siding with abnormality, dissimilarity, it calls for an understanding of what is normal. `Like 
produces like' is Aristotle's claim in Generation of Animals: a variation or a deficiency (excess or 
defect) was traditionally taken as an example of instructive hybridization or as an example of 
misleading likeness `by presenting similarities to categories of beings to which they are not related' 
(Huet, 1993: 5). As Shildrick has observed, `the traditional characterization of monstrosity in terms 
of excess, duplicity or displacement suggests not only bodily imperfection, but an improper being' 
(2001: 12). This crossing over from the physical to the moral will retain its classical significance 
well into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as I shall argue in Chapter 4 in relation to the 
science of physiognomics. Monsters blur the differences between genres, defying any classification 
and disrupting the strict order of Nature. The hybrid is the result of the intermixture of dissimilar 
beings, its unclassifiability unsettles any established taxonomy and has further implications for the 
structuration of identities and for the regulation of (symbolic) order. In this way, the monstrous 
confounds any definitive etymology; the monster becomes a sign of a will to pervert the divine order 
of things, to depart from divine precepts. Within classical and Medieval thought, a consideration of 
the etymologies of names was the key to their nature: `Etymology [... ] could reveal hidden meanings 
that might elude someone who merely looked at the object named' (Friedman, 1981: 110). 
A false likeness, according to Marie Helene Huet, demonstrates a relationship among the 
monstrous, resemblance and imagination. This `false resemblance' shows a monstrous progeny that 
results from disorder of the maternal imagination, a line of thought present within debates on 
imaginationism from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment. 3 Such debates need to be seen within a 
wider discussion on monstrous births centering around theories of preformationism and epigenesis, 
which took place in the French Academie Royale des Sciences during the first half of the eighteenth 
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century. Preformationists like Malebranche, Senebier, Spallanzani, Haller and Bonnet believed that 
living beings were created at the beginning of time by God, whereas defenders of epigenesis, like 
Fontana, Buffon, and Maupertuis, argued that living beings developed from an undifferentiated mass 
of matter into organs, and eventually, into a structure. Debates on monstrosity were considered 
within a theological frame since the main question was to explain monstrous births and 
malformations within a God-given universe. But let us briefly return to imaginationism. 
Imaginationists argued that, if the pregnant woman was affected or in some way "impressed" by an 
image or an object, imagination had the power to give shape to the foetus and even to imprint images 
on it. Considered among the causes of monstrosity, the power of imagination in pregnant women 
could provoke a deformity and play a role in the formation of monstrosities. The monstrous is 
identified with women or their sexuality (inner monstrosity, female organs) 
- 
the monstrous- 
feminine. In other words, the female regarded as another departure from the norm, as Aristotle wrote 
in Generation of Animals. In the passage on resemblance to parents and forebears, Aristotle writes: 
`anyone who does not take after the parents is really in a way a monstrosity, since in these cases 
Nature has in a way strayed from the generic type. The first beginning of this deviation is when a 
female is formed instead of a male [... ]' (1984: 401). 
The movement from monsters as prodigies to monsters as instances of medical pathology is 
Katharine Park's and Lorraine J. Daston's object of analysis in their now classical `Unnatural 
Conceptions: the Study of Monsters in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century France and England' 
(1981). Park and Daston argue that there is a long written tradition on the subject of monsters 
present in classical treatises, Medieval bestiaries and cosmographies, Renaissance wonder books and 
medical dissertations, until gradually the monster becomes an example of medical pathology. Park 
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and Daston consider these works on monstrous births as a case-study to describe some of the social 
and cultural changes in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe, especially `the "withdrawal" of 
high from popular culture', the gap opening between literate culture and traditional culture. It is their 
contention that the sharpening of social boundaries between city dwellers and peasants, between the 
illiterate and the learned, and the change in interpretation with regard to monstrous manifestations 
- 
`the emphasis shifted from final causes (divine will) to proximate ones (physical explanations and 
the natural order)' (1981: 35) 
- 
gave rise to a new, civil ideal of culture detached from the ignorance 
and superstition of the folk. During the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, monsters present in 
prodigy books, wonder books and popular forms of literature were associated with religion and 
pleasurable reading. They were part of a shared culture of common concerns and assumptions. But, 
by the end of the seventeenth century, the urban literate laymen included the social and sociable use 
of monsters as part of their education. Monsters became progressively one of the subjects of 
discussion of scientific societies4 and, eventually, the monstrous was approached in a medical light. 
Nonetheless, during this period the word `monster' retained the proto-scientific Aristotelian views on 
terata, the Augustinian tradition of the prodigy and its religious connotations continued, and the 
Plinian myths of the monstrous races `provided a familiar way of looking at the native people of the 
New World' (Friedman, 1981: 207). Indeed, during the early modern period the myths of the 
monstrous races `were too vital to be discarded' (1981: 207) because of their religious, moral, and 
political implications. The various attitudes toward monsters and interpretations of the monstrous 
intertwined, forming much more of a continuum, and prompting mixed responses at the same time: 
both repugnance and fascination, pleasure and horror, desire and repulsion. That was, is, and will be 
the lore of monsters. It could be said that awe, curiosity, entertainment, knowledge responded to a 
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similar attitude of mind. 
Park's and Daston's thesis has been criticized subsequently on the grounds that their 
progressive rationalization and naturalization of monstrosity offered a `secularizing teleology': `the 
progressive narrative, in which the monstrous moves from portent to science, undervalues the 
political, polemical, and juridical uses of monstrous imagery through the early modern period' 
(Knoppers and Landes, 2004: 8). 5 A second criticism leveled against Park's and Daston's study of 
monstrosity is that `they make only passing reference to its manifestation in popular culture' 
(Semonin, 1996: 71). The display of monsters in the marketplace was for religious purposes, but 
also as commercial display to curiosity seekers: `within the popular mind [... ] monsters were actors 
in a drama, rather than merely symbols of God's wrath or specimens of scientific interest' (Semonin, 
1996: 71). I shall be returning to the popular lore of monsters in my analysis of Goya's prints. In 
"`No Monsters at the Resurrection": Inside Some Conjoined Twins' (1996), Stephen Pender 
criticizes Park and Daston along the same lines since they `fail to take account of the complex, 
conflictual status of the monstrous in the early modern period [... ] There appears to be a more fluid 
interchange between the portentous and the anomalous' (1996: 145). By the end of the eighteenth 
century, it can be argued that the monstrous figures populating Los Caprichos `served for the 
judgment of cultivated and uncultivated alike, of the micromegalic abnormalities of gigantic excess 
and dwarfish deficiency rampant in Spanish society' (Stafford, 1997: 73). 
The writings on the monstrous and the reception of the monstrous, from Ambroise Pard's Des 
Monstres et Prodiges (1573) to the marketplace, from its recording in encyclopedias to its display in 
cabinets of curiosities or wunderkammern are witness to the impossibility of containing it in any 
conceptual system. The works of the surgeons Ambroise Pard and Fortunius Liceti (De Monstrorum 
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Caussis, Natura et Differentiis (1616)), could hardly be distinguished from the prodigy books of 
Pierre Boaistuau (Histoires Prodigieuses (1560) or Konrad Lycosthenes (Prodigiorum Liber (1557)), 
the historical account of Ulisse Aldrivandi (The History of Monsters (1642)), 6 or from books on 
natural wonders like that of Lemnis, De miraculis occultis naturae (1559). Although these monster 
books positioned `monstrosity within a familiar network of epistemic associations 
-mythological, 
classical, biblical, medical and symbolic' (Shildrick, 2001: 13), they also posed interesting questions 
regarding classical considerations of monstrosity, since, as Cohen has pointed out, "`wonder books" 
radically undermine the Aristotelian taxonomic system, for by refusing an easy compartmentalization 
of their monstrous contents, they demand a radical rethinking of boundary and normality' (1996: 6). 
Pare's Des Monstres et Prodiges serves here as an example. The French surgeon enumerates 
the causes of monstrous births; among the thirteen he lists are the traditional explanation of God's 
will and man's sins to demonstrate the anger and glory of God, a reference to the doctrine of the 
disorder of the maternal imagination, and more physiological explanations such as too great or too 
small a quantity of semen or hereditary diseases; he also posits, following Aristotle, three major 
categories of monstrosities: anomalies of excess, of default, and duplicity. According to Jean Ceard 
(1971), Pare's is the most sustained attempt to "naturalize" monsters during the sixteenth century. 
However, in the words of Thompson, the treatise `straddles the seam between wonder and error, 
between marvelous and medicalized narratives of the anomalous body' (1996: 3). Medicine, albeit 
in its primitive forms, had already approached the monstrous. 7 Traces of the development of the 
naturalization of the monster are to be seen in the inclusion of clinical descriptions of monstrous 
births, though these coexist with natural wonders and supernatural cases. The natural, the 
supernatural, and the medical partake of the same cultural milieu. The early seventeenth century sees 
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the English natural historian Francis Bacon willing to distinguish between marvels of natural and 
supernatural origin within a naturalist framework. By rejecting supernatural explanations and 
questioning popular superstitions, the Baconian scientific programme affirms that all phenomena, 
including monsters, were natural. They belonged to one of Nature's states, the preternatural. 8 
Monsters entered into the tripartite Baconian division of natural history as part of the history of 
nature erring. In the context of the Spanish Enlightenment, the Benedictine monk Benito Jeronimo 
Feijoo was the major introducer of the Baconian method in Spain; as he writes in `Scepticismo 
filosöfico' (1769): `I do not know, nor can anyone know without revelation, the precise limitation of 
human understanding with regard to natural things [... ] What I believe is that if such things can be 
known, it is most likely that this knowledge may be gained through use of Bacon's method and 
system' (cited in Haidt, 1998: 44). 
The meaning of monsters was, as Pender evinces, `subject to a dialectical understanding: the 
dynamic attempt to naturalize the monster through the discourses of science ran parallel to, and in 
some instances ratified, the continued proliferation of accounts of terata as miraculous, strange, and 
portentous' (1996: 146). Investigation and exhibition, dissection and display went hand in hand; 
monstrous births and human deformity were driven by the same force, common to the medical 
community and among people: (sanctioned) curiosity. Part of a similar attitude of mind, `the 
marvelous and the scientific coexisted in the reception and study of monsters and continued to do so 
long after the monster's absorption by "legitimate" scientific discourses in the eighteenth century' 
(1996: 150). Like the monster books of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries, the collection of 
etchings Los Caprichos defies easy categorization and demands that we pay attention to a whole 
range of epistemic associations related to the figure of the monster. 
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The teratological tradition in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spain is represented by 
Jose de Rivilla Bonet y Pueyo's Desvios de la Naturaleza o Tratado del origen de los monstruos 
(1695), Pedro Cachapero de Arevalo, whose El maestro Pedro Cachapero de Arevalo [... Ja los muy 
insignes y sapientisimos doctores medicos, ya los ejercitantisimos medicos vulnerianos, y curiosos 
cirujanos (1610) contains examples of monstrous pathologies, and the volume Colecciön de laminas 
que representan los animales y monstruos del Real Gabinete de Historia Natural, con una 
descripciön individual de cada una (1784-86) by Juan de Bru de Ramön y Parra (1740-1799), with 
which eighteenth-century Spanish engravers would have been familiar. In spite of the scarcity of 
prints representing monsters in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spain, accounts of human 
monsters demonstrate a comparable attitude to that of other European countries: `aunque a veces se 
estudiaban bajo supuestos cientificos, tambien se presentaban al püblico como curiosidades' (Carrete 
Parrondo, 1996: 65). 9 According to Henry Ettinghausen, Spanish seventeenth- and eighteenth- 
century relations on monsters could be roughly grouped into three main types: human monsters 
(monstrous births, congenital malformations), fabulous creatures (hybrid creatures or bizarre human 
physical deformations), and allegorical monsters ('composite figures endowed with a moral or a 
political meaning' (1996: 127)). Such prints were still popular during the eighteenth-century, as we 
shall see in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 where my analysis of some caprichos shows how Goya re- 
appropriated this tradition. The print revolution facilitated `the dissemination of the monstrous - not 
merely as text but as printed image' (Knoppers and Landes, 2004: 9). Let us consider two relations 
which circulated in Spain during the early modern period, 10 Relaciön verdadera de un parto 
monstruoso en la Ciudad de Tortosa (1634) (fig. 3) and Nino monstruoso, que naci6 en la Ciudad de 
Cadiz, el dia 25 de Noviembre de 1767 (fig. 4). 11 The former, a relation on Siamese twins written by 
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a Miguel Sorolla, includes a detailed anatomical description of the bodies (external, `descripciön de la 
parte de delante, ' `descripciön de la parte de las espaldas; ' and internal, `descripciön interior') as 
well as factual information concerning the parents, their place of origin and a record of the actual 
circumstances sorrounding the birth: `aviendo cofessado y comulgado, le tomaron dolores de parto 
entre las diez y las once del dia, ya los tres quartos para las doze pariö la criatura' (1993: 131-32). 
In the words of Miguel Sorolla, the anatomical examination was undertaken two days later under the 
supervision of two doctors, a surgeon, and a notary who were all witnesses to `este prodigio de 
naturaleza'. And he ends with a note accounting for the popularity of the monster: Tue tan grande el 
concurso de la gente que'acudio ä verle, que son pocos los de esta Ciudad que no le ayan visto' 
(1993: 131-32). More than a century later, on 25 November 1767, a monstrous birth is reported in 
Cadiz. The relation contains a thorough description of all the external parts of the deformed body; 
the text that accompanies the illustration relies on common objects and plain, vivid language to 
convey the physical organization of this anomalous body: `En el ojo derecho se le apercibe una 
Eminencia, de la que sale una cuerda ä manera de latigo'; `En el sitio del Brazo Derecho, tiene una 
Eminencia, como dos dedos de ancho, y quatro de largo, la qual estä unida ä el ojo del mismo lado; 
de la parte media de esta Eminencia le sale otra parecida al huevo de una paloma'. The monstrous 
child was baptised, as were the twins, before dying seven hours later. The body, we are told, was 
kept in the hospital of Cadiz (1993: 131-32). 
Naturalization of the monster 
Georges Canguilhem ('La monstruositd et le monstrueux', 1962) and Marie H61ene Huet 
(Monstrous Imagination, 1995) trace the naturalization of the monster to the eighteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries within the framework of modem science and rational thought. The `monstrous' 
had to be brought into relation with a type of discourse which was already, in some sense, natural 
and legible. For Jonathan Culler, "`naturalization" emphasizes the fact that the strange or deviant is 
brought within a discursive order and thus made to seem natural' (1989: 137). 12 The `monstrous' is 
given a place within modern science, within the scientist's laboratory. By being recognized and 
named, the monster is included in a system. Park and Daston refer to the naturalization of the 
monster in these terms: `[drawing] upon an established medical tradition of compiling anomalies as 
the basis for comparative investigations, they [the scientists] approached monsters as special cases in 
the established fields of comparative anatomy and embryology rather than as items in a 
heterogeneous category composed solely of anomalies' (1981: 52). In this way, the irregular submits 
to the rule, it submits to Reason. This intention to organize the monstrous and to integrate it into the 
medical disciplines and the programmes of academies, regarding it as an object of classification 
subject to the `familiar' order of things, is what I mean by naturalization. First biology and 
comparative analysis, and later on teratogeny 
- 
the systematic production of monsters in the 
laboratory-, and teratology 
- 
an attempt to classify all monstrosities 
- 
gave birth to a science of 
monsters. 13 Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772-1844), his son Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 
(1805-1861) and Camille Dareste (1822-1899) made of the monster their object of enquiry and their 
scientific instrument. The Saint-Hilaires were searching for evidence of ideal patterns imposed on 
nature by some superior creative force, they were looking for `the essence of things' that would 
reveal the system, the constant and general order of phenomena in nature, in their belief that mankind 
will eventually know and understand everything. Monsters were anomalies used for comparative 
purposes, and were considered counter-examples to normal embryological development. 14 Their 
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observation would shed light on normal anatomy and physiology, helping to classify constant 
relationships methodologically and to discern the orderly interplay of familiar norms. The 
taxonomical delimitation and determination of anomalous structures pointed towards the 
establishment of a scientific pathology, whereby hybridity is transformed into anomaly, the monster 
being an instance, a specimen that falls within the authoritative logic of medical discourse on the 
normal and the pathological. In our historical survey of monsters, the work of Canguilhem alerts us 
that the eighteenth-century established a new relation between monstrosity and normalcy: 
By identifying normalcy and normalization as the polemical or ideological byproducts of 
monstrosity, Canguilhem prompted scholars working in intellectual history and the history of 
science to complicate the narrative charting the supposedly neutral or positive movement of 
monstrosity's rationalization henceforth this story would have to include the possibility that 
monstrosity functioned didactically, teaching us who we should be. (Curran, 2004: 234). 
As Canguilhem points out, the same historical period, which, according to Foucault, 
naturalized madness, set itself to naturalizing monsters. "A foil for the norm" was Georges 
Canguilhem's definition of the monster in reference to the embryologist's jar in `Monstrosity and the 
Monstrous' (1962). In the same way that in the nineteenth century the madman was kept in the 
asylum as a foil for reason and observation, the monster was kept in the embryologist's jar ready to 
be dissected in order to shed light on more regular structures. And it is Foucault who, in Histoire de 
lafolie, writes: `until the beginning of the nineteenth century, (... ) madmen remained monsters - that 
is, etymologically, beings or things to be shown' (1965: 70). Two institutions, the hospital and the 
pedagogical institution, expressed a demand for rationalization and normativization. Both 
naturalized the term `normal' and opposed it to `unreason', be it in the form of the insane or the 
deviant. The Enlightenment's rationalist philosophy and physiology naturalized and normativized 
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the monster in an effort to make transparent this anomalous creation of nature as a variation of 
nature's recognizable laws. Thus naturalization is related to modes of discourse already available 
within culture whereas the concept of normativization refers to the prototypes (the scholastic 
prototype and the state of organic health) established by these same institutions. I shall be returning 
to Foucault's work in Chapter 2. For the time being, his work enables me here, firstly, to address a 
shift regarding the concept of monstrosity, and, secondly, to start seeing how monstrosity and 
corporeality can be thought together. In a series of lectures entitled `Les anormaux' (Cours au 
College de France, 1974-75), Foucault mapped the notion of monstrosity and argued that throughout 
history there have been changes in the locus of monstrosity: for the medieval mind the monster was 
the madman, while, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, conjoined twins came to occupy 
this locus, which was to be occupied by the hermaphrodite in the Age of Enlightenment. Foucault's 
work on `Les anormaux' provides therefore another dimension to my narrative on monsters and 
monstrosity 
- 
monsters and monstrosity as a conceptual locus. As for the relationship between 
monstrosity and corporeality, I shall be arguing that `in line with Foucault's concept of an emergent 
norm for the human body itself, monstrous difference became more regularly defined as deviant - 
abnormal- rather than as wholly distinctive' (Shildrick, 2001: 20). The theoretical implications of 
Foucault's study will be fully examined in the following chapter. Through his work, as well as that 
of Canguilhem and Derrida, we shall learn how knowledge of monsters is constructed through a 
double bind: contained within reason, the monster is indivisibly bound to the object of enquiry; yet 
the monster, the unclassifiable `other, ' is set up to be excluded. 
... 
produce monstruos 
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`El sueno de la razön produce monstruos' is invoked by the historian of science Georges 
Canguilhem in his article `La monstruosite et le monstrueux': 
One repeats with Goya: "The sleep of reason gives birth to monsters, " without asking 
sufficiently, precisely on consideration of Goya's work, whether by giving birth he meant 
engendering monsters or bearing them 
- 
put differently, whether the sleep of reason might not 
be the liberator rather than the generator of monsters. (1962: 34) 
The invocation of Goya in this article is part of the historian of science's tracing of the relationship 
between monstrosity and the monstrous from Classical Antiquity and the Middle Ages through the 
first works on teratology to contemporary science. A summary of his article will help us to recap the 
different discourses on monstrosity identified in the previous pages. According to Canguilhem, 
`monster' is a term reserved for organic beings; as a living being, a monster was the effect of the 
infraction of specific sexual segregation as well as a sign of the will to pervert the tableau of living 
creatures. Purity and perversion were part of the Medieval bond between teratology and 
demonology, `the consequence of the persistent dualism of Christian theology' (1962: 31). During 
the classical and Medieval periods, monstrosity is the effect of the monstrous, and `both concepts are 
at the service of two normative judgments, the medical and the legal' (1962: 30). Then the 
monstrous came progressively to be considered as a category of the imagination, more specifically, 
of the maternal imagination capable of rendering monstrous beings. In addition to the transformation 
of women into monsters according to Aristotelian principles, the Renaissance also blamed women 
for the production of monsters through their passions and desires. The first treatises on teratology 
juxtaposed monstrosity and the monstrous; it is the century of positivism that brings with it the 
scientific explanation of monstrosity and the reduction of the monstrous. The monstrous `points out 
the weakness or failure of reason' (1962: 35); whether reason produces monsters when asleep or 
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when dreaming, as the etching's caption ambivalently suggests, Canguilhem's invocation of Goya 
arguably refers to the nature of reason. 
One repeats with Goya: `El sueno de la razön produce monstruos' (The Sleep/Dream of 
Reason Produces Monsters). Capricho 43 (fig. 1) is open to a myriad of interpretations that will be 
taken into consideration at different stages of my study. Let us make a first interpretative move by 
focusing on the etching on a textual level, in particular the words `produce monstruos'. In the pre- 
scientific age, as I argued in the opening pages of this chapter, the appearance of monsters was an act 
of God; God was posited as the centre and cause of all things. The pre-modern mindset understood 
monsters as phenomena to be considered and, ultimately, interpreted as the will of God. This 
interpretation of monsters was in accordance with the early Christian and Medieval sense of 
establishing knowledge, namely to establish knowledge was to reveal the divine to humans as 
pertaining to their existence and the world. Thus monsters, by nature revelatory, an act of God, were 
created to illustrate by contradistinction the very perfection of the norm. Not only monsters, but also 
marvels and prodigies revealed the omnipotence of God whether they demonstrated His benevolence 
or His wrath. Either way they were signs read as divine communication. Monsters, marvels and 
prodigies acted therefore as signs of God's affiliation with the created world. 
The age of the sign, essentially theological, persists under the guise of scientific discourse. 
This dualistic system based on the supposed primeval conflict between light and darkness, good and 
evil, reappears in the form of rationalism and irrationalism in the age of the Enlightenment. In the 
modern age, the age of mechanical reproduction to use Walter Benjamin's expression in `The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' (1936), monsters are produced. From the eighteenth 
century onwards, human thought becomes the centre and cause of all things. The term `production' 
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understood as a productive, practical activity expresses man's essence; human production holds the 
centre of human life and social reality. Human thought (rationality), the modern, rational mind, 
produces knowledge and, by extension, bodies of knowledge, as I shall be arguing in Chapter 2. In 
the scientific age, monsters are stripped of any religious connotation and become a medical concept. 
The science of teratogeny is a prime example of the rational mind at work: the production of 
monsters in laboratories created a body of knowledge that allowed modern science to observe and 
shed light on normal anatomy, embryology and physiology. The techniques and practices through 
which the monstrous was known and treated helped in an understanding of the normal terrain of 
social and medical life. The following words by Etienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire illustrate the 
scientific re-appropiation of monstrosity: `monsters have their usefulness: they are means of study 
for our intellects' (cited in Huet, 1995: 126). Monsters are instruments for analyzing ideas and 
theories such as the eighteenth-century ideology of hereditary transmission, and are useful in order to 
conceive of the continuity of the universe. Nature ordains a place for monsters in her all-embracing 
scheme. Hence they are part of the greater scheme of things, of the Great Chain of Being. As the 
creation of an all-knowing maternal nature, the Chain of Being not only allowed for unexplainable 
differences but also required them to be accepted as part of nature's immutable plan. This 
underlying belief implied that the infinitesimal differences amongst beings would not allow for a 
clear definition of what could be labeled monstrous, that would contest the possibility of defining a 
being as monstrous. The idea of the Great Chain of Being withdrew from man the notion that 
monsters existed in contradistinction to him as his binary opposite. If man differed from the nearest 
so-called non-human species, his position as the `middle-link' in the chain 
- 
the point of transition 
from merely sentient beings to intellectual forms of being 
- 
had an effect upon man's conception of 
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himself. The belief that all creatures existed solely for man's sake was no longer valid within the 
philosophy of the Chain of Being; the relativeness of man's place and purpose within the Chain as 
well as the precept of the immutable Chain of Being, where every individual's place within it is fixed 
forever, was at odds with man's freedom and his desire to identify, name and rationalize things. If 
the place occupied by a being within the Chain has been allocated in accordance with some greater, 
perfect scheme, only excess(ive pride) would lead to any attempt at transcending such an order. A 
logical and tragic paradox repeated time and again in the history of Western reason. As the ` middle- 
link', man is `in a sense in which no other chain in the link is, a strange hybrid monster' (Lovejoy, 
1985: 199), for the universal scheme of things places him as a member of two orders of being at 
once, and he is not quite at home in either. 
Monsters, then, bear human knowledge. The monstrous is brought under the control of 
reason, reason colonizes the monstrous. Once the monstrous is domesticated by science, it becomes 
fully visible and, as presence, its meaning becomes wholly present. Empirical definitions relied 
mostly on visual observation, hence the preeminence of the etymology monstrare (to show) during 
the Enlightenment. Scientific observation and interpretation as well as general visual definitions 
reduce monsters to indexes of the order of things. This vision produced by science led to the 
construction and maintenance of boundaries for what may count as normal and deviant, and 
solidified cultural definitions of normalcy and superiority. Projecting ourselves to the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, the impossible paradigm of normalcy still persists, arguably, in the science of 
genetics, in particular in the Human Genome Project. As Leslie A. Fiedler observes in his article 
`The Tyranny of the Normal', `the whole therapeutic activity is haunted by the ghosts of those two- 
headed, three-legged, one-eyed chicks that the first scientific teratologists of the eighteenth-century 
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created and destroyed in their laboratories' (1985: 157). In 1844 the French illustrator Jean-Ignace 
Grandville, after visiting the comparative anatomy displays available to the public at the Jardin des 
Plantes in Paris, playfully depicted impossible hybrid creatures from the animal kingdom in `The 
pursuit' (fig. 5), an engraving inspired by the teratologists' experimentations. Grandville's print was 
engaging, at the same time, with representations of hybrid creatures in bestiaries, wonder books and, 
no doubt, with the monstrous creatures etched by Goya in Los Caprichos. 
`El sueflo de la razön produce monstrous' : Engendering? Bearing? Producing. What type of 
monsters? Physical monsters? Mental monsters? Social, political, moral monsters when reason is 
asleep? Monsters generated by the artist's imagination? No longer is monstrosity read as a divine 
sign, literally or allegorically, nor as a figure symbolizing the Manichaean understanding of the 
world, nor solely as the literal fact waiting to be dissected by the medical gaze. The fascination and 
the obsession with literal, physical and allegorical monstrosity gave way to a more complex 
conception of monstrosity. All the above traditions bear upon each other to produce or image forth 
those disturbingly ambiguous figures that populate Goya's teratology. Producing his work in the 
second half of the eighteenth century and in the early nineteenth century, Goya engaged with a whole 
panoply of monsters. For, as Curran and Graille have noted on eighteenth-century discourses and 
imagery on the monster: the monster is `a fluctuating beast, a hybrid occupying an ambiguous 
position in Enlightenment thought somewhere between the limits of empirical knowledge and the 
territory of fantasy' (1997: 4). 
Conclusion 
My aim in this chapter has been to frame the textual generation of the monster as a 
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`movement from a narrative of the marvelous to a narrative of the deviant', 15 from the classical 
explanations of Aristotle, Pliny and Augustine for the different origins of monsters to the scientific 
treatment of monsters in the eighteenth century. Within the discursive practices of academic 
disciplines and modem science `wonder becomes error' (Thomson, 1996: 3). However, as I argued, 
early considerations of monsters and beliefs on the monstrous run parallel to this `secularizing 
teleology'. The monster appears in a myriad of contexts: moral discourses, religious polemic, 
superstitious beliefs. Indeed, `what seems to be a simple narrative of progressively more rational 
approaches to the issue of monstrous forms obscures a far more complex process of contestation in 
which a whole range of modernist parameters of knowledge 
- 
truth and fiction, self and other, inner 
and outer, normal and abnormal are at stake' (Shildrick, 2001: 27). 
Avoiding a historicization of the concepts of the normal and the monstrous that would derive 
from the present moment of historical enunciation and would bear the indelible trace of present value 
judgments, my study will concentrate on the historical context out of which a particular naming of 
the monstrous emerges. The period of concern is eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Spain, 
particularly the years spanning the production and publication of Goya's Los Caprichos. Goya's 
semantics of the body in the hybrid creatures and distorted figures of Los Caprichos is inscribed with 
political, religious, moral and cultural meanings, displaying `the whole gamut of monsters available 
to the Enlightenment' (Stafford, 1997: 272). The comprehensive picture posited by the 
Enlightenment seems to me to be contested through the Goyesque vision; a vision that might provide 
an understanding of Spanish Enlightenment, and of the way in which body-images can be studied as 
a vehicle for the transmission of ideas. Goya's work will be read against contemporary discourses in 
order to understand the monster `as an embodiment of a certain cultural moment' (Cohen, 1996: 4). 
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I For a study of the tradition of monstrous races in the Medieval world and the way in which Western Christian thinkers 
came to terms with the questions beings posed about the nature of monstrosity, see John Friedman's seminal work The 
Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought (1981). 
2 In temporal terms, the `Classical Age' could be said to refer to the seventeenth century and part of the eighteenth 
century. 
3 See Huet's Monstrous Imagination (1993: 39-45) and Stafford's Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment 
Art and Medicine (1991: 211-279) for a discussion of epigenesis and preformationism. 
4 The French Bureau d'Adresse, the English Royal Society, the Athenian Society and, in a more professionalized and 
institutionalized manner, the Parisian Academic des Sciences. 
S In their 1998 Wonders and the Order of Nature (1150-1750) Park and Daston revisit their thesis by positing `three 
separate complexes 
-horror, pleasure, and repugnance- and attempt to address the ways in which cognitive and 
emotional response to anomalous births overlapped and coexisted within the early modem period' (Knoppers and 
Landes, 2004: 10). However, their story continues to be `tied to a progressive epistemological shift insofar as the 
supernatural is supplanted by the natural, and magical explanations give way to rational accounts' (2004: 11). 
6 Compiled and published posthumously in 1642 by Bartholomaeus Ambrosinus. 
7 See ` Monstrous Medicine' (Huet, 2004). 
8 The other two in the natural history of Bacon were the natural (species of things) and the artificial. For a further 
discussion of Bacon and the Baconian methodology, see Lorraine Daston (1991), Daston and Park (1981), and Pender 
(1996). 
9 In El Grabado. La estampa comp medio de comunicaci6n en la sociedad espannola (Madrid, 1984) and, more 
specifically, in 'Estampas fantästicas. Imägenes y descripciones de monstruos, ' Juan Carrete Parrondo (1993: 55-68) 
compiles a number of relations that circulated in Spain around this subject. 
10 `Las relaciones de sucesos son documentos que narran un acontecimiento ocurrido o, en algunas ocasiones 
inventado (pero verosimil), con el fin de informar, entretener y conmover al püblico 
-bien sea lector u oyente. 
Tratan de muy diversos temas: acontecimientos histörico-politicos (guerras, autos de fe 
... 
), sucesos monärquicos, 
fiestas religiosas o cortesanas, viajes, sucesos extraordinarios como catastrofes naturales, milagros, desgracias 
personales 
... 
' (see http: //rosalia. dc. fi. udc. esBORESU/Introduccion. html, accessed on 9/03/1999). 
11 These two relations are included within the category of human monsters in Henry Ettinghausen's article `The 
Illustrated Spanish News. Text and Image in the Seventeenth-Century Press' (1993). 
12 In Structuralist Poetics (1977), Culler defines the term naturalization in the context of structuralist writing and in 
particular in relation to a theory of genre. Recuperation, naturalization, motivation, vraisemblablisation enable the reader 
to interpret something by bringing it `within the modes of order which culture makes available, and this is usually done 
by talking about it in a mode of discourse which a culture takes as natural' (1977: 137). 
13 In `La logique du d6viant (Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire et la classification des monstres)', Patrick Tort traces the 
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birth and evolution of scientific teratology during the eighteenth century: 'La tdratologie d'Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 
se trouve en effet ä la convergence de nombreux discourses pratiques d'ordination et de reordination des connaissances 
positives et de l'investigation dans les sciences de la nature' (1980: 12). 
14 See Javier Moscoso, `Monsters as Evidence: The Uses of the Abnormal Body During the Early Eighteenth- 
Century' (1998: 355-382). 
15 In reference to what she defines as freak discourse, Thomson characterizes the freak discourse's genealogy in these 
terms in the introduction to Freakery. Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body (1996: 3). 
39 
Chapter 2 
Theoretical Dimension of Monstrosity: The Normal and the Monstrous 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the concept of monstrosity in its theoretical and visual 
manifestations, a preliminary move towards an exploration of the monstrous body in the Los 
Caprichos in Chapters 4 and 5. In order to establish the context of my own methodological 
approach in examining the concepts of monstrosity and the monstrous, I shall establish a dialogue 
between Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, philosophers who, through the 
interrogation of the binary normal / monstrous, put rational thought into question and challenge the 
Western metaphysical idea of pure vision. The intellectual exchange proposed here will be framed 
neither in terms of praise nor in terms of rivalry, but rather by establishing points of correspondence 
between their discourses. It is common knowledge that Canguilhem was Foucault's teacher as well 
as the official supervisor of Histoire de la folie for Foucault's doctorat d'etat, and that Derrida 
studied under Foucault, but my interest does not lie in drawing presumed influences. Georges 
Canguilhem's own criticism of precursors, the `virus of the precursor', in the history of sciences can 
be used here: 
A precursor, we are told, is a thinker or researcher who proceeded some distance along a path 
later explored all the way to its end by someone else. To look for, find and celebrate 
precursors is a sign of complacency and an unmistakable symptom of incompetence for 
epistemological criticism. Two itineraries cannot be compared unless the paths followed are 
truly the same. (1994: 49) 
This chapter will operate as a play of mirrors: the deflections, inflections and reflections of 
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the three philosophers' trajectories in play; it will explore the way in which theoretical encounters 
have reconfigured their respective enquiries into the normal and the pathological, the normal and the 
deviant, the normal and the monstrous. In the intersections created by these French philosophers, 
two different conceptions of monstrosity will be at stake. I will be forging a link between what I will 
refer to as the medicalization of the monster within the framework of modem science and rational 
thought as presented in the works of Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault, and a more abstract 
conception of monstrosity in the thought of Jacques Derrida. The former regard the monster through 
the reading grid of scientific disciplines such as biology and particular social practices like medicine; 
the latter's conceptual examination defines the monster as `that which appears for the first time and, 
consequently, is not yet recognized' (1995: 386). Dictionary definitions of the normal 
-'something 
that corresponds to what one has seen before' 
- 
obviously dwell on the idea of familiarity and 
recognition (normal is what is `usual, regular, common, typical'). 
This is what is reexamined in Derrida's thought: the familiar, the habitual, the usual; in other 
words, those received ideas that shape our vision and understanding of the world. Derrida's 
reexamination of familiar habits of thought, of `normal' habits of mind, within the Western 
metaphysical tradition draws attention to the procedures that legitimate a certain view of the world, 
of language, and of human communication. Derrida's project places in question a whole metaphysics 
which relies on conceptions of being as presence, and assimilates truth and reason to it; what Derrida 
calls a `metaphysics of presence' pervades Western philosophical discourse from Plato to Husserl. 
In what follows I shall be outlining some of Derrida's moves, since attempting a definition of 
deconstruction is not only beyond the scope of this chapter but would also be a delimiting, reductive 
gesture contrary to the Derridean enterprise. I will be drawing upon different deconstructive 
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strategies without ignoring their specific context of argument in order to map out ways in which 
Derridean thinking might contribute to an examination of certain crucial questions in the domain of 
the Spanish Enlightenment and, more specifically, through the incisive work of Goya, to further 
interrogate the tradition in which his artistic production was rooted. Without entirely breaking with 
the past, Goya forged a way forward to the new by transcending the aesthetic ideas of the age in 
which he lived. His art, whether as a designer of tapestries depicting Spanish national pastimes, as a 
portraitist of the court and its entourage, or as a cabinet painter, responded to the demands of his 
patrons while also exploring new forms of representation. Goya's extraordinary achievement lies not 
in the fact that he engraved and published Los Caprichos prints, which were the fruit of new ideas 
and a new aesthetic, but in that he imposed a boldly anti-academic, modem art upon the institutional 
conventions of his time. 
Displacing monstrosity 
The privilege of the voice over writing upon which traditional metaphysics founds itself 
reveals, for Derrida, a structure of opposition which is characteristic of the Western philosophical 
tradition. The relation between speech and writing as explored by Derrida in Of Grammatology 
(1967) prepares the ground for the deconstruction of other oppositions on which Western philosophy 
is constructed. In this tradition, the spoken sound has been identified with meaning and thought 
while the written sign, writing, has been considered useless and dangerous since it is just a mediating 
system that stands in for speech. The link between ideas and truth is ideally transparent in this model: 
the meaning of an utterance is self-present, simultaneous to the consciousness of the speaker. In the 
translator's preface, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak describes how Derrida relates phonocentrism to 
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logocentrism, `the belief that the first and last things are the Logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the 
infinite understanding of God, an infinite creative subjectivity, and, closer to our time, the self- 
presence or full self-consciousness', and the acceptance that `the evidence for this originary and 
teleologic presence has customarily been found in the voice, the phone' (1976: lxviii). 1 Speech is 
originary, self-present, authentic, full, natural; writing is secondary, supplementary, insincere, 
derivative, artificial. The value of self-presence as the paradigm of truth conceptually privileges the 
first term of the distinction between speech and writing, a conceptual privilege that can only be 
sustained by way of a violent exclusion of the second term. Such an exclusionary yet familiar 
founding gesture, Derrida writes, `naturally' structures all our thinking. The value and authority of 
metaphysical principles whereby a system of thought depends upon a primary principle is a product 
of a particular system of meaning and truth: meaning is only meaning through that which it displaces 
and excludes. 
Hierarchical dichotomies that establish the supremacy of one of the paired terms over the 
other 
- 
the high over the low, the inside over the outside, the visible over the invisible, reason over 
madness, the normal over the monstrous, the mind over the body 
- 
consistently devolve upon a logic 
of exclusion. In opposition to the ontological depth of the observer, the surveyed other is relegated 
to the status of the abject, simultaneously branded and rendered invisible. What Jacques Derrida has 
called a logic of the `beyond' informs all Western relational metaphors. The topological bias of 
Western consciousness must recognize the monstrous `other' as congenital, as a deferred version of 
itself. The monstrous is constitutive of it at the level of its structuration, and thus cannot be reduced 
to any particular apparatus or institution: 
the logic of the beyond, or rather of the not beyond (the step beyond, Du pas au delä) would 
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take the place of the logic of positing. But without opposing it: entering instead into another 
relation with what it sets free or transgressively frees itself from. (1978: 78) 
The logic of the beyond is the logic of positing. As I will be arguing throughout this chapter, the 
concept of the normal implies the logic of positing. An unquestioned observer, the sovereign 
subject, takes up his position denying or repressing the surveyed other. Yet this oppositional logic is 
informed by the paradox of the not beyond: the observer can only take up a position by assuming 
himself free from the object of study 
- 
denying or repressing other possibilities 
- 
but this freedom 
itself is dependent upon what is denied or repressed. A logic of dissent is built into the oppositional 
modus operandi of Western metaphysical thought so that any claim to be beyond what are mutually 
constitutive terms, any attempts to transcend these terms through recourse to some mythical time and 
space outside of language, is violently, impossibly, exclusive. My intention in what follows is to 
articulate the irreducibly double and supplemental character of the referent, the fallacy, that is, of any 
absolute differentiation; to draw attention to the inseparability of discourse and violence. 
But, first, we must attempt an explanation of the phrase `the irreducibly double and 
supplemental character of the referent' by turning to Derrida's operational use of the notions 
`double' and `supplement' in Of Grammatology, a critique of the works of Rousseau, Saussure, and 
Levi-Strauss. 2 These notions will lead us, firstly, to Derrida's reconsideration and radicalization of 
Saussure's theory of the sign in his essay `Linguistics and Grammatology'; 3 and, secondly, to what 
he calls `the logic of supplementarity'. As representatives of the logocentric tradition that accords 
privilege to the spoken word and rejects writing 
- 
`the exclusion by which [logocentrism] has 
constituted and recognized itself, from the Phaedrus to the Course in General Linguistics' (1976: 
103) 
-, 
Derrida's enterprise is to point to the concealment of the metaphysical presuppositions within 
their texts. Moreover, Derrida interrogates through the work of Saussure and Levi-Strauss the 
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methods and assumptions of structuralism: as a dominant discourse in Western and notably French 
thought during the 1960s, structuralism `remains caught, by an entire layer, sometimes the most 
fecund, of its stratification, within the metaphysics 
- 
logocentrism 
- 
which at the same time claims 
rather precipitately to have "gone beyond"' (1976: 99). A model for the study of other cultural 
systems, Saussurian linguistics provided the methods for investigating cultural codes in different 
disciplines across the human sciences, and offered an attractive model of total coherence and 
analytical power. Derrida shows how Saussure's notion of the sign is metaphysical and exposes how 
its application to other disciplines such as anthropology or the social sciences is underwritten by an 
affirmation of phonocentric and logocentric notions about writing. 
The fundamental insight of Saussurian linguistics is that any sign is intelligible not by virtue 
of a self-conscious intender, of a self-evident meaning, but through its differential relations with 
other signs in the linguistic system. Saussurian linguistics' all too familiar precept that `there are 
only differences without positive terms' explicitly points to the diacritical nature of meaning 
-a sign 
is not complete in and of itself. Signs consist of a signifier (phonic or graphic) and a signified (the 
mental concept), and the relation between them is, according to Saussure, arbitrary and conventional 
. 
The identification of the spoken sound with meaning (thought) in Saussure's methodology re-enacts 
the relation between the spoken and the written as well as the conventional relation of language and 
thought that belongs, as Derrida says, to this epoch, to the history of Western metaphysics: 
This logocentrism, this epoch of the full speech, has always placed in parenthesis, suspended, 
and suppressed for essential reasons, all free reflection on the origin and status of writing. 
(1976: 43) 
While writing represents a danger to the purity of the system of speech, Derrida searches for those 
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blindspots in Saussure's text that will subvert this very assumption. Writing acquires a problematic 
status within the text itself: 
If "writing" signifies inscription and specially the durable institution of a sign (and that is the 
only irreducible kernel of the concept of writing), writing in general covers the entire field of 
linguistic signs. (1976: 44) 
Writing (ecriture) is not just a graphic or phonetic system, a sign of a sign, it is any system of signs 
always inscribed in a network of differential meaning: 
We say "[w]riting" for all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or 
not and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of the voice: cinematography, 
choreography, of course, but also pictorial, musical, sculptural writing". (1976: 9; my italics) 
And here I would like to comment briefly on the technique(s) used by Goya in Los Caprichos. 
Etching is a form of inscription, to etch is to mark. The etcher's burin engraves metal, grave, stone 
by coating it with a protective layer, drawing on it with a needle, and then covering it with acid to 
attack the parts the needle has exposed, especially to produce prints from it. Difference or `writing' 
is at the origin of language, hence even speech is a form of writing: every concept has its opposite 
inscribed within it. Derrida fastens on Saussure's theory of the diacritical nature of meaning 
- 
there 
is no natural meaning inherent in the sign for language is dependent on a structural economy of 
differences 
- 
and drives the Saussurian project, in Christopher Norris' words, `to its ultimate 
conclusions' (1982: 23). Difference, then, constitutes all language, and language, if we follow the 
Saussurian model, is institution and convention. As Robert Young puts it, `representation never re- 
presents, but always defers the presence of the signified. The sign, therefore, always defers and 
differs, a curious double movement that Derrida calls "differance"' (1981: 15). 
The `logic of supplement' is another name for `diffe rance'. With these terms, Derrida not 
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only overturns accustomed hierarchies but also displaces habitual modes of thought. This time it is 
Rousseau's work which Derrida uses in order to expose the counter-logic at work in his Essay on the 
Origin of Languages: the logic goes that speech is at the origin of language, the counter-logic is 
marked by Rousseau's confirmation of the priority of writing by treating it as the `supplement' of 
spoken language. The meaning of the double-edged word `supplement' 
-a supplement is something 
that may or may not be added as required but it is also that which completes or enhances something 
else when added to it 
-, serves Derrida to open Rousseau's essay up to its own deconstruction. 
Rousseau's conception of writing is undone and displaced, Derrida situates it differently for `writing 
is the example par excellence of a supplement which enters into the heart of all intelligible discourse 
and comes to define its very nature and condition' (Norris, 1982: 33). According to Derrida, the 
structure of supplementarity is always already presupposed: writing is the structural property of the 
discourse itself. 
Whether one calls deconstruction's intervention 'differance' or 'supplement' or `writing', 
and, as Derrida's strategic operations constantly remind us, these terms remain distinct in a chain 
with many others 
- 
'they form a chain where each other may be substituted for the other, but not 
exactly (of course, even two uses of the same word would not be exactly the same): "no concept 
overlaps with any other"' (1976: lxx) 
-, 
the operation seeks to shake and displace those institutional 
structures governing our practices. One of the main operations of deconstructive criticism is to focus 
on hierarchical oppositions in order to show their inconsistencies and contradictions. A certain kind 
of structurally and axiologically determined conceptual binary (speech / writing) exceeds its division, 
pointing therefore to the impossibility of closing off the deferring and the deferral of meaning in 
language. The critical operation of deconstruction shows how hierarchies can be not only reversed at 
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any given moment, but also transformed. As D. C. Wood describes it, the reversal is just a first move 
in the game, thus in order to prevent the old opposition from reconstituting itself, a second move is 
needed, `a reorganization of the conceptual field brought about by the introduction of a new term' 
(1979: 24). My argument in this chapter is that the monstrous occupies a position structurally 
analogous to other derogated terms in the speech / writing dualisms that shape Western thought; 
therefore the normal / monstrous will serve here to open up a critique or deconstruction of binary 
thinking in general. This is to anticipate my reading of those eighteenth-century Spanish institutional 
practices and forces that institute the normal by marking and excluding the monstrous. In `Monster 
Culture (Seven Theses)', Jeffrey Jerome Cohen has drawn attention to the monster in these terms: 
`the monster's destructiveness is rather a deconstructiveness: it threatens to reveal that difference 
originates in process' (1996: 14). The monster introduces a disruption, a crisis that undermines the 
stability of a given opposition 
- 
normal / monstrous 
- 
and thus also of a given structure that operates 
through differentiation, displacement, and exclusion. The monster resists any classification built on 
a hierarchy or a merely binary opposition; it throws into question a hierarchy of meanings, a fixed 
principle, a centre. 
Binary oppositions represent a way of seeing, a sight that draws rigid boundaries. The 
position of the slash fixes both the place and the value of the terms on either side, separating 
orthodoxy from heterodoxy, normality from monstrosity. The emergence of an undecidable concept, 
the `supplement', escapes any appropriation into binary conceptualizations yet the `supplement' is 
always already structurally inscribed. The monster `is a rebuke to boundary and enclosure, it is the 
living embodiment of the phenomenon Derrida has labeled the "supplement": it breaks apart 
bifurcating "either/or" syllogistic logic with a kind of reasoning closer to "and/or"' (1996: 7). The 
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Derridean project questions logocentric models of reasoning in Western discourse by reconsidering 
the familiar place and function allocated to concepts on either side of the slash. By altering the 
terrain, Derrida produces a reading which leads to unfamiliar conclusions. As Norris has pointed 
out, the clear-cut boundaries that define modern academic discourse are challenged by Derridean 
thinking, `the texts of Derrida defy classification' (1982: 18). Because they resist orthodoxy, they 
establish a new relation to language and traditional modes of seeing; one that unavoidably revolves 
around the operations of that institution and the possibilities of subverting it. 
Vincent B. Leitch describes the Derridean enterprise in the following terms: `deconstruction 
is production' (1983: 178), more specifically, the production of undecidables: `the purpose of 
deconstruction is to produce such undecidables and to track their insistent operations throughout the 
text' (1983: 180). Production is not to be understood as revelatory, as the revelation of the true 
meaning of a stable text. Derrida does not reveal, rather his texts rehearse the kind of foundational 
instability of any sign system. The production of meaning originates in process, in the movement of 
`differance'; the contours of deconstruction are always changing. My reading of Goya's `El sueno de 
la razön produce monstruos' (fig. 1) will suggest a moment of undecidability: `sueno' can mean 
either `sleep' or `dream', it can mean `sleep' and `dream'. The undecidability of signification in 
terms, and also in visual terms as I will be arguing, will lead to a consideration of reason during the 
Spanish Enlightenment. 
My method will be a modus legendi: a method of reading cultures from the monsters they 
engender. The culture to be read is Spanish culture during the life of Francisco de Goya. My 
analysis will deal with the work of Goya, and more specifically his constructions and representations 
of the monstrous body in his work after 1793, in particular in Los Caprichos. Regarded as a turning 
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point in the work of the Spanish painter, his art after that date assumed significant technical and 
thematic shifts as he embarked on a less rational and more demonically imaginative course of 
paintings and engravings. Goya's hybrid creatures and grotesque figures, which took the form of the 
unacceptable, of the incomprehensible, will help to question notions of corporeality and monstrosity 
as they might relate to Spanish culture at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century: a period of crisis and extreme contradictions under the reigns of Carlos III, 
Carlos 1V and Fernando VII. Through an analysis of Goya's monstrous representations from a post- 
structuralist perspective, I shall be examining the institutional practices of the monstrous in Spanish 
Enlightened culture. 
The point of departure for my itinerary will be the work of the historian of science Georges 
Canguilhem on the normal and the pathological. His discussion of this binary opposition focuses on 
the failure of modern medicine to understand that `normal' and `abnormal' are evaluative or 
normative terms, not descriptive ones; and modern medicine's central assumption that pathological 
phenomena differ only quantitatively from normal ones. Canguilhem's work is both historical and 
philosophical for it is concerned with the actual practice of scientists, the production of scientific 
knowledge, and the nature of reason. 4 For Canguilhem, the concepts of the normal and the 
pathological are constitutive of and necessary for the activity and thought of the biological and 
medical sciences; however, his approach to the history of science poses philosophical questions as to 
the production of these sciences in particular contexts and practices. The second phase of the 
argument entails focusing on Michel Foucault's Histoire de lafolie a l'äge classique (1961) in order 
to put into operation my methodological procedure when examining Goya's corpus. The discussion 
of Foucault's history of madness is twofold: first, it will enable us to formulate a series of problems 
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that will be fundamental for my examination of Goya's monstrous bodies: the division between 
reason and unreason, the economy of exclusion and opposition, the figure of the other, and the power 
of normalization. Secondly, the critical exchange between Foucault and Derrida on the subject of the 
former's interpretation of Descartes' First Meditations in Histoire de la Folie will allow us to reflect 
on the methodological difficulties that one may encounter when writing against the categorical 
oppositions that inform Western metaphysics. According to Derrida, `certain philosophical and 
methodological presuppositions of this history of madness' (1977: 33) could be questioned. 
Derrida's critique could be summarized thus: Foucault's argument that a whole history of reason 
- 
classical reason 
- 
began in the seventeenth century is contested by Derrida: there is only one form of 
reason (and this will be fundamental for our understanding of Goya's El sueno de la razön produce 
monstruos (fig. 1) and the analysis of Goya's corpus). Derrida's second objection focuses on 
Foucault's reading of Descartes whereby madness is excluded from thought. Derrida's strategies 
will be examined in due course. By bringing together different lines of argument, the theoretical 
encounter between the history of the sciences and deconstruction will offer a base from which to 
explore the historical nature of reason, the historicity of writing, and to reevaluate our cultural 
assumptions concerning the `monstrous'. 
history of the sciences 
Why bring together such disparate names, Goya and Canguilhem? Why invoke Georges 
Canguilhem, a historian of science, in my analysis of the monstrous body in Goya? Canguilhem's 
approach to the history of the sciences seems to me to offer a critique of reason that echoes that of 
the Spanish painter. Both question how the rationalism of the Enlightenment mind betrays its own 
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necessarily monstrous positioning. The painter problematizes the Enlightenment's assumptions of 
representation and delves into the problems of human perception and knowledge; the historian of 
science seeks to unmask the philosophical assumptions underlying the life sciences, tracing the 
irrationalities and excesses practiced in the name of reason. The ruse of reason. 
In the introduction to Canguilhem's The Normal and the Pathological (1978), 5 Michel 
Foucault reminds us of the importance of the work of Canguilhem, placing him at the very centre of 
French intellectual life. To name but a few theorists who have been influenced by Canguilhem's 
work: Althusser and the Althusserian circle of French Marxism, the sociological work of Bourdieu, 
the work of psychoanalysts close to Lacan, and Foucault himself. Why, then, can such a specialized 
work be of any relevance for our argument? It is my contention that Canguilhem's critique of modem 
rationality proves to be methodologically relevant to an analysis of modern culture. 
The history of science as practiced in France by Alexander Koyre, Gaston Bachelard and 
Georges Canguilhem sets in play, according to Michel Foucault, `the philosophical question of the 
Enlightenment' (1989: 10). This philosophical question is articulated in the French history of 
science from the early nineteenth century onwards: 
The history of science avails itself of one of the themes which was introduced almost 
surreptitiously into late eighteenth-century philosophy: for the first time rational thought was 
put into question not only as to its nature, its foundations, its power and its rights, but also as 
to its history and its geography; as to its immediate past and its present reality; as to its time 
and place. (1989: 9) 
Among the themes which Michel Foucault and others like Dominique Lecourt see reflected in the 
works of Koyre, Bachelard and Canguilhem are the essentialist and idealist claims of reason, the 
rationalist optimism of the age, the rationalist desire for empirical discourse, the authority of 
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positivist models of knowledge, and the political and cultural forces at play in the production of 
knowledge. Their genealogical approach is a critique of modern rationality and of the cultural 
practices it has sanctioned. 
The ruse of reason in the actual practice of the history of science covers up the real position 
and the material interests inscribed within the techniques and theoretical knowledges themselves. 
Canguilhem's project teases out the contradictions inherent in the positivism of the biological 
sciences and exposes how modern, rational science is caught in the contradictions of its own 
conceptual logic. Canguilhem interrogates the philosophy of science and its normativizing moves, 
and through this interrogation his work traces the historical implications of modern structures of 
knowledge. His interest in the specificity of the life sciences' object of study is deeply imbricated 
with the production of knowledge. As Dominique Lecourt has observed: `Georges Canguilhem's 
history of the sciences is epistemological [... ] his history of the sciences is only epistemological 
because his epistemology is itself historical' (1975: 166). In other words, knowledge is historically 
produced. Hence the historico-epistemological perspective of his `projet de savoir' 
-a philosophy of 
knowledge, of reason and of concept. Lecourt establishes in his work Marxism and Epistemology ` a 
certain form of writing (ecriture), ' a line of descent, what he calls a certain epistemological tradition, 
between Bachelard and Canguilhem. Bachelard's proposition that `every particular science produces 
at each moment of its history its own norms of truth' (1975: 164) permeates the work of 
Canguilhem; in Canguilhem's search for the norm process within the life sciences one sees the 
underlying Bachelardian stratum. Bachelard's proposition can be expressed in these terms: the 
production of a certain knowledge determines the production of a certain normality. Scientific 
knowledges and their conceptual systems are formed around and determined by the connection 
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between norms and the normal. For Bachelard, the actual historicity of knowledge is understood in 
terms of epistemological obstacles and epistemological breaks. The former are those beliefs, 
preconveived ideas and prejudices that people accept as commonsensical but which represent a limit 
for the investigation of things; the latter define the way in which scientific knowledge splits off from 
and contradicts commonsense experience and beliefs. The Bachelardian and, later on, the 
Canguilhemian method examines the way in which the production of a certain knowledge is 
established through processes of rupture and reorganization, contrary to the traditional philosophical 
belief whereby scientific knowledge is accumulative and progressive, and scientific truths are 
canonized as necessary truths devoid of contingent factors. Expressing his views on the notion of 
epistemological breaks in an interview with Julia Kristeva in 1972, Derrida is close to Canguilhem's 
thought: 
I do not believe in decisive ruptures, in an unequivocal "epistemological break", as it is 
called today. Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in an old cloth that must continually, 
interminably be undone. This interminability is not an accident or contingency; it is 
essentially systematic, and theoretical. And this in no way minimizes the necessity and 
relative importance of certain breaks, of the appearance and definition of new studies. (1987: 
29)6 
The relationship between the thinking of Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault was 
always marked by mutual influence and admiration. In 1960 Canguilhem, in his report on Foucault's 
doctorat d'etat, already suggests that Histoire de la folie a l'äge classique will be an event in the 
understanding of the history of psychiatry. 7 In a short essay published after Foucault's death, he 
admits as much; its title is: `On Histoire de la folie as an Event' (1986): 8 `Reading Foucault 
fascinated me while revealing to me my limits' (1995: 284). By acknowledging his limits, 
Canguilhem learned `another figure of the abnormal than organic pathology' and recognized `the 
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historical existence of a medical power that was equivocal'. 9 Canguilhem redefined and pushed back 
the limits of the concepts of abnormality and pathology within his theory on the normal and the 
pathological, as his `New Reflections on the Normal and the Pathological' (1963-1966) attests. And 
it is within a Canguilhemian frame that Foucault charts the relationship between archaeology and 
discourse, examines the foundations of a historical order perceived in terms of continuity and 
accumulative progression within the human sciences, and reinterprets the history of scientific 
thought. In his archaeological project, Foucault extends, adapts and transforms the conceptual 
moves made by Canguilhem. But, what are these conceptual moves? 
Canguilhem's method and approach focuses on the actual historicity of knowledge; to be 
more precise, on the actual historicity of human knowledge but never leaving aside the realm of 
concrete existence 
- 
how living organisms, and man is included here, relate to their natural and social 
environment. His interest in the life sciences 
- 
those disciplines where living beings are the objects 
of knowledge and man himself is an object of knowledge 
- 
brought about a shift in the history of 
science. Foucault describes it as a move from 
the heights (mathematics, astronomy, Galilean mechanics, Newtonian physics, relativity 
theory) toward the middle regions where knowledge is much more deductive, much more 
dependent on external processes (economic stimulations or institutional supports) and where 
it has remained tied much longer to the marvels of the imagination. (1989: 13) 
Canguilhem's methodological position is also, as has been argued, a philosophical position for it 
carries with it an understanding of concrete human problems. Contrary to the idealistic philosophies 
of knowledge, of which positivism is symptomatic, and grounded upon the unity of method in the 
theory of knowledge and in the sciences, the continuous progress of the human mind and the logic of 
true and false, Canguilhem emphasizes the discontinuities of epistemic and scientific development. 
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Following on from Gaston Bachelard, Canguilhem rectifies the former's concept of discontinuity as 
applied to science. 
In The Normal and the Pathological, Canguilhem's object of problematization is the assumed 
continuity in biology and physiology between health and disease. Within the life sciences such 
apparently oppositional structures 
- 
the normal and the pathological 
- 
can be reduced ultimately to a 
simple continuity and quantitative variation, to a statistical mean. This biological model of the norm 
delimits objectively the recognizable boundaries of the normal, and offers the category of 
abnormality as a reality to knowledge. As Canguilhem argues, the contrast between the normal and 
the abnormal has been `actually grounded in the structure of living things themselves' (1994: 214). 
Through such considerations Canguilhem examines the pathologizing of otherness within the life 
sciences and the legitimatization of conceptions of abnormality, monstrosity, pathology, and so on 
through the practices of techniques of normalization. The structural oppositions are set up through a 
pathologizing of otherness, an operation which simultaneously conceals and makes visible the 
`other. ' What the biological sciences could not deny is that `it proved impossible to make up a 
science of the living being without having taken into account, as essential to its object, the possibility 
of disease, death, monstrosity, anomaly, error (... ]' (Foucault, 1989: 17). 
In his `Essay on Some Problems Concerning the Normal and the Pathological' (1943) and 
`New Reflections on the Normal and the Pathological' (1963-1966), 10 Canguilhem explores the 
concepts of health and disease in the disciplines of physiology and pathology, and addresses the 
general problem of the normal and the pathological. In the same way that the monster was 
considered with regard to its excesses or its lacks, its measure within the "too much" or the "not 
enough", nineteenth-century medicine spoke of these excesses or lacks in relation to a norm 
- 
the 
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pathological departing from the normal. Hence `the pathological phenomena found in living 
organisms are nothing more than quantitative variations, greater or lesser according to corresponding 
physiological phenomena' (1989: 42). Following Broussais's principle, whose thesis was later 
appropiated by Auguste Comte and Claude Bernard, Canguilhem devotes part of his work to 
showing how during the nineteenth century pathogeny is reduced to a phenomenon of increase and 
excess. For instance, Claude Bernard postulates that an illness like diabetes consists in the disorder 
of a normal function (an excessive amount of glucose within the body): `every disease has a 
corresponding normal function of which it is only the disturbed, exaggerated, diminished, or 
obliterated expression' (1989: 68). This claim and its corollary diagnosis are challenged by 
Canguilhem who argues that many diseases, understood in their full complexity, are not produced by 
an excess or defect of some constituent of a healthy body but by something else entirely. In the case 
of diabetes, ` it is the disease of an organism all of whose functions are changed' (1989: 88), not just 
a kidney disease or a pancreatic disease, but a diseased organism exposed to endless infections and 
dysfunctions. Therefore, it `is completely illegitimate to maintain that the pathological state is really 
and simply a greater or lesser variation of the physiological state' (1989: 110). 
If the healthy and the pathological states are susceptible to gradual explanation, nineteenth- 
century physiology is not far away from Aristotelian ideas of gradation and of hierarchy, and, by 
implication, of the superiority of normality, nor from the metaphysical assumptions underlying the 
Great Chain of Being. As argued in Chapter 1, the conceptions of plenitude, continuity and 
gradation as part of the belief in the general scheme of things `continued to constitute essential 
presuppositions in the framing of scientific hypotheses' in eighteenth-century biology: 
Every discovery was a step towards the completion of a systematic structure of which the 
57 
general plan was known in advance, an additional bit of empirical evidence of the truth of the 
generally accepted scheme of things. (Lovejoy, 1960: 232) 
The persistent influence of Platonism is clear in that for every piece of empirical evidence there must 
be an ultimate reason, self-explanatory and sufficient, and in that there are no sudden "leaps" in 
nature. The principles of plenitude and continuity presupposed that the universe is a rational order 
and that man could understand things in full confidence. Lovejoy sees in empirical science the 
logically inevitable outcome of these beliefs, 
since it was acquainted in advance with the fundamental principles with which the facts 
must, in the end, accord, and was provided with a sort of diagram of the general pattern of 
the universe, could know in outline what to expect, and even anticipate particular disclosures 
of actual observation. (1960: 328) 
Canguilhem sees these principles of the realist philosophical tradition imbricated in nineteenth- 
century physiology. Auguste Comte's and Claude Bernard's texts bear along with them a whole 
network of articulated themes and assumptions whose meaning links up with previous philosophical 
texts. This effect is what Derrida calls the `disseminating' force always at work within language: 
[A]s every generality is the sign of an essence, and every perception the realization of the 
essence, a generality observable in fact takes the value of realized perfection, and a common 
characteristic, the value of an ideal type. (Canguilhem, 1989: 125) 
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As Canguilhem argues in the case of health and disease, however, the premise upon which 
physiology grounds its ideas is flawed since health and disease do not exist as a continuum. 
It is in his problematization of the qualitative distinction between the normal and the 
pathological that Canguilhem outlines his views on norms and the normal. Always bearing in mind 
his reference to norms and normativity in the context of biology, these two states of the organism are 
to be considered as qualitatively different. Norms are the activity of the organism itself, and life is a 
normative activity, that is to say, it is institutive of norms and capable of changing the norms that it 
has instituted. Medical judgement does not establish what is normal or pathological 
- 
the normal 
cannot in reality be objectively measured and the pathological must be understood as one type of the 
normal11- this is established by the very nature of the organism. For the scientist explains both states 
by reducing them to a common measure: 
it is obvious that if one asserts the real homogeneity and continuity of the normal and 
the pathological it is in order to establish a physiological science that would govern 
therapeutic activity. (1989: 105) 
Therefore physiology's object of study becomes stable by positing that physiology and pathology 
exist as a continuum. The former, defined as the science of the laws or constants of normal life, 
determines its object, a stable idea of the normal. 
On the contrary, Canguilhem stresses that the normal is a dynamic and polemical concept. 
The term norma, associated with the actions of squaring and straightening, meaning to square, 
anxiously and negatively qualifies what it cannot contain 
- 
what offers resistance to the imposition of 
its normalising rule. `The normal is the effect obtained by the execution of the normative project' to 
contain indeterminate phenomena in a- defensively 
- 
oppositional structure. This oppositional 
structure 
- 
the normal and the deviant 
- 
is set up through a relationship of exclusion: 
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That which diverges from the preferable in a given area of evaluation is not the indifferent 
but the repulsive or more exactly, the repulsed, the detestable. (1989: 240) 
The concept of an immutable locus or plenitude is bogus because the notion of normalcy is itself an 
unstable point of reference. What passes for normal is historically mutable: 
It is not by depending on a "normal science" in T. S. Kuhn's sense that one can return to the 
past and validly trace its history: it is in rediscovering the "norm" process, the actual 
knowledge of which is only one moment of it, without one being able, save from 
prophesying, to predict the future (1989: 16). 12 
Abnormality is existentially prior to the imposition of any normalising rule for a rule or a 
norm can only be established by setting it in opposition to some concept of abnormality, deviancy, 
monstrosity. From Nietzsche, through Bachelard and Canguilhem, this way of thinking is present in 
Michel Foucault's works Folie et deraison: histoire de lafolie a l'äge classique (1961), Naissance 
de la clinique: une archeologie du regard medical (1963), and Surveiller et punir (1975), which 
analyze the "dividing practices" existent within the domains of psychiatry, psychology, medicine and 
criminology at the turn of nineteenth-century France. The asylum, the clinic and the prison housed 
those individuals who had strayed away from the norms of reason, health or lawful conduct, dividing 
individuals into the mad 
- 
sane, the sick 
- 
healthy, and the criminal 
- 
law-abiding. Foucault's thesis is 
summarised in Mark Cousins' and Athar Hussain's book on the French thinker: `starting from the 
19th century, discursive reflections on normal 
- 
adult 
- 
humans grew out of reflections on their 
converse 
- 
the "abnormals" and children' (1984: 101). Thus the abnormals bear human knowledge; 
an integral part of Foucault's methodology is that man becomes both the subject and the object of 
knowledge. The observer 
- 
and his cognitive and ideological apparatus 
- 
frames and determines the 
very object he purports to be seeking to know. The Foucaldian exploration of the conditions under 
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which present-day judgement of normality and abnormality was constructed is a reflection of the 
fundamental duality of Western consciousness, Good and Evil. His method operates and stands at 
the dividing line between the normal and abnormal in rational, scientific societies in order to show 
how these dividing practices work and how they change; it proposes a change in the perspective from 
which things are seen and known, which carries with it a change of what is seen and known. The 
shift in changing the perspective of traditional assumptions, in doubting accepted modes of historical 
analysis and the methodological approach brought about by Foucault with respect to epistemology 
seeks to excavate the underlying epistemic conditions (savoir) that, in any given period, make 
various domains of scientific disciplines (connaissance) possible. The Foucaldian methodology in 
the above-mentioned works operates by inverting, reversing and overturning (renversement) 
accepted values, modes of analysis and historical continuities that alter the imbalance of the dualities 
under scrutiny. (This renversement would prove problematical as we will argue in the second half of 
this chapter when focusing on Derrida's critique of Histoire de lafolie. ) 
If norms conform to habits, to rational principles, and to history or tradition, hence acting on 
the formation of habits, rationalizing principles, and historical legitimisations, respectively, Foucault 
denounces this given situation. However, in Foucault's work, the production of a certain normality in 
its relationship to its objects and subjects within domains of knowledge can be understood in two 
ways according to whether the priority is given to the juridical or the biological model of the norm. 
In the former case, norms are produced by acts of exclusion. The norm refers to a boundary, `a line 
of division, traversing and controlling, in the form of a domination, an area of spontaneous events the 
starting point of which are considered to pre-exist this intervention (which, after the event, orders 
them, by containing them, in the way that a form contains a content)' (Macherey, 1992: 263). 13 In 
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Histoire de la folie, Naissance de la clinique, and Surveiller et punir, Foucault demonstrates the 
principles of exclusionary practice at work in nineteenth-century French institutions 
- 
the asylum, the 
clinic, and the prison. Arguably, and for the purposes of this chapter, Histoire de la folie is the 
classic example in which Foucault, through the narration of the history of the negativity of insanity, 
the subordination of madness to the notion of reason, through a model of juridical disqualification 
and exclusion, puts into practice a reading of the past that accounts for the present configuration of 
forces in modem structures of knowledge. The accepted view of asylums as benevolent, curative 
places is overturned by Foucault's analysis for they were juridical institutions that segregated 
individuals and marked off spaces of exclusion. The biological model of the norm refers to a limit. 
In this case, the norm acts `positively and expansively, like an extensive movement, which 
progressively withdrawing the limits of its domain of action, itself effectively constitutes a field of 
existence in which norms find their application' (Macherey, 1992: 264). The work of Canguilhem in 
the biological sciences bears witness to the way the productive character of the norm acts as an 
inclusive and regulatory limit. 
The positivist physiological principle whereby the normal is a statistical mean subject to 
measurement and deterministic explanations naturalizes social stratification as a hierarchical 
relation, thus concealing the way in which the `essence', the ` common characteristic', the ` ideal type' 
have been politically constructed. The scientific logic resting upon the norma came to understand 
itself as eternal, having been true for all time, and as natural or `god-given', not contingent upon 
human input. Driven by a desire to control nature and to correct its "mistakes", the normalising gaze 
of science and its narrative of the deviant designated that which did not conform to the norms and 
ordained its correction, operating through the normal-deviant model, the `objective' visual method of 
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classification, and the `degrees of deviance' from the norm. The taxonomic impulse of empirical 
discourse literalized and obscured the intangibles of human variation, it contained physical 
differences within the diagnostic categories of empiricism. 
Canguilhem's views on the normal and the pathological can be summarized thus: knowledge 
of the normal is triggered by disease. Only the pathological attracts our attention and through disease 
we appreciate the normal: `it is the priority of the abnormal that attracts the attention of the 
normative, that calls forth a normative decision and provides an opportunity to establish normality 
through the application of a norm' (1994: 383). A practical operation whereby the abnormal, which 
comes first in functional terms, becomes logically posterior to the normal. 
Canguilhem examines the normal and the pathological as an instance of what Derrida's 
deconstructive reading/practice would later have to say on Western philosophy. The history of 
Western thought is constructed around hierarchical oppositional structures in which one term is 
promoted at the expense of the other. Despite being prior to normality, the pathological is defined as 
a deviation from the normal. The abnormal is dominated logically by the normal: anything deviating 
from the normal type by excess, defect or configuration is abnormal. Canguilhem's problematization 
of the normal and the pathological recognizes the flawed configuration of this opposition, thereby 
destabilizing the structure on which normalization is built. According to Canguilhem, `a norm is not 
a fixed rule but a transitive capacity' (1989: 212), by which he means that a living being in a 
pathological state is capable of instituting its own norms since a `pathological state is never a state 
without norms. ' Moreover, `the normal should not be opposed to the pathological, because under 
certain conditions and in its own way, the pathological is normal' (1989: 354). The contrast between 
health and disease, in Canguilhem's words, is necessary. To recognize that this necessary contrast, 
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or if one prefers construct, is flawed is to affirm the provisional nature of all meaning. In Derridian 
terms, to put the elements into `play. ' Thus one can hear Derrida in Canguilhem's texts. 
Monstrosity and normality are constructed in relationship, they necessarily participate in each 
other: 
The history of monstrosity makes us aware of the history of normality: faced with a monster, 
one may become aware of what the norm is and when this norm has a history 
- 
which is the 
case with discursive norms, philosophical norms, socio-cultural norms 
- 
any appearance of 
monstrosity in this domain allows us an analysis of the history of normality. (Derrida, 1995: 
386)14 
The monstrosity represented in Goya's work will allow an examination of the norm ruling/prevailing 
during that particular period in Spanish history. The very perfection of the norm, represented by the 
classical body, is challenged by the physical human monstrosity explored in the painter's work. 
Through an examination of his pictorial bodies I will attempt to find out in what way and to what 
extent it would be possible to think differently about Goya's work. His monstrous figures will be a 
corpus from which to reread the dominant paradigms of his time, that is, the discursive norms, 
philosophical norms, socio-cultural norms of late eighteenth-century Spain. 
Histoire de la folie criticizes the normative boundaries drawn by reason in its attempt to 
identify, disqualify, and exclude everything that posed a threat to its sense of order. For Foucault, 
the movement of reason is clear: the progressive domination of madness so that it can be integrated 
into reason. If Foucault's work on madness is `an allegory of reason at the moment of establishing 
its will-to-power over truth' (Derrida, 1987: 215), his work allows a criticism of the very notion of 
rationality. His position in his analysis of rationality will be one of Derrida's targets in `Cogito et 
histoire de la folie'. Derrida's words on the history of normality and the history of monstrosity will 
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advance some of the issues at stake in the second half of the chapter, and take a different inflection 
with Derrida's closing words on Histoire de lafolie in `Cogito et histoire de la folie'. In that work, 
Foucault teaches us to think `that there are crises of reason in strange complicity with what the world 
calls crises of madness' (1987: 63). We will think with Foucault and rethink with Derrida this 
`strange complicity' through the exchange between the two thinkers. 
The event 
'In the age of fables, monstrosity denounced the monstrous power of the imagination. In the 
age of experiment, the monster is considered a symbol of puerility or mental sickness' (Canguilhem, 
1962: 35). The monster is identified with intellectual primitivism and puerility, and becomes part of 
a discourse not just on physical pathology, but also on mental pathology. The madman in the 
classical age is perceived and constituted as a form of infirmity. There is no physical monstrosity in 
them, they are `normal' people. Nevertheless, the madman is the deviant or morally other. The 
constitution of madness during the classical age is part of a much wider and more complex 
conception of monstrosity (in the form of human beings, social systems, systems of thought, 
superstitions). Let us focus on what Foucault has to say about the history of madness. 15 
Histoire de la folie shook the (epistemological) foundations of bodies of knowledge like 
psychology, psychiatry and the judiciary whose powers rested upon techniques of normalization, and 
exposed how these disciplines created their own norms of validity and objectivity without 
questioning the very possibility of such norms. An heir to the Bachelardian and Canguilheian work 
on the norm, Foucault becomes `a denouncer of the normalcy of anonymous norms. ' 16 
Two dates mark what Foucault refers to as an institutional creation peculiar to the 
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seventeenth century in France. The decree that founded the H6pital General in 1656 was followed a 
year later by the creation of the H6pital General and the `The Great Confinement' of the poor, the 
vagabond, the unemployed, the madmen 
- 
the outcasts from social order. This act of repression that 
spread throughout Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries established the concept of 
madness as we know it today. It objectified madness and introduced social exclusion as the sole 
recognition of man's relationship to the irrational, hence creating an abstract counterpoint to 
established rationality and subjugating madness to Reason. The Great Confinement was not just an 
act of internment, but rather an amalgam of heterogeneous elements and police practices, and it is 
this amalgam or stratification that Foucault is concerned with in Histoire de la folie, where he 
describes the hidden cultural formations that seem to have produced this particular phenomenon 
which operationally constituted the insane as an object of knowledge. A study that, in the words of 
Canguilhem, `endeavors to show that madness is an object of perception in a "social space" 
structured in diverse ways throughout the course of history, an object of perception created by social 
practices rather than grasped by a collective sensibility, rather, above all, than broken down 
analytically by speculative understanding' (p. 278). 17 What were these social practices? Exclusion, 
internment, and discipline. This "social space, " juridical and medical, constructs the madman 
through administrative and police practices as well as a new social ethic of labour. 
`The delimitation of the "normal" is in fact only the discursive consecration of practices for 
establishing the juridical incapacity of the individual' (Canguilhem, 1995: 283). At the end of the 
seventeenth-century, the decision for internment lay in the hands of the judiciary. It was the judicial 
apparatus that enforced the confinement imposed upon the madman, moving away from solely 
medical criteria. In so far as he is alienated from his senses, the madman comes under a juridical 
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theory of madness that considers him a subject of law; incapable in the eyes of the law of managing 
his own affairs on account of unsoundness of mind, he is exempted from his responsibilities. 
Concurrent with the juridical interdiction, the social practices of internment posit the madman as a 
social being whose exclusion, internment and relegation are socially and morally justifiable. His 
moral behaviour renders him asocial and implicates him in a field of culpability. Foucault suggests 
that these two aspects will lead to the emergence of two forms of medicine: on the one hand, a 
psychology that analyzes the mental faculties of the individual from the viewpoint of the capacities 
of the subject of law; on the other, a dualist pathology that observes the behaviour of social man and 
intervenes in order to divide individuals in terms of sane-mad, normal-abnormal. It is Foucault's 
contention that the 
alienaciön del sujeto de derecho puede y debe coincidir con la locura del hombre social, en la 
unidad de una realidad patolögica que es a la vez analizable en tesrminos de derecho y 
perceptible en las formas mäs inmediatas de la sensibilidad social. (1997: 205) 
The strategies of different powers 
- 
juridical, medical, and social 
- 
create a single unity 
- 
homo 
natura 
- 
in which a social, normative experience of madness and a juridical, qualitative experience of 
madness collude. The synthesis produces the essential basis for nineteenth-century psychopathology. 
The economic significance of confinement is fundamental in order to understand the social 
treatment of the mad, not just an enforcement of social order but also a display of a new `ethical 
consciousness' with regard to the moral world of labour. Labour and poverty, work and idleness 
become polar opposites and another partition of Good and Evil in terms of Reason and Unreason. 
Those who were not productive were confined in periods of economic crisis due to their potential as 
social destabilizers, whereas in more buoyant times they were used as cheap workforce. Confinement 
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had a double role: on the one hand, to reabsorb unemployment in an attempt to make invisible its 
most visible social effects; on the other, to control prices when there was a risk of inflation. Thus 
political, economic, and national considerations underpin the new attitude towards `the idle and the 
unproductive' and, above all, the madman. It was this gesture of segregation which defined what 
was asocial and inhuman in the classical period, and by banishing what was defined as asocial or 
inhuman, segregation created the `other' to characterize it as the 'alienated'. According to Foucault, 
then, the classical category of confinement is linked to the power being organized in France during 
the period, absolutist and increasingly bourgeois. 
For Foucault, confinement hid away `unreason, and betrayed the shame it aroused; but it 
explicitly drew attention to madness, pointed to it' (1967: 70). This is a major shift in the 
consideration of madness within Western society. Up until the classical period, madness was an 
undifferentiated experience; the Middle Ages and the Renaissance `had freely allowed the forms of 
unreason to come out into the light of the day' (1967: 66). The madman was an eschatological 
figure, bearer of the secrets of the world or of the Devil. Foucault looks for the act of scission 
- 
constitutive and originative 
- 
whereby Unreason is categorically divided from a properly human 
Reason. These are his claims in the preface to Histoire de lafolie: `we must try to return, in history, 
to that zero point in the course of madness at which madness is an undifferentiated experience, a not 
yet divided experience of division itself (1967: xi). Claims that will change in the 1972 edition after 
Derrida's critique of Foucault's project on the `archaeology of silence'. 
The dialogue between Derrida and Foucault 
This section, in which I discuss at length the critical exchange between Foucault and Derrida, 
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will act as a methodological as well as a theoretical frame from which to view Goya's 
representations of the monstrous body in the social, institutional and political dynamic of its specific 
time and place. The extensive use I make of the Foucault-Derrida debate seeks to consider: firstly, 
the dangers and difficulties of working with any critical method that does not interrogate its own 
philosophical and political presuppositions, that is to say, the methodological and thematic 
consequences that govern the reading of a text; and, secondly, the teasing out of the inevitable double 
binds of logocentrism. In Derrida's words, methodology is never totally free from the marks of 
philosophical language. For Derrida, Foucault's reading of Descartes in Histoire de lafolie provides 
a prime example of a discursive exercise that is inconsistent with the philosophical position it claims. 
Derrida's metaphysically symptomatic reading of the moments of aporia that overtake Foucault's 
discourse on madness and reason will render explicit and thematic the philosophical subtext of 
Foucault's exposition, and will open up an effective critique of those institutions within and against 
which Goya's work is set. 
Jacques Derrida opens his `Cogito et histoire de la folie' (1963), 18 a critique of Foucault's 
Histoire de lafolie, by describing his consciousness 
- 
the disciple's consciousness 
- 
as an unhappy 
consciousness. 19 As somebody who studied under Foucault, Derrida dwells upon the dialogic 
relationship between master and disciple, and `the danger of this dialogue being taken 
- 
incorrectly 
- 
as a challenge' (1997: 31). But engaging or reengaging in `the interminable and silent dialogue 
which made him into a disciple' (ibid), the disciple `must break the glass, or better the mirror, the 
reflection, his infinite speculation on the master. And start to speak' (1997: 32). 
Derrida examines Foucault's enterprise in order to question the methodological operation 
adopted in the preface to the first edition of Histoire de la folie. 20 Is it feasible, Derrida asks, `to 
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write a history of madness itself? ' Is it possible to write about a system without using the terms of 
that system; in other words, is it possible to talk about madness without using the language of 
reason? Doesn't the project of an `archaeology of silence' already intimate its own impossibility? 
For `is not an archaeology, even of silence, that is, an organized language, a project, an order, a 
sentence, a syntax, a work? ' (1997: 35). Derrida's logic is clear: to expose the internal stability and 
cogency of the Foucaldian project which rests on Foucault's reading of a passage from Descartes's 
first Meditations. Foucault opens the chapter on `The Great Confinement' by referring to the 
Cartesian exclusion of madness from the realm of philosophical thought and its resulting reduction to 
silence from the seventeenth century onwards. `Dans le cheminement de doute, Descartes encontre 
la folie ä cote du reve et de toutes les formes d'erreur. ' Foucault sees in this passage the 
philosophical equivalent to the social practice of confinement, and its concomitant implication that 
madness is excluded from the paradigm of truth and doubt, that is, from the Cartesian philosophical 
project. Philosophical judgment and social practices are closely related as part of the same structure 
of exclusion that marginalizes the madman; the Cartesian act of force is a sign of this structure of 
exclusion, the theoretical reflection of a social practice. What Derrida questions is whether the 
dismissal, exclusion and ostracism of madness from the realm of the Cogito, that Foucault locates in 
the passage of Descartes and that inaugurates the division between reason and madness (unreason), 
has ` the historical meaning assigned to it' (1997: 33). 
In the economy of doubt, madness is excluded from the realm of the Cogito. According to 
Foucault, this exclusion is a founding move in the Cogito and represents an epistemological break 
that inaugurates the division between reason and unreason. The classical division, therefore, 
becomes the original moment, the event, the historical structure that disrupts the free circulation and 
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exchange of reason and madness. The division refers to a point of presence, a fixed origin which, 
according to Derrida, is unavailable to us. The history of The Decision as established by Foucault 
via Descartes is challenged by Derrida: 
The attempt to write the history of the decision, division, difference runs the risk of 
construing that division as an event or a structure subsequent to the unity of an original 
presence, thereby confirming metaphysics in its fundamental operation. (1997: 40) 
The event or structure which inaugurates this epistemological break privileges the Cartesian Cogito 
and places the `classical' exclusion of madness as originary. By referring to an original moment in 
which the dyadic relationship did not exist, in which madness existed before being caught by 
knowledge, Foucault is reaffirming a source of historicity, of meaning and of language for his own 
argument. It is in this operation, that of reaching a point of origin, where Derrida discerns a different 
project in Foucault's book 
- 
`the project of convoking the first dissension of logos against itself is 
quite another project than the archaeology of silence' (59) 
- 
an attempt to account for a `total 
historical structure, ' that is, to account for the totality of a phenomenon by its reduction to a formula 
that governs the totality. Thus, Derrida says, Foucault conceives of the event as an instance/sample 
of the structure, the appearance of which precisely allows the structure to be grasped. 
Foucault's claims for origins contain metaphysical contradictions that are not only 
troublesome for Derrida but also unnecessary. Foucault's aim to situate this silence of madness 
outside or beyond reason repeats the very same process of exclusion that he condemns, and takes the 
form of a valorization of the concept of `madness' or `unreason' in its attempt to write a history of 
madness itself. This privileging of and identification with the subjugated term 
- 
`madness-as- 
negativity' 
- 
offers a simple reversal of the value-laden hierarchy and reduplicates the same structure 
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being questioned: a violent, structurally totalitarian project. Is it necessary for Foucault to look for 
this point of origin? What Derrida reminds us at this juncture is that there is only one form of 
reason, that there is no going outside or beyond reason: the dividing line between reason and 
unreason did not emerge with classical reason since all thought is premised on a less comforting 
dissension within reason. As Derrida argues, `the praise [eloge] of silence always takes place within 
logos, the language of objectification' (1997: 37). The exclusion of madness can only be seen as an 
operation within reason: reason, logic (logos, as language, thought) against itself. Therefore 
Foucault's project of transcending this division in order to recover the idea of the possibility of an 
original experience of madness is not only impossible but is imbued with unreflected historicism. 
It is a problematic of `Reason-in-general, ' and Reason-in-general, Derrida remarks, cannot be 
exceeded: 
The unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur of the order of reason, that which makes it 
just another actual order or structure (a determined historical structure, one possible structure 
among other possible ones), is that one cannot speak against it except by being for it, that one 
can only protest from within it; and within its domain, Reason leaves us only the recourse to 
strategies and stratagems. (1997: 36) 
Foucault is overlooking the specificities of this particular structure of exclusion to which he attaches 
structural totality. For, as Derrida has shown elsewhere, structures are historical, temporary, 
contingent, operating through differentiation and displacement. In the opening paragraphs of 
`Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences' (1966), Derrida returns to the 
concepts of structure and event in order to problematize the structuralist project: 21 
the movement of any archaeology, like that of any eschatology, is an accomplice of this 
reduction of the structurality of structure and always attempts to conceive of structure on the 
basis of a full presence which is beyond play. (1978: 279) 
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And to make a structure present is to immobilize it, to fix it, to stop the play of signifiers 
-a 
revelatory moment. Derrida re-thinks the notion of `structure', `no longer seeking to limit the play of 
its differential elements by always referring them back, in the last instance, to some organizing 
"center" or thematic point of origin' (Norris, 1983: 139); the structuralist project is at the heart of the 
tradition that makes the concept of `structure' dependent upon the concept of `centre'. Centres or 
governing principles such as essence, subject, transcendentality, constitute the very thing within a 
structure which, while governing the structure, escapes structurality, that is to say, they are not 
themselves subject to a structural analysis. As an operative concept the centre does not belong to the 
totality, and yet it is within it. This is what Derrida refers to as the `structurality of the structure': the 
centre is paradoxically unique. A fixed centre aspires to a fundamental immobility, it expresses the 
desire for a fundamental certitude, hence freezing out the possibility of play, the possibility of 
thinking about history, change, the individual agent, time. 
This attempt is also a first passion. It keeps within itself the trace of a violence. It is more 
written than said, it is economized. The economy of this writing is a regulated relationship 
between that which exceeds and the exceeded totality: the differance of the absolute excess. 
(Derrida, 1997: 62) 
No longer a fixed centre that limits and arrests the play of a system of differences, the centre comes 
to be thought of as a `function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions 
came to be thought' (Derrida, 1978: 280). 
Derrida observes that Foucault's book presents itself precisely as a structuralist study in that 
it uncovers the preconditions of meaning, it finds in the Cartesian Cogito the division between 
madness and reason as the precondition for the possibility of meaning and therefore historicity. 
Every event is itself already inscribed in the structure of language. The dissension within the logos is 
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the very origin of history, of historicity itself. And `nothing within this language, and no one among 
those who speak it, can escape the historical guilt' (p. 35). Derrida's critique of Western reason 
acknowledges the impossibility of abolishing this thinking tout court: 
We have no language 
- 
no syntax and no lexicon 
- 
which is foreign to this history; we can 
pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the 
form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of what it seeks to contest. (1978: 280) 
Now we turn to Derrida's second objection, which concerns the detailed reading of 
Descartes's Meditations to which I alluded earlier. Foucault observes an imbalance between the 
treatment of doubt that derives both from the senses and from imagination and dreams, and the one 
that originates from madness. While the former, signs of reflection and thought in the conceptual 
economy of doubt, always contain a bedrock of truth that cannot be doubted, the latter leaves no 
residue of truth for `I who think cannot be mad. ' But I am pre-empting the dispute over Descartes's 
passage for, at this juncture, it is necessary to summon up the Cartesian methodical doubt in order to 
understand Derrida's criticisms of Foucault's reading of the Cartesian Cogito as well as Derrida's 
rereading of the passage in question. I will follow Descartes' method so as to locate those aspects in 
which Derrida's detailed reading of Descartes' passage and Foucault's interpretation of Descartes 
differ. 
Descartes' systematic doubt seeks to find those fundamental truths from which it is possible 
to deduce the whole edifice of our understanding. To this end, the point of departure must be an 
absolute certitude about which no doubt at all would be possible. The Cartesian method seeks to 
eradicate all that can be doubted. Systematic doubt starts with one's sense perceptions: the senses 
can make one fall into error sometimes, but, Descartes asks, can they always make one err? Most 
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men would consider it highly improbable that sense perceptions could always lead us into error, 
however, improbability does not mean certitude. Therefore the possibility of doubting one's sense 
perceptions cannot be totally eradicated. Descartes poses the following question: if the senses 
sometimes deceive us with respect to objects which are very small or very far away, there could 
perhaps be other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible even though they are derived from the 
senses. For instance, the certainty of the materiality and fleshiness of the body 
- 
`I am here, sitting by 
the fire, wearing a winter dressing' 
-, 
however, this could be denied, Descartes proceeds to explain, 
perhaps if I were to liken myself to madmen 
- 
who imagine that they have a head made of 
earthenware or a body made of glass. `But they are mad, sed amentes sunt isti, and I should be any 
the less insane (demens) were Ito follow examples so extravagant' (1997: 46). Here lies the dispute 
over the (apparent) dismissal of the madman in Foucault's and Derrida's respective expositions. For 
Foucault, Descartes banishes madness from thought, establishing thereby a complicity with the 
medical and judicial structures of the time, whereas Derrida's analysis of Descartes' philosophical 
discourse does not see madness submitted to any particular exclusion. Moreover, Derrida's reading 
of Descartes proposes that the opening of the paragraph with a perhaps brings the figure of an 
imaginary non-philosopher to the method of doubt, a rhetorical and pedagogical movement which 
allows Descartes to introduce a more natural, common, and universal experience, that of sleep and 
dream. According to Derrida, the example of the madman is not total enough for it pertains to 
knowledge of a sensory origin. 
The second step for Descartes is even more radical: the generalization by hyperbole of the 
hypothesis of sleep and dream 
- 
`Now let us assume that we are asleep' 
- 
implies a radical break with 
all the senses. In this way, the absolute totality of ideas of sensory origin becomes suspect. How can 
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one distinguish the state of sleep from that of being awake? How can one be certain that the world 
one perceives is real? Which are the certainties and truths that escape perception? Questions posited 
by Descartes at this stage which he seeks to answer in this manner. Let us take the following 
example: the impossibility which allows doubt about the existence of things and of the world does 
not affect some truths, like, for instance, the truths of mathematics 
- 
whether one is asleep or awake, 
the three angles of a triangle total 180° in Euclidean geometry. This is a simple and intelligible 
thing. The hypothesis of sleep and dream indicates a radical departure from all the senses and a 
move towards another, higher order of reasoning, the intelligible. In Derrida's account, it is at this 
moment in the Cartesian method that `all significations or "ideas" of sensory origin are excluded 
from the realm of truth, for the same reason as madness is excluded from it' (1997: 50). What 
concerns Descartes, Derrida argues, is those questions regarding only the truth of ideas. And 
Foucault would reply to this in `My Body, This Paper, This Fire'22 by pointing to Derrida's 
discursive inattentiveness. The passage from Descartes we have just discussed does not refer to the 
`truth of ideas, ' but rather, in Foucault's words, to the subject who thinks. Firstly, Foucault 
comments on the status of Descartes' Meditations as both an argument of logic and a demonstration 
orientated towards the modification and constitution of the thinking subject while doubting and 
meditating. Secondly, he reminds Derrida of some lexical and textual differences in Descartes' 
passage concerning the terms insani, amentes, and demens. While the first term alludes to the 
illusions of the madman within medicine, the second and third point to the juridical incapacity of the 
individual. Both terms, amentes and demens, designated those individuals incapable of religious, 
judicial, or social duties and responsibilities. Alienated from their senses, disqualified as subjects, 
they could not act as reasoning subjects (I who think cannot be mad). Foucault's position takes us 
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again to Derrida's objection regarding Foucault's theoretical reflection of Descartes' text in the 
actual historical (juridical, political, and economic) sets of concerns. The exclusion to which 
Foucault assigns a historical or extra-philosophical origin is an exclusion, as Derrida remarks, that is 
`at the very nature of discourse and language' (54), an exclusion which is always already achieved. It 
is the logic of exclusion. 
Discourse and philosophical communication (and language itself, that which from meaning 
emerges) carry normality within themselves. And Derrida insists that `in its most impoverished 
syntax logos is reason, and, indeed, a historical reason' (1997: 54). In its actual process, language is 
institution and convention: it is the logos man has inherited from the Greeks. It is a case of always 
already, of always being recognizable, of language as conventionality and normality. 
In the third step of the route to a secure foundation for knowledge, Descartes suggests the 
hypothesis of the evil genius (malin genie) who distorts and deforms not only our sense perceptions 
but intelligible truth itself, an evil genius who deceives us in all things. It is equivalent to saying that 
perhaps our understanding is of such a nature that it necessarily errs whenever it tries to grasp the 
truth: `I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any senses, yet 
falsely believing myself to possess all these things. ' The artificial and metaphysical assault of the 
evil genius will, in Derrida's words, conjure up the possibility of total madness, `a total derangement 
over which I could have no control since it is inflicted upon me 
- 
hypothetically 
- 
and I am no longer 
responsible for it' (1997: 52). 23 A madness from which ideas of either a sensory or intellectual origin 
cannot be sheltered. 
Wherein lies fundamental certitude for Descartes? In the existence of the subject that thinks 
and doubts. If I think that the world exists, I might be wrong as to the existence of the world, but 
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there is no error in that I am thinking. In the same way, I can doubt everything except that I doubt. 
My existence as a thinking subject (that doubts, that errs) is exempted from all possible error and all 
possible doubt. I think, therefore I am. The rational subject is the wellspring of truth 
- 
res cogitans. 
My existence as a thinking subject is not only the fundamental truth and certitude but also the 
prototype of all truth and certitude, since I perceive it with absolute clarity and distinction. This 
impenetrable point of certainty, clear and distinct, attained in the act of the Cogito and in the 
certainty of his own existence, enables Descartes to say, according to Derrida, `whether or not I am 
mad, Cogito sum. ' It is the point `in which the possibility of all the determined forms of the 
exchange between reason and madness are embedded' (1997: 56). Even if I am mad, I still formulate 
the project of thinking this totality, of grasping this totality: thinking escapes the alternative of a 
determined madness or a determined reason. Thinking as excess, as the hyperbolical project, 
overflows the totality. To cite Derrida: `any effort to reduce this totality, to enclose it within a 
determined historical structure, however comprehensive, ' as Foucault attempts in his project, `risks 
missing the essential, risks dulling the point itself' 1997: 57). Furthermore, `it cannot be recounted, 
cannot be objectified as an event in a determined history' (1998: 58). 
When Descartes reaches this extremity, he needs to guarantee the Cogito in God. Once the 
certainty of his own existence is achieved, Descartes needs to demonstrate the existence of a reality 
external to thought. All our knowledge, Descartes says, springs from the `I think', thus all of my 
ideas must arise in myself. The only idea that could not have arisen from myself is the idea of God. 
The idea of an infinite and perfect being, whose content so far exceeds my capacity that I could not 
have constructed it from my own resources. The more I consider this infinite, omnipotent, 
omniscient being, the less convinced I am that such an idea could arise in me. Hence, one must 
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conclude necessarily that God exists. 24 It follows that the infinite being, God, really exists, and has 
placed the idea of Himself within me. The idea of God, as infinite being, is innate. God, who 
exists as supreme power and perfection, made me the kind of creature that I am and created all that 
exists. 25 Once the deity's existence is established, Descartes can proceed to reinstate his belief in the 
world around him. 
When Descartes pronounces the words 'I think, therefore I am, ' in that instant of intuition, 
that instant in which the self is immediately present to itself, Derrida notes, the Cogito is 
temporalized. `The Cogito must reflect and proffer itself in an organized philosophical discourse' 
(1997: 58). God becomes the sole guarantor of my representations and my cognitive determinations, 
and the supreme protective barrier against madness. Descartes uses the deity to set up a reliable 
method for the pursuit of truth, the guarantee that reason can be trusted; the existence of God 
henceforth plays a major role in the validation of reason. According to Derrida, this is the moment 
when internment takes place in Descartes's text. `The identification of the Cogito with reasonable 
- 
normal 
- 
reason need not even await 
- 
in fact, if not in principle 
- 
the proofs of the existence of a 
veracious God as the supreme or protective barrier against madness' (1997: 59) because Descartes 
appeals to the principles of logic and causality in his conception of the existence and truthfulness of 
God and pulls himself out of madness. 26 The reliable 'clear and distinct' perceptions of the pure 
intellect as well as the consideration of such intellectual knowledge as a kind of illumination derived 
from a higher source than man's own mind ("natural light" or "light of reason"). 27 
Foucault, Derrida says, has performed a "Cartesian gesture for the twentieth century", one 
that, according to Norris, is 'more deceptive for flatly denying (unlike Descartes) the fact of its 
investment in the discourse of reason' (Norris, 1987: 216). In his attempt to capture the plenitude of 
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lost speech, Foucault reinstates the old onto-theological idea of an absolute origin or essence of truth, 
the transcendental event, and accepts into his discourse the premises of the tradition of metaphysics 
at the very moment he denounces it. By attempting to define the meaning of the Cartesian Cogito in 
terms of a determinate historical structure, Foucault fails to grasp that the Cogito has a 
transcendental status. In Norris' words, the "`critical" moments of Cartesian doubt when the security 
of every last rational belief was genuinely called into question' (Norris, 1987: 217) are ignored in 
Foucault's discourse. Derrida's intervention displays the latent metaphysical structure of the text, it 
shows the contradictions that shadow the text's coherence and express the form of a desire. As 
Derrida remarks, the logos casts a long shadow. 
Conclusion 
What I have attempted in this chapter is to incorporate into my argument three modes of 
analysis whose focus on the normal versus monstrous opposition 
-a paradigm for the oppositions of 
logocentrism in general- has incited a metaphysically symptomatic reading. Along the route of 
inquiry, 
-my methodological trajectory has incorporated Canguilhem, Foucault and Derrida. 
Departing from a Canguilhemian framework, the Foucaldian and Derridian modes of analysis have 
enabled a consideration of the risks of falling back into logocentric procedures, and opened up the 
possibilities of moving around our own logical concepts. Derrida's critique of the logic at work in 
Histoire de lafolie has provided some fundamental insights to understand the metaphysical traditions 
present not only in certain forms of historicism and structuralism but also in positivist philosophical 
traditions (as Canguilhem was well aware): the search for a transcendental fact or event, the search 
for a `true reading'. Each mode of analysis in its own way displays strategies with which to challenge 
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notions such as the Platonic ideal form or the Cogito of Descartes, creates new spaces from which to 
problematize the institutions that determine and re-enact such conceptual paradigms, and offers 
crucial insights into the fundamental philosophical issues of language and interpretation. Their 
works represent significant interventions in the way the monstrous has been determined, controlled 
and framed; moreover, their reading practices, concerned as they are with the imposition of 
institutional forms, de-limit institutional boundaries: 
Texts and discourses that provoke at the outset reactions of rejection, that are denounced 
precisely as anomalies or monstrosities are often texts that, before being in turn appropriated, 
assimilated, acculturated, transform the nature of the field of reception, transform the nature 
of social and cultural experience, historical experience. (Derrida, 1995: 386) 
Not conforming to pre-existing academic practice, contesting traditional ways of organizing 
knowledge, contaminating cultural and linguistic convention, deconstruction has transformed 
familiar habits of thought. Nonetheless, the discursive monster, like all monsters, always runs the 
risk of being assimilated, legitimated and normalized. It is in that space where the monster appears, 
where it shows itself, as if invoking from the outset the metaphysics of presence, where 
deconstruction operates in order to become aware of the history of normality. 
The possibilities figured forth in this chapter aim to establish a different frame(work) 
through which to look at Goya's work as well as of the social, institutional and political dynamics of 
his time. The bringing of Canguilhem's, Foucault's and Derrida's work to bear on Goya opens up a 
strategic reading of his corpus that will consider the Spanish painter's work within a tradition and 
how it works within and against it, thereby giving a new movement to previous interpretations and 
conventional critical approaches. In his work, rupture (discontinuity) and repetition or tradition 
(continuity) work contradictorily together from 1793 onwards: 
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What gives these later paintings [post-1793 production] such force and such potency, and 
what makes them so inimitable, is the fact that they did indeed spring from disillusionment 
and were created out of the wreckage and death of an older kind of culture and another kind 
of painting. They draw their strength and tension from the painter's. own sense of their 
newness and dissidence and from the knowledge that his way of seeing is not the old way of 
seeing. 28 
To think Goya differently will entail a change of perspective, a re-vision of Goya's monstrous 
configurations, which emerge at a given moment without tradition or normative precedent, while 
working through tradition. Working within a tradition, the tradition of Reason, will leave us 
recourse only to stratagems and strategies. 
'Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
Hereafter citations will be from this edition. 
2 The critique of Levi-Strauss is a continuation of a 1966 Lecture given at the John Hopkins University, 'Structure, 
Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences'. This critique of structuralism and its logocentric limitations 
will reappear in a more explicit form in the section on the Foucault and Derrida debate. 
3Of Grammatology, pp. 27-73. 
4 Canguilhem turned to medicine to sharpen his philosophical understanding of concrete human problems: `what I 
expected from medicine was nothing other than an introduction to concrete human problems. Medicine seemed to me 
then, and still seems to me now, a technique or an art at the crossroads of several sciences more than a science in the strict 
sense of the word' (1988: vii). These words are taken from the Introduction to his 1943 thesis, The Normal and the 
Pathological as quoted in the translator's preface to Ideology and rationality in the history of the life sciences 
(Massachussetts: Massachussetts Institute of Technology, 1988). 
5 Le normal et le pathologique was originally published in 1966. Foucault's introduction was added to the English 
language edition in 1978 and appears in the 1989 edition, The Normal and the Pathological, translation by Carolyn 
Fawcett in collaboration with Robert S. Cohen (Zone Books: New York, 1991). Foucault's original appeared as 'La vie 
et la science'in Revue de Metäphysique et de Morale, 1986 (special issue devoted to Georges Canguilhem, no: 1 pp. 3- 
14). 
'interview with Julia Kristeva, 'Semiology and Grammatology' in Positions (London : The Athlone Press, 1987) 
, 
translated and annotated by Alan Bass. The interview was published originally in France in 1972 as Positions by Les 
Editions de Minuit. 
7 
"Report from Mr. Canguilhem on the Manuscript Filed by Mr. Michel Foucault, Director of the Institut Francais of 
Hamburg, in Order to Obtain Permission to Print His Principal Thesis for the Doctor of Letters. " Reproduced in Critical 
Inquiry 21 (Winter 1995) pp. 277-281. 
8 
"On Histoire de lafolie as an Event" in Critical Inquiry 21 (Winter 1995) pp. 282-286. First published in Le debat, 
1986 (special issue after Foucault's death, n 41 Sept 
- 
Nov. 1986). 
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9 
"Introduction to Penser la folie: Essais sur Michel Foucault" in Critical Inquiry 21 (Winter 1995) pp. 287-289. 
10 Citations will be from the 1989 edition, translation by Carolyn R. Fawcett in collaboration with Robert S. Cohen. 
11 
,() The abnormal is not what is normal, but what constitutes another normal' (1989: 203). 
12 As Foucault says in the introduction to The Normal and the Pathological in reference to the "norm" process. 
13 Paul Macherey in `Towards a natural history of norms', in Foucault Philosopher. 
14 In `Passages 
- 
from Traumatism to Promise' (1995: 373-395). 
is First published in 1961 as Folie et deraison and known later as Histoire de la folie. Since Histoire de la folie has 
never been fully translated into English, I will be referring, where necessary, to the French original and to the 
Spanish translation, Historia de la locura y de la civilizaciön. The abridged version was published in English by 
Richard Howard under the title Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. 
16 In `On Histoire de la folie as an Event', Canguilhem argues that this defines and describes Foucault's so-called 
genealogical works (1995: 282-286). 
17 
"Report from Mr Canguilhem 
... 
" (1995: 277-281). 
1s First delivered as a lecture (1966) and later appearing in Writing and Differance. 
19 There is a Hegelian undertone in Derrida's words. Against the individuality of the impulse, the universality of 
reason enters into play; in other words, one needs to `reflect' in order to overcome the immediate proximity with the 
master. The dialogue expresses, on the one hand, the contradictions inherent in Foucault's work, and, on the other, 
the need to surpass its limits. The dialogic relationship between master and disciple manifests this insurmountable 
contradiction. 
20 The critical exchange between Foucault and Derrida has generated much debate and its relevance has reached 
literature, history, and philosophy. For further reading see the following: Geoff Bennington (1979) offers a very help 
summary of the main issues at stake in the exchange; Roy Boyne (1990) gives a sensible appraisal of the 
convergence of their thought around the themes of power and ethics; Robert D'Amico (1984) touches upon the 
positions that the Foucaldian and Derridian modes of analysis raise as to the relationship between the text and the 
world; and, Adam Sharman (1995) considers the critical exchange within Foucault's theory of discourse as act or 
event. 
21 In a provocative lecture delivered 21 October 1966 at the International Colloquium on Critical Languages and the 
Sciences of Man, Derrida criticized Ldvi-Strauss' structural anthropology and, by extension, structuralism. It was 
Derrida's contention that the metaphysical presuppositions about truth and meaning that structuralism sought to 
contest were already implied in the structuralist discourse since every particular borrowing brings along with it the 
whole of metaphysics. 
22'My Body, This Paper, This Fire' ('Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu') appears as an appendix to the second edition of Folie 
et deraison: histoire de lafolie a lä dge classique. It contains another appendix, 'Madness, the absence of work' ('La 
folie, l'absence d'ouvre'). This second edition, 1972, was entitled Histoire de lafolie a lä dge classique and eliminates 
the original preface to which Derrida's criticisms are directed. 
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23 Here I follow Adam Sharman's (1995) corrected translation of Alan Bass (1978). 
za A further proof of God's existence is that existence is contained within the very definition or essence of a perfect 
being. 
zs Having established the existence of God, the meditator is able to reconstruct solid foundations for knowledge, 
based on the mind's clear and distinct ideas whose reliability is guaranteed in God. Descartes' proof of the existence 
of God, as well as that of other rational philosophers such a Spinoza and Leibniz, derives from Saint Amselm's 
formulation of the ontological argument. It is an attempt to prove rationally that God exists, without appeal to 
revelation through Scripture or otherwise. Saint Anselm formulated the proof of the existence of God from a 
consideration of the concept of God which clearly and distinctly includes the existence of the external world which is 
guaranteed for us by the truthfulness of God who cannot allow that our natural desire to affirm the existence of the 
material world is a mere description. 
26 The material principle of causality: the objective reality of ideas requires a cause that has such reality in itself, the 
idea as an objective reality requires a proportional real cause; therefore the idea of an infinite being requires an 
infinite cause, it has been caused in me by an infinite being. The second principle appeals to morality: God is a 
being with every positive perfection, that is, God lacks nothing; a perfect God could not be a deceiver. 
27 It is not my aim to address either the structural flaws in Descartes' procedure or the controversial proofs of God's 
existence, namely what has come to be known as the `Cartesian circle': if the reliability of the clear and distinct 
perceptions of the intellect depends on our knowledge of God, the question is how can that knowledge be established 
in the first place? 
28Andrew Graham-Dixon in `Seeing, but not believing., ' an article published in The Independent (22 March 1994) on the 
occasion of the exhibition `Truth and Fantasy. Goya. The Small Paintings' held in the Royal Academy of Arts, 17 March 
- 
12 June 1994. 
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Chapter 3 
Locating Los Caprichos historically 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to locate Francisco de Goya's collection of etchings 
Los Caprichos (1799) in the historical and cultural context in which it was produced. 
I will be focusing on three interrelated areas of the Spanish Enlightenment 
- 
ideology, 
culture and the visual arts 
- 
in order to understand the political, philosophical, cultural 
and artistic currents with which Los Caprichos engage. Although the actual 
production of the eighty prints took place in the last decade of the eighteenth century, 
a period that stretched from 1794 to 1799, it is necessary to consider the dominant 
paradigms of the time, that is, the sociocultural, discursive and institutional dynamics 
of the Spanish eighteenth-century. My goal, then, is not to re-rehearse what historians 
and philosophers have written elsewhere about the period and the intellectual 
movement. Rather I wish to identify and explore those debates and ideas which are 
pertinent to the study of Los Caprichos. ' The account of the historical and political 
events offered in the following pages will go hand in hand with a cultural analysis of 
the period under consideration, thereby, on the one hand, acknowledging the key 
historical moments that shaped the Spanish eighteenth century, while, on the other, 
always giving preeminence to a critical understanding of a variety of contemporary 
cultural and ideological formations. 
According to Dorinda Outram, the Enlightenment `necessarily took different 
shapes and forms in particular national and cultural contexts' (1995: 3), thus the 
specificities of the Spanish Enlightenment (ilustracibn) need to be addressed in the 
present discussion of Los Caprichos. The epistemological shift that took place across 
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Europe during the eighteenth century assumed a local form in Spain; concrete forces 
such as the Catholic Church and the Inquisition and their influence on the population, 
an immovable social hierarchy ('sociedad estamental'), an almost absent mercantile 
middle class, as well as the timid political reforms of progressive statesmen and 
leading intellectuals (ilustrados), the lack of a radical critique of beliefs, the 
repercussions of the French Revolution, all these factors helped to shape the ways in 
which the enlightened project developed in eighteenth-century Spain. This period of 
Spanish history is one of political and cultural conflict between two monarchical 
conceptions of political organization 
- 
`a modern, centralist, bureaucratic state open 
to change' and a restrictive `conciliar, aristocratic, and regionalist model' (Lynch, 
1989: 295) 
-, and between two different cultures, that of the enlightened reformers 
and that of the traditionalists. 
The first two sections of this chapter focus on the nature of the reforming 
movement. I will outline the policies of reformist absolutism and their influence on 
the body politic of Spain. As has been pointed out, the sections will establish, firstly, 
the conflictive ideological positions between the reformist minority and those sectors 
of society resistant to change, and, secondly, the existence of two camps within the 
reformist movement 
- 
one moderate (and more influential) and another more radical 
- 
in order to highlight that reformist absolutism was concerned more with immediate 
needs and social order rather than with a radical, programmatic and rigorous critique 
of eighteenth-century society. Through an examination of the reformist ideas of the 
Bourbon monarchy and the enlightened minority, I will be exploring the 
contradictions, limits, or insufficiencies of the Spanish ilustraciön in order to establish 
the ideological, cultural and artistic context out of which Los Caprichos emerged. 
The main question being posed in the following three sections 
- 
ideology, culture, and 
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the visual arts 
- 
is to establish how far, and in what ways, Los Caprichos can be seen 
as an Enlightenment work. That is to say, I will be establishing the enlightened 
credentials of (Goya and) the series so as to identify in Chapters 4 and 5 the `limits' at 
which Los Caprichos is more than or even stops being an enlightened work. In the 
words of Janis Tomlinson, `the artist's relation to the Enlightenment is an issue to be 
addressed rather than an assumption that dictates our conclusions' (1992: 6). 
Addressing such a question will necessarily entail, as the chapter progresses, a general 
review of the critical and historical writing 
- 
reading protocols 
- 
that the etchings have 
generated since their publication on 6 February 1799, with the aim of showing the 
ways in which critics have constructed the vision of Los Caprichos as an 
Enlightenment work. Goya's relation to the Enlightenment has been mainly read 
through his graphic production of the late 1790s, and literature on Los Caprichos has, 
more often than not, located the artist among the ilustrados, considering the collection 
as a typical text of the Enlightenment. 
As an introductory and paradigmatic example of this position, and a first 
approach to the society of the period, let us dwell briefly on the collection of etchings 
through a consideration of a recent exhibition of Goya's graphic work (Los 
Caprichos, Desastres de la guerra, Tauromaquia and Disparates). `Goya. Personajes 
y Rostros', an exhibition held in Barcelona between 20 June and 17 September 2000 
in the Centre Cultural Caixa Catalunya, presented to the modem viewer figures from 
all walks of late eighteenth-century Spanish life, in particular those etchings 
belonging to the series Los Caprichos that are a window onto the political and social 
structures of Spanish society: the exercise of power, the privileged estates (nobility 
and clergy) and the popular classes (women, peasants, the dispossessed). Taking a 
lead from the Announcement, the organizers claimed that the aim of Los Caprichos 
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was to satirize the evil and follies of contemporary Spanish society; specific etchings 
illustrate the targets of the artist: the abuses of the privileged estates (Capricho 42 `Tü 
que no puedes' (fig. 6), Capricho 23 `Aquellos polbos' (fig. 7)), the ignorance and 
idleness of the nobility (Capricho 4 `El de la rollona' (fig. 8), Capricho 39 `Asta su 
abuelo' (fig. 9), Capricho 50 `Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10)), the unproductive and corrupt 
clergy (Capricho 13 `Estän calientes' (fig. 11), Capricho 79 `Nadie nos ha visto' (fig. 
12)), and the vices of the populace (Capricho 11 `Muchachos al avio' (fig. 13), 
Capricho 18 `Y se le quema la casa' (fig. 14)). Seen in this light, Los Caprichos is an 
unmistakeably Enlightenment work: such a view of the series, seen as social critique 
and satire of Spanish eighteenth-century society, provides an immediate identification 
with the political, social and moral aspirations of the Spanish reformers. The 
introduction to the exhibition catalogue establishes such a link quite explicitly: 
Durante la decada de 1790, Goya entablö relaciones con los miembros mäs 
progresistas de la aristocracia madrilena y un selecto grupo de politicos y 
escritores adscritos ideolögicamente a la Ilustraciön, partidarios de la reforma 
social, como Jovellanos, Moratfn, Iriarte, Melendez Valdes o Ceän Bermüdez. 
En este contexto histörico y personal fueron concebidos Los Caprichos, que 
dan testimonio de una sociedad en proceso de cambio, en el momento critico 
entre el fin del Antiguo Regimen y el nacimiento del pensamiento liberal 
burgues. 2 
Many a contemporary exhibition sets Goya up as an Enlightenment artist and presents 
the series as an Enlightened work. The aspirations and policies of the Spanish 
ilustrados are the focus of the following sections; attention to the contradictory 
ideologies, political and cultural policies, and artistic tastes of the Bourbon regime 
will enable me to relate Goya's work to its political and cultural milieu. 
Ideology 
It has only been over the last three decades that scholars of the Spanish 
eighteenth century have come to agree that conflict and contradiction configured the 
Spanish Enlightenment (Maravall (1967,1968), Elorza (1970), Subirats (1981), 
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Sanchez-Blanco Parody (1991)); long gone are the monolithic views of Menendez 
Pelayo in Historia de los heterodoxos espanoles (1880-1882), which defined the 
period as `extranjerizante' (that is, dominated by imported ideas alien to the Spanish 
tradition), or the homogenizing visions of Sarrailh (1954) and Herr (1958), for whom 
the Spanish Enlightenment was the collective project of an enlightened minority and a 
phenomenon that was merely derivative of the French philosophes. Such views, 
according to Elorza (1970: 13), have meant that the ideological tensions pervading the 
period and the contradictions existing within different enlightened groups have been 
overlooked. Thus if Goya has been located among the progressive statesmen and 
intellectuals of the time 
- 
the 'minor fa selecta' (Sarrailh, 1974: 122) 
- 
and has come to 
be seen unproblematically as an Enlightenment artist, these very same tensions and 
contradictions that define the late Spanish eighteenth century have been overlooked in 
readings of Los Caprichos. It is necessary then to qualify the artist's relation with the 
ilustraciön and the ilustrados. 
Goya's lifetime (1746-1828) was marked by political change and revolution, 
`exposing him firstly to the pleasures and aspirations of an enlightened Spain under 
Carlos III, then to the corruption of the reign of Carlos IV, which led to the 
martyrdom of his country under the Napoleonic occupation; and finally to the chaotic 
years of the confrontation between liberalism and the tyranny of Ferdinand VII, which 
forced him to live his life in exile' (Gassier and Wilson, 1971: 16). The Spanish 
eighteenth century is marked by the end of the Habsburg dynasty and the arrival on 
the throne of the Bourbons. Successive Bourbon monarchs (Felipe V (1700-1746), 
Fernando VI (1746-1759), Carlos III (1759-1789), Carlos IV (1789-1808)), following 
the French model, established the basis for an authoritarian and centralized 
government whose main priorities were the defence of Spanish interests and the 
89 
reform of antiquated political, social and economic structures. The former entailed a 
more realistic foreign policy that sought (an almost impossible) neutrality in the 
European context as well as a reconsideration of the economic control of its colonies, 
while the structural reforms sought to `activate the state and to make it an effective 
instrument of change' (Lynch, 1989: 163) in the modernization and regeneration of 
Spain. Faced with the legacy of the Habsburgs, 3 the political, economic, social and 
cultural programmes of the new dynasty were directed towards the reform of 
institutional practices, mainly the modification of old hierarchical religious and state 
institutions: `the principal flaws in royal government', writes Lynch, `were not the 
monarch nor the bureaucrats but the institutions' (1989: 2), namely regional autonomy 
and the privileges of the aristocracy and the Church. To this end, the first half of the 
century witnessed the strengthening of a central authority through the `Decretos de 
Nueva Planta', whereby many of the `fueros' or regional juridical and administrative 
privileges were eliminated (firstly in Valencia in 1707 and later on, in 1716, in 
Aragon, Cataluna and Mallorca) and regalist policies were implemented to control the 
power of the Church, policies that would characterize relations between the State and 
the Church throughout the century. ' Economical reforms were made necessary by an 
increase in population and the steady development of the economy, leading to the 
first attempts to modify property and tax policies. And, in the cultural field, new 
philosophical and scientific ideas were introduced particularly through the 
`novatores', who in private gatherings and away from universities and ecclesiastical 
institutions discussed the works of Bacon or Bayle or the publications of European 
academies and journals. 5 The main figures of the first half of the Spanish eighteenth 
century were Gregorio Mayans y Siscar (1699-1781), 6 a continuer of the Humanist 
tradition of Vives, Valdes and El Brocense, and Benito Jeronimo Feijoo (1676-1764). 
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According to Nigel Glendinning (1972), at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century Voltaire and other writers described Spain as `a skeleton of its former self' 
(1972: 1), whilst the Spanish writer Cadalso (1741-1782) referred to the nation with a 
similar image in his Cartas Marruecas (begun in 1768 and written over a period of 
six years): `en la muerte de Carlos III no era Espana sino el esqueleto de un gigante' 
(1999: 50). Military defeats, economic crises and inadequate political leadership 
made Spain a shadow of its former self. Both the absolutist monarchy and the 
enlightened reformers sought to restore the health of an ailing nation, the concept of 
reform being germane to Bourbon politics. The Spanish economy needed to recover if 
the country wanted to compete both in Europe and in the New World with the other 
powers, particularly France and Great Britain. The reformist movement, Palacio 
Atard observes, focused mainly on the economy: `un formidable empeno de 
regeneraciön econömica, al cual se subordina 
- 
como instrumento 
- 
la reforma del 
orden cultural y tambien la präctica politico-administrativa' (1964: 34). Changes in 
the economic sphere would permeate all aspects of society and would contribute, 
according to the reformers, to the progress of the nation and the happiness of its 
citizens, and ultimately bring changes in the cultural sphere. The cultural politics of 
the Bourbon monarchies will be the focus of the next section so let us turn now to 
what the historian Jean Sarrailh defines as the `cruzada de fndole econbmica' 
(Sarrailh, 1974: 573) of the reformers and the main economic resolutions through 
which they sought to regenerate Spain. The following pages therefore place particular 
emphasis on the primacy of the economic factor since the rationalisation of the 
economic infrastructure and the changes in the mode of production affected all other 
spheres of eighteenth-century Spanish society. 
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The promotion of economic reforms was ultimately directed at rationalizing 
the modes of production of Spanish society. The reform programme of the 
governments of Carlos III and Carlos IV `responded to needs rather than ideas' 
(Lynch, 1989: 254), their policies containing little ideology and, as I shall examine 
later, `no overt attack on religion' (1989: 254). The `economic crusade' failed to 
change not only historical privileges but also, it could be argued, the cultural norms 
legitimizing them, a world dominated by tradition, authority and mythology. Most 
enlightened reformers worked in conjunction with the Bourbon absolutist monarchy, 
which was considered to be `el nervio de la reforma' (Palacio Atard, 1964: 34). 
Policies were designed and implemented respecting the status quo, since the main aim 
was to `racionalizar el modo de producciön, sin introducir cambios cualitativos en el 
mismo ni alterar las relaciones de producciön, de acuerdo con los intereses primeros 
de los estamentos privilegiados' (Elorza, 1970: 27). Such rationalization was 
nonetheless favourable to the traditionally privileged classes (clergy and nobility) as 
well as to a nascent, mostly peripheral, mercantile class, creating, as Elorza argues in 
La ideologia del despotismo ilustrado, a non-conflictive relationship between the 
reforming movement and traditionalist positions. Only a nascent liberal ideology, 
according to Elorza, offered a source of potential conflict: 
las relaciones entre las clases privilegiadas (i. e., la estructura del Antiguo 
Regimen) y la naciente burguesia tenian un caräcter no antagönico; el estilo de 
pensamiento del despotismo ilustrado 
- 
incorporado por funcionarios y 
magistrados como Roma y Rosell, Campomanes, Perez y Lopez, nobles como 
Penaflorida y un largo etcetera 
- 
constituyo la expresion ideolögica de esta 
situaciön. (1970: 16) 
To a reforming movement working within the status quo, Elorza opposes a different 
conception of politics and society embodied in the figure of a few radical reformers: 
A esta ideologia, con su defensa coherente de la monarquia absoluta y el 
predominio de clero y nobleza, sobre la base de la producciön agraria y una 
forma de explotaciön artesanal y manufacturera pre-capitalista se superpone la 
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naciente ideologfa liberal, con su incitaciön, mäs o menos radical, a romper las 
relaciones sociales caracterfsticas de la sociedad estamental en favor de nuevas 
relaciones sociales y polfticas tfpicamente burguesas. (1970: 16) 
Whilst there were radical reformers seeking to transform society and culture, the vast 
majority of reformers designed their policies to modernize the state in order to create 
`una sociedad estamental racionalizada y progresiva' (1970: 37), rather than to 
dismantle traditional social and cultural relations. However, radical voices, like those 
of Vicente Alcalä Galiano, Leon de Arroyal, Luis Garcia Canuelo, Francisco 
Cabarrds, 8 Valentin de Foronda, 9 Jose Agustin Ibanez de la Renterfa, Jose Marchenalo 
or Manuel Rubin de Celis, " break any monolithic consideration of the reformist 
movement as being exclusively moderate. 12 Elorza traces these moderate and radical 
voices of the 1770s and the 1780s in his study, where he claims that the works of 
these radical reformers represent the origins of a liberal ideology in the Peninsula 
during the final decades of the eighteenth century and the first of the nineteenth 
century. Their writings represent the first attempts at dismantling the power 
structures of the absolutist regime, 13 a political change that did not finally take place 
until 1812, in the wake of the crisis of 1808, when the Cortes of Cadiz approved the 
Constitution. 14 
Moderate and radical reformers shared certain concerns in economic matters. 
There was a shared interest in the modernization of the State through economic 
reform and the secularization of the country (that is, the restriction of ecclesiastical 
power to the religious sphere), as well as in a critique of the privileged groups. The 
transformation of society, however, signified a marked ideological contrast between 
status quo and radical positions. While the liberal (and revolutionary) notions 
- 
social 
contract, equality and constitution 
- 
and European (mainly the English) political 
models invoked in the works of Arroyal (Cartas econömico-politicas al Conde de 
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Lerena (1787-1790) and the satire Pan y Toros) or Canuelo (El censor (between 
1781-1787)) advocated change in the political structures of Spain, 15 moderate 
reformers such as Jovellanos and Melendez Valdes, both of whom held ministerial 
posts in the final decade of the eighteenth century, resisted any reformist policies that 
could undermine the hierarchies of the absolutist regime. The cautious policies of 
reformist absolutism, together with the course of events in Europe towards the end of 
the century (namely the French Revolution of 1789), which brought financial and 
social crisis to the country, and the indifference of the populace meant that no radical 
reform of the sociopolitical body was carried out. 
As part of the reform of the economy, `ilustraciön' in the Spanish 
Enlightenment came to be equated with practical knowledge ('saberes ütiles') and the 
technical formation of the populace (`ensenanza tecnica de oficios'). The educational 
aspects of the term 
- 
`ilustraciön' as `tares pedagögica-moral' (Elorza, 1970: 30) 
- 
partook also of the economic ideology since the role of education was fundamental in 
the regeneration of the country 
- 
`la educaciön como base imprescindible para el 
progreso social y econömico del pals' (Aguilar Pifial, 1991: 74). Historians and 
cultural analysts like Elorza and Eduardo Subirats have emphasised the instrumental 
use of reason during the Spanish Enlightenment. For example, in La ilustraciön 
insuficiente (1981), Eduardo Subirats argues that the term `ilustraciön' is mainly 
understood as the divulging of knowledge, privileging the didactic, the pedagogic and 
the technical. I shall return to Subirats' essay in more detail in Chapter 5 in the 
context of my analysis of institutional bodies. 
The reformers' legislation (economic, fiscal, commercial) held production to 
be the fundamental instrument of change: `producir y dar mäs salida a los productos 
son dos objetivos siempre presentes en nuestros ilustrados, que repican una y otra vez 
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en las päginas de Campomanes, Floridablanca, Ward, Gändara, Arriqufbar' (Elorza, 
1970: 29). Productivity, the development of productive forces whether in agriculture, 
industry or commerce, was at the centre of a reformist programme that aimed to put 
an end to the non-productivity not only of undercultivated land but also of a large 
sector of the population 
- 
nobility, clergymen, useless bureaucrats, beggars, women. 
`Ociosidad' is a recurrent theme in reformist discourses: `Que nadie este ocioso' 
(cited in Sarrailh, 1974: 530) is Pedro Rodriguez de Campomanes' motto in Discurso 
sobre la educaciön popular de los artesanos y su fomento (1774), in which the 
magistrate resorts to an exclusionary rhetoric, `el verdadero extranjero en su patria es 
el ocioso' (1978: 60) 
- 
we might recall here Foucault's ideas on the age of 
confinement as discussed in Chapter 2. Such exclusion is to be enforced by the State: 
`todo hombre ocioso debe ser objeto de Inquisiciön del Gobierno' (Nicolas de 
Arriqufbar in Recreaciön politica (1770, published in 1779) cited in Elorza, 1970: 
54). The critique of idle, non-productive bodies seemed to be the solution to this 
socioeconomic problem, these words being echoed throughout the second half of the 
century, for instance, in the texts of Arroyal (Cartas) and Cadalso (Cartas 
Marruecas). The two main non-productive groups yet at the same time the wealthiest 
landowners were the higher nobility and the higher clergy who monopolized the land 
and in whose hands the economic infrastructure of the country rested. The 
transformation of these privileged estates and their age-old institutional practices was 
the main aim of the enlightened reformers moderate and radical alike. They needed to 
confront the traditional society of estates on the one hand and, on the other, the 
mentality of a population steeped in `un sentido aristocrätico de la vida' (Palacio 
Atard, 1964: 26) and in the excesses of popular religion. Insofar as the Enlightenment 
in general is recognized as a reformist movement of a secular nature, the Spanish 
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enlightened reformers aimed through reports, economic societies and public initiatives 
approved by the Bourbon kings to secularize the economy and increase the 
productivity of the country. 16 
The Spain of the eighteenth century was a rural society whose economy was 
of an agricultural nature; any agrarian crisis, whether harvest losses, droughts or 
floods, had devastating effects on the economy of the country, plunging the nation 
into disaster. The privileged estates, higher nobility and clergy, owned the land and 
lived off rents; fiscal, legal and customary privileges were deeply rooted in 
institutions such as the noble entails ('mayorazgos'), which perpetuated the hereditary 
transmission of property, and the clerical mortmains (`senor os'). 17 Both institutions 
underscored the relations of agrarian production. Among the attempts at agrarian 
reform were Campomanes' Tratado de la regalia de amortizaciön (1765), which 
primarily defended state intervention and denounced the privileges of the Mesta and 
the clerical mortmain, Gerönimo de Uztäriz's Informe al Consejo sobre la ley agraria 
(1768), and Jovellanos' Informe sobre la ley agraria (1795), 1ß commissioned by the 
Real Sociedad Econömica Matritense, openly hostile to the Church's accumulation of 
property and advocating the distribution of land to peasants, as well as the work of the 
Economic Societies 
- 
Sociedades Econömicas de Amigos del Pais 
- 
which followed 
the example of the Basque Seminario de Vergara (Guipüzcoa) established in 1765. 
These new institutions, considered as instruments of change in the service of the 
State, played an important role in the dissemination of new techniques and useful 
sciences and contributed significantly to the enlightened programme of repopulating 
and colonizing undercultivated and underdeveloped areas. 
With the increase in urban population and a general economic growth, 
reformers also directed their efforts towards the protection of industry and trade in 
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urban areas; among the measures taken by the government were the development of 
crafts, the disappearance of internal custom barriers, and the creation of factories such 
as the Fäbrica de Tapices de Santa Barbara (Madrid), founded in 1720 and supported 
by the State. The artisan sector would be the object of analysis of Campomanes' 
Discurso sobre la educaciön popular (1775), where the minister focuses on the 
professional dignification and technical improvement of the artisans, both 
considerations at the service of productivity and utility, the fundamental criteria for 
the advancement of society in the writings of Campomanes. Such are the economic 
and legislative reasons behind the magistrate's discourse; I will return to 
Campomanes' text in the next section in order to dwell upon its educational aspects, a 
paradigmatic example of the links between economic reform and culture. As for the 
disappearance of internal customs barriers, legislation aimed at creating the necessary 
conditions for the existence of a unified national market and, eventually, a 
`homogenizacion del espacio econömico espanol' (Elorza, 1970: 33). But, as Lynch 
argues, `the failure of agrarian reforms denied the economy the pre-conditions of 
industrialization' (1989: 233). Only cities on the periphery, such as Barcelona, Bilbao 
and Cadiz, became important commercial centres, giving rise to a new relationship 
between the centre and the periphery. Their ports made them into places open to 
external influence where contact with the international community 
- 
the exchange of 
commercial goods and the encounter with other peoples and ideas 
- 
was an everyday 
occurrence. Trade with the colonies was mainly conducted from Cadiz, although this 
monopoly would end in 1778 with the introduction of free trade with America, 
whereas Barcelona added to its commercial port a textile industry developed in and 
around the city, allowing for the emergence of a wealthy bourgeoisie. It is commonly 
believed that Goya would have seen English (as well as French) satirical prints in the 
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house of the businessman and art collector Sebastian Martinez during his 
convalescence in Cadiz. 
Together with reformist laws on agriculture, the other main objective of the 
Bourbon monarchs, riddled with significant social and political implications, was the 
reform of the tax system. 19 From Ensenada's never-implemented policies on a single 
income tax in 1749 to Godoy's legislation on clerical tithes and non-discriminatory 
taxes for commoners and nobles in the last decades of the century, the fiscal 
privileges of the nobility and the Church were placed under scrutiny. However, such 
modifications of the tax system were met with resistance by the privileged estates, and 
more often than not were doing no more than seeking practical answers to specific 
crises. In the words of Lynch, `rather than reorganize the tax structure and challenge 
fiscal privilege, the government preferred to borrow its way out of trouble by 
successive issues of state bonds, the infamous vales reales, and so unleashed a 
monster it could not control' (1989: 414). Los Caprichos might be said to engage 
politically in the debate on tax that threatened a long-established social hierarchy; as 
Tomlinson argues, `they serve in fact as political cartoons that reinforce the attitudes 
underlying royal policy' (1992: 21). As examples of this, Tomlinson cites Capricho 
29 `Esto sf que es leer' (fig. 15), which comments on the nobility's dependence upon 
servants, a luxury to be taxed, and Capricho 42 `Tü que no puedes' (fig. 6) and 
Capricho 10 `Unos a otros' (fig. 16), both of which represent the privileged church 
and the aristocracy as social burdens. 
Both the agrarian and the tax reform were symptomatic of a politics of caution 
that was devoid of radical political content and did not attempt to subvert traditional 
social structures. The reformist policies emanating from within the framework of 
absolutism were directed towards a modernization of the State rather than of society; 
98 
if anything, the nobility kept its place in the social hierarchy. It was not only the 
traditionalists who defended the status of the nobility, but so also did thinkers like 
Feijoo in the first half of the century and moderate reformers such as Duque de 
Almodövar and Sempere y Guarinos in the closing decades (see Elorza, 1970: 61-2). 
The attitudes towards the nobility coming from radical quarters were very different. 
Figures like Arroyal, Canuelo, and Cabarrüs criticised the nobility, as Maravall aptly 
puts it; by `negändole todo fundamento objetivo y funcional, acusändola de atraso 
intelectual y aun biolögico y haciendola responsable del estancamiento econömico y 
cientifico del pals' (1967: 61). As I shall be arguing in the next section, monarchy 
and moderate reformers promoted the education of an existing nobility whose 
ultimate duty was to serve the State. Furthermore, as a ruling class, it was to be 
exemplary, virtuous and productive. It was believed that new criteria 
- 
service to the 
common good, virtue and merit 
- 
would transform the aristocratic 61ite into an 
economic, political and moral force. Only wealth and a politics of ennoblement 
during the reigns of Carlos III and Carlos IV allowed entrance into an estate 
traditionally bearing the marks of lineage. The promotion of members of the lower 
nobility such as Campomanes and Floridablanca to central positions in power was 
based on merit, thereby challenging the traditional holding of administrative and 
ministerial posts based solely on hereditary rights and collegiate education. The 
pueblo Llano or tercer estado comprised the rural classes, the artisans and an emerging 
middle class of bureaucrats, merchants and urban artisans, who loosened `the 
structure of traditional society, without however undermining its foundations' (Lynch, 
1989: 235). Hierarchies and privileges remained as unshakeable institutional 
practices. In the words of Elorza, `conservando los principios bäsicos de 
estratificaciön social y las relaciones de producciön anteriores, se intentarä conseguir 
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la homogeneidad legal, econömica y cultural, a fin de que el poder absoluto pueda 
actuar con plena eficacia' (1970: 38). 
What about that fundamental social and religious institution in the history of 
Spain, the Church? And, more particularly, what was the relationship between the 
Bourbon monarchy and the Catholic Church? A powerful landowner hindering 
agricultural development, the Church was everpresent in society, monopolizing 
education and acting as supreme moral censor. In the same way that the Bourbon 
regime sought to renovate the social and moral functions of the ruling classes, its 
reformist policies were aimed at transforming the Church as part of the modernizing 
process: `the clergy were seen as agents of the State promoting economic 
development, improving education, building public works, and, in general, advancing 
the utilitarian policies formulated in Madrid' (Callahan, 1984: 5). Religious measures 
were undertaken for a variety of reasons: economic, educational, legal and social. 
King and Government sought to become independent from the ecclesiastical authority 
- 
the power of Rome and its representatives in the Spanish Church 
- 
not just in 
economic matters but also in historical and ideological matters. In sum, the State 
sought to limit the power of the Church within the body politic. Regalism, namely the 
defence of the privileges of the Spanish Crown against the Holy See, was at the 
forefront of the Bourbon policy, particularly in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, its most active promoters being Aranda and Campomanes during the reign of 
Carlos III and Cabarrüs and Urquijo under the government of Carlos IV. The main 
aim behind regalist ideas was to establish a government as economically and 
ideologically independent from the authority of the Church as possible and to 
minimize the power of the Papacy in Spain. The latter, the reduction of papal 
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authority over the Spanish Church, was an interest shared by royal bureaucrats and 
reformist ecclesiastical figures. 
In the economic sphere, the State needed a more rational, utilitarian 
administration of an excessive and unproductive ecclesiastical body, more specifically 
the regular clergy; ideologically, reformers directed their efforts towards a 
redefinition of the role of the Church in the education and moral guidance of Spanish 
society. Thus institutional and pastoral aspects of the Church were to be addressed by 
the Bourbons with a view to a rational organization of the Church as well as a change 
of attitudes as far as pastoral responsibilities were concerned (Callahan, 1984: 81). 
The Church had its own reformers; according to Callahan, `between 1750 and 1780 
the reforming movement, with its primarily pastoral and educational emphasis, 
received broad support from the elite of the Caroline Church' (1984: 70), represented 
in the figures of Felipe Berträn, Bishop of Salamanca, Clement, Bishop of Barcelona, 
Francisco Fabian, Archbishop of Valencia, and Francisco Lorenzana, Cardinal of 
Toledo. They would be followed by other reforming figures in the 1780s such as 
Archdeacon Palafox of Cuenca, Antonio Tavira, and Juan Antonio Llorente. The 
reforms coming from within the institution itself can be traced back to the Humanist 
tradition of the Spanish sixteenth century, 20 which had already criticized the excesses 
of popular religion, so germane to Counter-Reformation culture and society, and had 
argued in favour of a simpler and more personalised devotional practice. What were 
the reformers within the Church after, then? First and foremost, `the emphasis was 
not doctrinal but practical and pastoral' (Callahan, 1984: 69), hence their stress on the 
need to re-educate their parish clergy and to eradicate superstition and a vast array of 
popular religious beliefs and practices. `The ideal of the reforming movement', writes 
Callahan, `was an intellectual religion in which the faithful understood the truths of 
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the faith, practiced the liturgy with simplicity and advanced on the road of personal 
spiritual perfection' (1984: 70). In the same way that certain enlightened reformers 
were close to the Bourbons' reforming policies, reformers within the Church might be 
described as being part of the status quo. Likewise, they belonged to a privileged 
enlightened minority, whose ideas were poles apart from those of the traditionalists, 
the regular priests and the general populace. 
However, the traditionalist sectors of the Church were not prepared to lose 
their privileges and rejected the secular and utilitarian role assigned to them by the 
reforming elite (Callahan, 1984: 7,65). Resistance to reform came from the 
conservative bulk of the Church (the majority of the hierarchy, the religious orders, 
the parish clergy and the missionaries) and a populace whose beliefs were deeply 
entrenched in traditional forms of religious expression. The ideological and moral 
orthodoxy imposed by the Catholic Church over the centuries was enforced by the 
Inquisition 
- 
founded by Fernando and Isabel, the Catholic monarchs, in 1478 
- 
whose pervasive institutional presence still held sway during the eighteenth century. 
As the case of the Peruvian lawyer Pablo de Olavide, accused of heresy and 
imprisoned in 1778 after three years of trials (see Roth, 1996: 254-57), and the 
reaction to the French Revolution, which brought State and Church closer, attested, 
the Holy Office could set its repressive mechanisms in motion at any time. 21 
Nevertheless, Carlos III managed to control and moderate Inquisitorial power through 
the appointment of reform-minded prelates like Felipe Berträn to the position of 
Inquisitor General (Callahan, 1984: 33). Other factors, such as the lack of religious 
dissent, the complex economic and jurisdictional privileges of the clergy, and the 
illiteracy of wide sectors of the population made the changes promoted by the 
reformist minority difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Thus during the Spanish 
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Enlightenment `the chasm between the reforming ideal and the social reality of the 
Church was never bridged' (Callahan, 1984: 72). The limitations in State policy as 
well as the resistance to reform within the Church meant that the long eighteenth- 
century saw no radical transformation of the Spanish Church. 
Feijoo never questioned Catholic dogma; other enlightened reformers later in 
the century, whose main attempts stopped at limiting the power of the Catholic 
Church and regenerating the moral and pedagogical role of the clergy, did not 
question Catholic dogma either. Only the expulsion in 1767 both from Spain and the 
colonies of the Jesuits, 22 an order which for centuries had dominated Spanish 
education and imposed scholasticism, was a significant intervention of the State in 
religious affairs, though the Church hierarchy and the other religious orders in fact 
supported Carlos III's decision. The consequences of the expulsion of the Jesuit order 
for the educational system will be addressed in the next section. The equilibrium 
achieved during the reign of Carlos III between government officials and episcopal 
reformers, particularly in regalist matters and religious practices, was upset in the 
1790s both by the effects of the French Revolution, the wars with France and England 
and the ensuing crises, and the alternate use of enlightened reformers and 
conservative figures in government under Carlos IV, which polarised even more the 
different political conceptions of kingship and Church. Traditionalists made use of 
this unstable state of affairs by launching attacks on `the "execrable philosophy" of 
the eighteenth century' and on `the secularism and "libertinism" propagated by the 
French Revolution' (Callahan, 1984: 81), resorting to an even more ultramontane and 
incendiary rhetoric and causing further divisions within the Church. Challenged by 
the new, secular doctrines, traditionalist groups argued that `the survival of a Catholic 
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society depended on the maintenance of the institutions and privileges of the Church 
before the threat of internal and external enemies' (1984: 82). 
The presence of the Church pervades the social fabric of eighteenth-century 
Spain. `The real strength of the Church', notes Callahan, `lay in its spiritual hold over 
the population, from aristocrat to peasant' (1984: 52). Paul Ilie, meanwhile, refers in 
these terms to Spanish cultural life: it `was steeped in Counter-Reformational 
traditions' (1984: 11) which made the Catholic religion `the most powerful norm of 
Spanish civilization' (1984: 13). For Jimenez Lozano, eighteenth-century Spanish 
society is essentially 
una sociedad culturalmente catölica; lo que quiere decir que es una cultura 
eidetica tanto o mäs que una cultura auditiva: el catolicismo medieval en todas 
partes es una religion de la imagen [... ] Es pues con una cultura campesina, 
catölica y medieval, con una viva, fuerte y complaciente conciencia de ella, y 
con sus imägenes idealizadas y absolutizadas y su modo de percepciön, con lo 
que la llustraciön va a chocar. Y lo va a hacer, naturalmente, en el piano de la 
vivencia y la cotidianeidad, mucho antes, mucho mäs y mucho mäs 
profundamente que en el de las ideas. (1989: 142-143) 
Thus the Catholic religion shaped the beliefs and the customs of the Spanish 
population, their minds as well as their bodies. And nowhere is the power of 
traditional forms of religion and their impact on the populace more clear than in 
external expressions of piety (processions, official rituals, devotional associations, 
popular missions, mass evangelizations), religious prints, folk belief (local traditions) 
and the activities of the Inquisition. Most of these practices were the signs of 
Counter-Reformation devotions, which relied on public visual display and the 
superstition of the population; for instance, Capricho 24 `No hubo remedio' (fig. 17), 
which shows an image of an inquisitorial process, and Capricho 52 `iLo que puede un 
sastre! ' (fig. 18) capture the visible (and invisible) looming presence of the Holy 
Office and the clergy. Likewise, Capricho 53 `iQue pico de oro! '(fig. 19) might be 
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read as a satirical reference to the popular missions of missionary preachers such as 
Padre Pedro de Calatayud and Fray Diego de Cadiz. 
Although the power of the Holy Office was restrained by the Bourbon regime, 
Floridablanca, Carlos N's Secretary of State, turned to the Inquisition in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution in order to protect Spain from revolutionary 
contagion. State and Church, at specific historical junctures, still protected each 
other's corporate interests. The 1790s were generally a period of political and social 
unrest. Continuous changes in government characterize the decade, enlightened 
reformers of different hues such as Campomanes, Cabarrüs, and Jovellanos were 
dismissed in 1792, the last two only to be recalled into government during the liberal 
interlude of 1797-98 and ousted again a few months later. 23 The political relationship 
with France marks the decade, affecting both Spain's foreign affairs and her domestic 
policies. The events of 1789, as already noted, set in motion governmental and 
inquisitorial action against revolutionary ideas, 24 provoked war against France 
between 1793 and 1795, alliances with the neighbouring country with the arrival of 
Godoy, the new Secretary of State (and favourite) of Carlos N, which consequently 
brought uninterrupted military conflict with Great Britain between 1796 and 1802. 
The emblematic date of 1789 also coincides with the coronation of Carlos N; the 
events happening in France brought the fear of revolution and social upheaval into the 
Peninsula and served to polarize contrasting ideologies even further. The minister 
Floridablanca established a cordon sanitaire to prevent the spread of revolutionary 
ideas, restoring a rigid censorship with the help of the Inquisition and repressing 
intellectual freedom (Herr, 1958: 239-68). What followed was a period of social and 
political unrest, despite the fact that there were brief interludes of liberal tendencies in 
the mid-1790s, after Godoy signed the Peace of Basle in July 1795. It was agreed 
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that French troops would be withdrawn from Spain (and in return Spain would cede to 
France the colony of Santo Domingo). Two years later Godoy was forced to step 
down from power due to the economic collapse of the country. Leading ilustrados 
such as Jovellanos, after a period of exile from the court of the Spanish Bourbons, and 
Saavedra returned to power (as Minister of Justice and Minister of Finance, 
respectively) between November 1797 and August 1798. Meanwhile, shifts in the 
Church hierarchy responded to the shifts in the balance of power between 
traditionalists and reformists in ministerial positions during the decade: `the balances 
of power shifted constantly, to the reformers between 1790 to 1792, to the 
traditionalists between 1793 and 1795, to reform again during the progressive 
ministry of 1797-1800' (Callahan, 1984: 83). 
It could be argued that the decade in which Goya worked on and published 
Los Caprichos was in many ways a microcosm of the tensions and conflicts that had 
been shaping the evolution of the Spanish nation over the course of the century. In 
this context the Announcement that accompanied the publication of Los Caprichos is 
for many critics inextricably linked with the political events that shook the decade. 
Not surprisingly, with the political situation becoming more volatile, the 
Announcement carries with it a cautionary note. The characters populating the 
collection bear, we are told, no relation to any particular living person: `en ninguna de 
las composiciones que forman esta coleccion se ha propuesto el autor, para ridiculizar 
los defectos particulares a uno ü otro individuo'. Claims to universality and 
disclaimers did not stop Goya's contemporaries from identifying some of the 
characters with public figures, a process encouraged by Valentin Carderera during the 
first half of the century and continued after 1860 by Charles Yriarte (1867), Paul 
Lefort (1877) and Conde de la Vinaza, pseudonym of Cipriano Munoz y Manzano 
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(1887). In this vein Capricho 55 `Hasta la muerte' (fig. 20) has been considered a 
caricature of the Queen, Maria Luisa. This identificatory process will be a prominent 
feature of nineteenth-century French criticism's construction of Goya as a social 
satirist. As Tomlinson (1989/1994) has convincingly argued, these identifications 
respond to a very specific historical moment, the years that followed the publication 
of Los Caprichos, when revolutionary connotations and direct political references 
were grafted onto some of the etchings. Such political readings have accompanied the 
prints from the beginning of the eighteenth century to our days and have contributed 
to the view that they are an Enlightenment work. The author's concern might have 
arisen therefore from his own social and historical context: moving away from direct 
references to particular individuals, the author exonerated himself from any 
inquisitorial process coming from the State or the Church. Censorship was a major 
ideological limit on the dissemination of certain reformist ideas and, during specific 
periods, government and religious censorship worked together; such cooperation was 
particularly activated by the French Revolution. In addition to the censorious 
apparatuses of State and Church, self-imposed censorship also acted against the 
spreading of reformist programmes in general and radical ideas in particular (see 
Glendinning (1972: 6-7), Aguilar Pifial (1991: 118-124)). Thus critics and historians 
read in these lines a disclaimer on the part of Goya with the aim of avoiding 
prosecution by a still powerful Holy Office; their interpretation is justified by some 
facts: firstly, the dropping of subscription in the sales process in 1799 ratifies those 
precautionary words since, as Wilson-Bureau notes, it `could have compromised those 
whose names would appear on the list' (1981: 36); and, secondly, Goya's action in 
1803, when he decided to take the collection off the market and to donate the original 
copperplates, together with 240 unsold copies, to Carlos IV in exchange for a pension 
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of 12,000 reales in favour of his son Javier. 25 Notwithstanding the importance of such 
facts, the universality of the compositions hinted at in the Announcement corresponds 
to a general belief arising from enlightened discourse, namely that the transformation 
and reform of social life was thought to begin with education. 
Culture and education 
The Spanish Enlightenment has been mainly described as a period of cultural 
renovation; tied to the decisions and actions of the absolutist monarchy and the 
reformist minority, its institutional practices were characterized by a certain 
pedadogic ideal: `la misiön de ilustrar en Espana', writes Alvarez de Miranda, `es 
esencialmente una tarea educativa; se considers a la educaciön como uno de los 
cauces de la felicidad püblica' (1995: 423). Driven by the idea that culture was a 
`fuente de felicidad, puesto que crea y desarrolla la felicidad del pueblo' (Sarrailh, 
1974: 167), reformers such as Jovellanos directed their programmes and writings 
towards the common good and public utility. Spanish enlightened reformers' `faith in 
culture'26 and in the role of education27 is comparable with that of their European 
counterparts, with whom they shared the desire to overcome fear, mythology and 
superstition, and to transform a series of institutional practices based on privileges, 
uses and customs. Education for the enlightened reformers was, as Sarrailh defines it, 
`fuente y principio de la dicha de la naciön, como de la de cada individuo', and was 
primarily concerned with the necessity `de reducir la miseria y de fomentar los 
recursos y, por consiguiente, las tecnicas' (1974: 173). And Sarrailh concludes, with 
reference to education: 
Para que su eficacia sea inmediata, como to desean apasionadamente los 
pensadores espanoles, se propondrä tareas modestas y präcticas: sera utilitaria 
en primerfsimo lugar. Finalmente, para no enganarse en cuanto a sus fines, 
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deberä ser dirigida por el poder central, que precisarä su orientaciön y su 
desarrollo con vistas a la felicidad püblica. (1974: 189) 
The Spanish Enlightenment's `cultural dirigisme', to borrow Sarrailh's phrase, refers 
to certain cultural policies: educational reforms and cultural actions emanated from 
the monarch, with the support of the status quo reformers, who directed and regulated 
cultural production. Reason and science would make people increasingly happy, the 
critical use of reason could prove emancipatory and could help to change habits of 
thinking and modes of conduct. In his Cartas a Jovellanos (1792), the radical 
Cabarrüs writes that education is the `condiciön bäsica de un progreso social en el 
futuro, con ciudadanos capaces de desenvolver una conducta racional, frente a los 
atrasos de la tradiciön' (cited in Elorza, 1970: 152). Reason, as opposed to Tradition 
and Revelation, would permeate all levels of society and challenge those established 
educational practices linked to specific groups: the instruction of the populace in order 
to improve agriculture and industry, the education of the dominant classes in order to 
reorganize a pedagogical model monopolized by ecclesiastical institutions and to 
transform the nobility into a productive, exemplary ruling class, and the reform of an 
obsolete higher education system, declared enemy of the new and anchored in 
scholasticism. The education of the nobility, the clergy and the third estate would 
benefit the country economically 
- 
the progress of the nation 
- 
and socially 
- 
happiness for all subjects. However, in the same way that economic measures were 
not aimed at subverting the established social and political order, cultural decisions 
did little to shake the foundations of an educational model still dependent on estatist 
hierarchies. Campomanes' and Jovellanos' cultural policies are to be seen in this 
light. 
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In his Discurso sobre la educaciön popular, Campomanes laid out the 
reformation of manners 
- 
the `civilising process' of the Enlightenment project as 
Norbert Elias (1939) put it 
- 
of the artisan sector. In his introductory remarks to 
Campomanes' treatise, Elorza writes that 
la clase laboral con que suefia Campomanes deberia distinguirse por su 
obediencia y resignaciön cristianas, por su amor al trabajo, por su aseo 
personal ("la poca limpieza de los artesanos los confunde con los mendigos y 
disminuye el aprecio del rico"), por sus sanas costumbres (les prohibe las 
tabernas, los toros, el teatro, el juego de apuestas), por su correcta forma de 
vestir (destierro de la capa larga y la redecilla de los majos). (1978: 23) 
Jovellanos intervened in the policing of public spectacles in La memoria para el 
arreglo de la policia de los espectäculos y de las diversiones püblicas (1796), making 
of the theatre a site of indoctrination and an ideal instrument for social and moral 
reform, as Stephanie Sieburth observes: 
In the eighteenth century, Jovellanos and other men of the Enlightenment 
sought to hierarchize cultural production, to define audiences by socio- 
economic rank, and tried to use the theatre as a means of social control by 
educating the audience into certain kinds of behaviour and values. This 
attempted control of the populace's leisure time extended even to regulating 
the kinds of seating available in the theatre. (1999: 16) 
The `cultural dirigisme' of the government was enforced on public spectacles and 
popular festivals: `sobre cada una de las fiestas y diversiones cayö la losa del silencio: 
edictos y prohibiciones legislan contra las expresiones carnavalescas por motivos de 
utilidad, moral y progreso' (Zavala, 1984: 6-7). Such policies were enforced in order 
to create orderly individuals and were directed at securing social order, responding 
ultimately to Enlightenment constructions of a reasoned or reasonable subject, as I 
shall be arguing in Chapter 4. The influential theories of Foucault on bodies 
disciplined by normative culture into performing appropriate roles 
- 
as discussed in 
previous chapters 
- 
come to mind as a way of accounting theoretically for the 
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regulatory and interventionist policies of Campomanes and Jovellanos on the social 
body. 
In `The Idea and Function of Education in Enlightenment Thought' (1987), 
Jose Antonio Maravall opens his discussion by reflecting on epistemic shifts. The 
transformation of a mentality of an epoch necessarily brings with it 
a transformation of the modes of behaviour among individuals, and, moreover, 
changes in the appraisal of different social roles. This presupposes changes in 
the structure of society that lead to establishing for reasons of maximum 
efficiency, the reform of the human being as the basis for general reform. 
(1987: 39) 
Reform entailed not only the transformation of mentalities and social mores 
- 
but also 
the transformation of bodily behaviours. Whether it was the reformation of habits, 
deportment or manners, Enlightenment projects promoted `normal' bodily behaviours 
and marked others as `deviant', as `un-disciplined'. Thus the body became central in 
the construction and regulation of knowledge, identities and social order. New forms 
of knowledge, new forms of perception and changing attitudes meant the 
establishment of new cultural norms. The culture of the Enlightenment led to cultural 
re-orientations and decreed new ways of seeing. But traditional beliefs and traditional 
cultural forms 
- 
those belonging to the nobility or those of the populace 
- 
were also 
part of the cultural landscape of the second half of the eighteenth century. Broadly 
speaking, epistemic shifts changed the understanding of the natural world and the 
social world of eighteenth-century society. And the violent conflict between the new 
ideas and the old traditions led to cultural change: 
Major social changes in the later eighteenth century led throughout Europe to 
cultural reorientations that in different ways affected all classes. You could 
describe this conflict-ridden historical process as the clash of two cultures, a 
traditional one marked by feudalism, defended tenaciously not least by the 
lower orders, and another that struggled against its dominance, allied to the 
implementation of new economic modes of production and aimed at 
rationalisation and demythologisation of daily life and the personal relations 
characteristic of feudalism. (Held, 1987: 39)2 
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The eighteenth century and the Enlightenment 
- 
in its different conceptions 
(Lumieres, Aufklärung, Enlightenment, Prosvechtence, Illuminismo, Ilustraciön) 
- 
brought with it new categories of thought and perception, as well as new cultural 
values, which in turn were shaped by concrete forces and local cultural practices. In 
the case of Spain, reformers and traditionalists struggled over cultural 
transformations, from governmental policies to everyday life. Thus, according to the 
reformers, economic (and scientific) knowledge would bring progress and happiness 
to the subjects; the instruction and betterment of the nation was justified socially in 
terms of productivity, rationalisation and profit for industry, commerce and, above all, 
the State. `[A]s soon as the enlightened thinkers consider that the concept of 
education / instruction includes a link to the duties and rights with respect to the 
State', Maravall notes, `the subject of education falls under the responsibility of the 
political government' (1992: 79). The diffusion of culture was therefore considered 
to be the key to the transformation 
- 
and modernisation 
- 
of society. But, as has been 
argued, enlightened reformers in government focused mainly on the reform of the 
State and lacked the effective power to change the old social structures. In the 
Spanish Enlightenment the cultural and educational practices encouraged by the State 
were bound up with economic and ideological rules, meaning that traditional ways of 
life and traditional cultural forms resisted against the new cultural norms. 
The works of the Benedictine scholar Feijöo, Teatro Critico Universal (1726- 
1740) and Cartas Eruditas y Curiosas (1742-1760), represent a cultural revolution in 
eighteenth-century Spain. In his role as `desenganador de errores comunes', the 
Benedictine intended to eradicate popular and `learned' superstition by questioning 
traditional beliefs and authorities. The maxims `desenganador de errores comunes' 
and `impugnar errores comunes' pervade the publications of enlightened reformers 
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who declared their didactic and moral intentions in critical, as well as satirical, works 
throughout the second half of the century, and, significantly, the critical tone of the 
Announcement advertising the sale of Los Caprichos, with its reference to the need to 
eradicate evil through education, beckons the reader to the discourses of Feijoo. The 
work of Feijöo parallels the new values of enlightened thinkers across Europe: to 
teach reason and eradicate superstition so as to question previous conceptions of 
religion and science, society and the individual. His faith in experimentation and 
observation, as well as his encyclopaedic work, did much to bring Spain up to date 
with European thought, but both Teatro and Cartas were more a repository of 
technical information, ideas and beliefs than a radical, programmatic and rigorous 
critique of his society. Like the `novatores', Feijöo, a follower of Bacon, questioned 
the scholastic method: `ni esclavo de Aristoteles ni aliado de sus enemigos, escuchare 
siempre, con preferencia a toda autoridad privada, lo que me dictaran la Experiencia y 
la Razön' ('Lo que sobra y falta en la fisica'). 29 His critique was levelled at religious 
practices (popular superstitious beliefs in goblins and ghosts, astrology and almanac 
predictions, and witchcraft), false miracles and self-serving mythologies, and the 
economic abuse and vested interests of ecclesiastical institutions. The `vulgo' 
- 
'los 
que aceptan sin critica cuanto se les dice y cuanto leen, sin pararse a discernir si se 
trata de topicos inaceptables, de mentiras o de disparates' (cited in Caso Gonzalez, 
1983: 70) 
- 
was the explicit target of Feijöo. His teachings loom large in the lexicon 
of the Announcement when we recall them here: `al publico se le ensefla: al vulgo no 
queda mas remedio que desenganarle'. 30 Feij6o takes on the role of desenganador de 
errores comunes, employing the word desengano, that is, the negation of errors, the 
destruction of errors, in its most literal sense. Whilst the writings of the Benedictine 
might be said to imply a reform of the whole of society, his discourses did not change 
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the very fabric of Spanish society. I will be returning to Feijöo's work in Chapter 5 in 
order to compare his project with that of Goya's Los Caprichos in the context of the 
Spanish eighteenth century. 
Education lay in the hands of the clergy. The Catholic Church controlled all 
spheres of education from schools to colleges and universities; the Society of Jesus in 
particular, with its network of seminaries and schools, occupied a privileged position 
within the educational system. It was in charge of the formation of the aristocracy as 
well as the spiritual guidance of the populace. The Church legitimated its authority 
through the transmission of eternal truths and received ideas 
- 
trust in ecclesiastical 
auctoritas, which had replaced the idea of knowledge through direct perception 
characteristic of the Middle Ages. The Church imposed its presence through the Holy 
Office. Revelation, Tradition and Authority were the immovable principles that 
shaped the mentality of eighteenth-century Spanish society. Thus in a country where 
faith and education were the domain of the Catholic Church, the new philosophical 
categories (reason, progress, nature, science) and sets of socio-cultural values 
(secularism, rationalism, utility, observation and experimentation) that the century 
brought with it found the unabated opposition of the traditionalist social bodies. 
Callahan's words might be recalled here: the Church held sway over the whole 
population, `from aristocrat to peasant' (1984: 52). On one side of the social 
spectrum, the aristocratic elite received a traditional education in ecclesiastical 
institutions and obsolete universities; on the other side, the mass of ordinary believers 
was steeped in an oral tradition of folk memory, superstition and blind faith. Of 
course, one of the crucial questions one needs to ask when considering not only 
Feijöo but also the writings of the minority of enlightened reformers is: how did their 
political and educational views fit with their Catholic beliefs? Palacio Atard's 
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description of these men might be said to encapsulate the, at first sight, irreconcilable 
conflict between reformist ideology and Catholic mentality: `los espanoles de la 
ilustraciön eran [... ] hombres contradictorios [... ] que han sido conformados 
intelectualmente por fuerzas morales y culturales diversas, divergentes y hasta 
radicalmente irreconciliables' (1964: 30). To the previous question, one might add: 
how could enlightened reformers counteract the Church since eighteenth-century 
Spain was an `universo totalmente teologizado, sin una sola parcela de laicidad' 
(Jimenez Lozano, 1989: 144), a view of the world deeply ingrained in the imaginary 
of the Spanish people from Medieval and Counter-Reformational times? And a final 
and related question, already addressed in these pages, relates to the limits imposed by 
the Inquisition on their readings and writings. Thus the major obstacles that the 
enlightened reformers needed to confront were the mentality of the population and the 
formative power of the Catholic Church across all sectors of the population, in 
particular scholastic dogma and blind faith. 
Children, women, artisans, the ignorant and unimproved populace would 
become the subject of the pedagogical writings (as well as the socio-economic 
literature) of European and Spanish reformers throughout the century. In his work on 
the British Enlightenment, Enlightenment. Britain and the Creation of the Modern 
World (2001), Roy Porter has pointed out that `the attitudes of enlightened elites 
towards the populace at large were, nevertheless, profoundly ambiguous' (2001: 364); 
to draw a comparison with Spanish enlightened elites' attitudes towards the Spanish 
populace would not be that far-fetched 
.31 These `people' were addressed in the 
writings of Campomanes and Jovellanos, albeit in the reformers' own terms, that is, as 
part of governmental action. Thus Campomanes would defend adamantly the use of 
female labour in industry: `defensor del trabajo femenino 
- 
no, por supuesto, de su 
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liberaciön 
- 
como medio de redimir a la mujer de la ociosidad y convertirla en agente 
productor de la prosperidad econömica' (Elorza, 1978: 32). Feijöo is the first 
enlightened thinker to address the condition of women and the education of women in 
`Defensa de las mujeres', while Leandro Fernandez de Moratin would make of 
women a fundamental aspect of his theatre in the last third of the century. 32 Josefa de 
Amar y Borbön would be one of the first women to express in her Discurso sobre la 
educaciön fisica y moral de la mujer (1785) what education signified to eighteenth- 
century women as subjects of education. 33 However, for the enlightened reformers, 
the economic and moral regeneration of the nation was still dependent upon the 
dominant classes. 
Indeed, the notion of education, Alvarez de Miranda (1995: 424) reminds us, 
was restricted until the eighteenth century to the social elite, princes and nobles, and 
was generally associated with the concept of `crianza' as presented in sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century treatises like Libro de la Buena Educaciön y enseflanza de los 
nobles (Pedro Lopez de Montoya, 1595) and books of emblems such as Idea de un 
Principe Politico Christiano (Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, 1659). The principal 
objective amongst eighteenth-century Spanish reformers `was to educate the broad 
dominant group, the nobility and those related to it, but education in the disciplines of 
politics and morality predominated' (Maravall, 1987: 41). Thus the education of the 
elites was a priority, not all segments of the population were as important. Therefore 
the institutional reforms undertaken in the second half of the eighteenth century, in 
particular during the reign of Carlos III, sought to change certain traditional habits of 
thought, `normal' habits of mind, that legitimated the political privileges and the 
moral authority of the nobility. Among the institutional reforms specifically directed 
to this social group were the decrees of 1771 and 1783: the former was an attempt to 
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dismantle and reorganize an educational system controlled by the `colegios mayores', 
an institution which was originally conceived to support students coming from the 
lower ranks of the nobility but which with the passing of time had been monopolized 
by the Jesuits (until their expulsion in 1767) and contributed to the perpetuation of the 
high nobility in the nation's government; 34 the latter established that nobility and 
work were compatible, attacking mainly the `hidalgo' mentality, and making their 
dominance economically and socially justifiable (that is, making them profitable for 
industry, commerce and State). 
The education of the higher social echelons was the concern of the reformers, 
and satire seemed to be the preferred medium to convey their criticisms. Different 
literary forms took issue with such concerns: the `prensa filosöfica y de costumbres' 
of reformist leanings such as El Censor or El Apologista Universal; the official press 
(La Gazeta de Madrid, Diario Noticioso Universal (known from 1788 onwards as 
Diario de Madrid)) used the nobility as a major target from the 1760s to the 1790s; 35 
plays like Trigueros' Los menestrales (1784), writes Glendinning, took `the common 
view of the period that true nobility lies in usefulness to society rather than in title' 
(1972: 119); the same theme is recurrent in Cadalso's Cartas Marruecas (for instance, 
letters VII, XII and XIII) and in Jovellanos's satirical poem `On The Poor Education 
of the Nobility'; 36 associated with the Sociedades Econömicas del Pais, Iriarte, Ibanez 
de la Renteria and Samaniego would express similar critical positions in their fables. 
Goya also participates in this institutional preoccupation of his time since the theme 
of the asinine in Los Caprichos, directed to exposing and condemning the Spanish 
nobility at the end of the century, lends itself most obviously to a social and moral 
reading. Education and ignorance, social abuse and oppression, or the genealogical 
obsessions of a sector of the population are among Goya's ostensible targets in the 
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prints devoted to the asinine subject (Capricho 39 `Hasta su abuelo' (fig. 9) being a 
case in point). 
Spanish reformist literature of the eighteenth century is a literature of ideas 
that sought to modify the social, political and cultural contexts; in other words, 
literature was used as a tool for change. The artist should subordinate art to politics, 
namely to the common good. Essays, reports and treatises, letters and memoirs, 
fables and plays, the press were all instruments used by the reformers. 37 Such literary 
forms would shape the modern literary genres of Spanish literature, as well as modern 
Spanish prose. 38 In the socio-political context of the period (`critica de costumbres') 
Goya is necessarily read as a cultural critic, a reformer, since he is expressing in 
pictorial form the political and social concerns of literary friends and contributing 
visually to subjects (and forms) typical of the satire of the period. Another common 
literary reference accepted by critics when considering Goya's first conception of Los 
Caprichos is the literary suenos of the seventeenth century, in particular Quevedo's 
Los suenos (1627); other critics such as Bozal (1987,1994) or Stochita and Coderch 
(1999) relate them to G. M. Mitelli's Alfabeto in sogno (1683), too. In the general 
context of Spanish eighteenth-century literature, Glendinning observes that the 
fictional dream or sueno as a vehicle of social satire became, together with the essay 
and the letter, `a staple of periodicals in Spain in the late eighteenth-century and the 
early nineteenth century' (1977: 19). Following the frontispiece to Quevedo's work, 
Goya's first conception of Los Caprichos, known as the Suenos, features as the first 
Sueno a figure dreaming, the inscription being `Ydioma Universal. Dibujado y 
Grabado por Francisco de Goya. 1797' (fig. 21). 
The general views on education outlined up to this point enable us to consider 
the educational function ascribed to Los Caprichos (as seen mainly in the 
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Announcement). Los Caprichos have been regarded as an educational tool sharing 
the concerns of eighteenth-century reformist discourses. It is to these discourses that I 
now turn. Taking the Announcement as a point of departure to read the collection of 
etchings, and unproblematically assuming Goya to be its author, Maravall aligns 
Goya's etchings with the educational goals of the enlightened reformers in his (poorly 
translated) 1987 article: 
Goya said that he engraved and published his prints to combat the evils that 
human beings fall prey to because of "authority, ignorance, and self-interest" 
[... ]. Goya noted that there was another way to arrive at and influence the 
sensibility and even thinking, that is, through the visual lesson of images; that 
was also education. And thus the painter reveals the educational path that the 
Caprichos follow, making them into a "censure of human errors and vices"; 
the painter represents "the multitude of extravagant acts and blunders that are 
common in civil society, " "vulgar deceptions that generate ignorance. " It is 
simply a matter of confronting one with the "forms and attitudes that have 
existed until now in the human mind, darkened or confused by the lack of 
enlightenment or encouraged by the unleashing of the passions. " They are not 
figurations invented by the author. His fantasy allowed him to grasp the ideal 
objects that exist in the mind of a society submerged in vice and ignorance. 
(1987: 72-3) 
Maravall's consideration is our point of entry for a more detailed discussion of culture 
and education during the Spanish Enlightenment. His reference to Los Caprichos 
serves two purposes here: firstly, it allows me to frame my present discussion on the 
cultural politics of the enlightened reformers and to anticipate specific debates and 
issues, and, secondly, it situates the collection of etchings squarely as an 
Enlightenment work. Maravall's words pose some immediate general questions about 
education during the Spanish Enlightenment, as well as some specific questions about 
Goya's prints. What were the major obstacles 
- 
`evils' 
- 
which enlightened reformers 
had to confront? Who, or what institutions, defended and perpetuated `authority, 
ignorance, and self-interest'? What is the meaning of enlightenment (or `lack of 
enlightenment')? How does the collection of etchings relate to contemporary 
reformist discourses in other cultural fields? How does it relate to other `visual 
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lessons'? What does the Announcement tell us about the series? And, was Goya the 
author of the Announcement that appeared in Diario de Madrid? 
For a start, the Announcement itself, as I will be arguing, is already framed in 
ambiguity, thus undoing any categorical thinking about or transparent meaning in Los 
Caprichos. By its very nature, many readers and critics are predictably wrapped up in 
the literariness of the Announcement. Critics such as Sanchez Canton (1949), Gassier 
and Wilson (1971), Perez Sanchez (1979), and Wilson-Bureau (1981) have no doubt 
that the text was composed, entirely or almost entirely, by the writer Leandro 
Fernandez de Moratin or the art historian Cean Bermudez 
- 
both of whom were close 
friends of Goya 
-, while others allow some possibility for Goya's authorship (Lopez 
Rey, 1953 (1970)) or, at least, for his formulation of the text (Helman (1963), Sayre 
(1989), Tomlinson (1994)). Those who believe that Goya was the author read in the 
Advertisement a continuation of what the artist had expressed on the title page of his 
Suenos, Goya's first conception of Los Caprichos, in 1797: `Ydioma Universal. 
Dibujado y Grabado por Francisco de Goya ano 1797. El autor sonando. Su yntento 
solo es desterrar bulgaridades perjudiciales, y perpetuar con esta obra de caprichos el 
testimonio solido de la verdad'. 39 The literary flavor of the Announcement, together 
with its sociopolitical dimension, connects Goya with the ideas and values of a 
moderate and reformist enlightened circle as represented by Gaspar Melchor de 
Jovellanos, Leandro Fernandez de Moratin, Juan Antonio Melendez Valdes, Juan 
Antonio Cean Bermudez and others. 
Los Caprichos certainly engaged with the topics and the pedagogic purpose 
expressed in the Announcement: to banish `extravagancias y desaciertos' and 
`embustes vulgares' sanctioned by custom, ignorance or vested interest. It is in the 
drawings that Goya begins to make his observations on the world that surrounds him, 
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looking into the social structures, groups and values that were the targets of the 
enlightened reformers whose main aim was to criticize Spanish society and reform its 
institutions and its customs. Such was the agenda of the radical reformers behind the 
already mentioned El Censor during the 1780s: `someter a examen el funcionamiento 
de la sociedad espanola' and `los fundamentos mismos de la estructura social del 
despotismo ilustrado' (Enciso Recio, 1988: 86). 
The work of Helman was one of the first consistently to read Los Caprichos in 
the context of the contemporary literature of ideas. 40 In Trasmundo de Goya (1963), 
she considers the literary as forming the backdrop to the collection in the widest 
sense. Goya's images of asses, for instance, might have found their point of departure 
in Gabriel Alvarez de Toledo's La Burromaquia (date unknown), Juan Pablo Forner's 
Asno Erudito (1782), and Doctor de Ballesteros' Memorias de la Insigne Academia 
Asnal (1792). Helman's investigations are extended to other themes: for those 
etchings on prostitution, Nicolas Fernandez de Moratin's Arte de las putas 
(circulating in manuscript form and not published until 1898), whereas for those 
portraying the vices of the religious orders, Padre Isla's Historia del famoso 
predicador Fray Gerundio de Campazas, Alias Zotes (Part I, 1758; Part II, 1770). 
Helman suggested what other critics like Bozal (1994: 99-153) have expressed in a 
more cautious way, that is, that the etchings participate in the cultural milieu in which 
they were created but they are not mere descriptions or illustrations of literary 
sources. Traditionally, therefore, Los Caprichos have been interpreted within the 
larger movement of the Enlightenment and Neoclassical criticism related to rational 
didacticism; and the collection is seen as an educational tool for attaining 
enlightenment, a social critique and satire of Spanish eighteenth-century society. 
Familiar and recognizable readings that shape our vision and understanding of the 
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series are those pioneered by Lafuente Ferrari (1947,1977), Sanchez Canton (1949) 
and Lopez Rey (1947,1953), who take the neoclassical aesthetics of the 
Announcement as a point of departure: `se cree que este anuncio fue redactado por 
Leandro Fernandez de Moratin' as a `manifestaciön del espiritu neocläsico' (Bozal, 
1987: 715). Their works stake out a territory which has contextualized Goya's life 
and work within (moderate, I would argue) enlightened circles; a critical tradition 
explored further by Helman, and extended, more recently, in Alcalä Flecha's 
Literatura e ideologia en el arte de Goya (1988) and Perez Sanchez and Sayre's Goya 
and the Spirit of the Enlightenment (1989). Literatura e ideologia en el arte de Goya 
traces the literature and the cultural ideas of Goya's contemporary milieu in order to 
interpret the series; Goya and the Spirit of the Enlightenment, the result of an 
exhibition and catalogue that investigates the relationship between Goya and the 
Enlightenment, locates the artist among the progressive statesmen and intellectuals. 41 
Such readings of Los Caprichos in the light of literary traditions set Goya up as a man 
of the Enlightenment, a `painter philosopher' in the words of Helman (1993: 199). 
Helman is invoking a concept which is contemporary to Goya; a painter philosopher, 
Ceän Bermudez writes in Diccionario de los mds ilustres Profesores de las Bellas 
Artes en Espana (1800), is `a painter who spent time in careful preparation and study 
before embarking on a work of art, employing his head as well as hand' (cited in 
Glendinning, 1997: 67). While art historians might insert Goya into this established 
artistic notion, literary critics, by associating the artist with the philosophical ideas of 
the Enlightenment, would give his work a rather different inflection. 42 
The involvement of the State in cultural guidance and regulation meant that 
the Spanish eighteenth century was witness to the creation of cultural institutions that 
parallel those of the rest Europe. Academies and the already mentioned Economic 
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Societies were created and sanctioned with the approval of the Bourbon monarchy 
from 1740 onwards (Glendinning, 1972: 6; Aguilar Pinal, 1991: 94-98), not to forget 
the creation of other cultural spaces typical of the century like the `tertulia' (Palacio 
Atard, 1964: 232; Aguilar Pinal, 1991: 94). Although most of the Academies such as 
the Real Gabinete de Historia Natural (1771) and the Observatorio Astronömico 
(1790) were located in Madrid, responding to the centralizing politics of the Bourbon 
kings, other institutions were founded outside the capital, for instance the Colegio dc 
Cirugfa in Cadiz (1748) and in Barcelona (1760). But of particular interest for us in 
the present discussion of Los Caprichos are the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San 
Fernando inaugurated by Fernando VI on 12 April 1752 and the Calcograffa Real set 
up in 1789 under the auspices of Carlos 111.43 The former would become an 
institution for the teaching of arts as well as the observance of aesthetic norms and the 
arbiter of taste; the latter would play an important role in the diffusion of scientific 
knowledge and artistic heritage. In the final section of this chapter, I will be turning 
my attention to the visual culture of the period in order to place Goya's graphic 
production within an institutional and artistic context. Such a move will enable me to 
examine the broader operations of the Spanish Enlightenment visual culture through 
Goya's images in the next two chapters. 
The visual arts 
Whilst Los Caprichos have been largely considered through the lens of the 
literature and the philosophy of the period, the visual image as a direct and potent 
medium of communication cannot be relegated to a subordinate position and, by 
extension, given less intellectual ground. So, for instance, in their exhibition 
catalogue `Mirar y leer. Los Caprichos de Goya', Carrete Parrondo's and Centellas 
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Salamero's position is symptomatic of a critical tradition which assumes that the 
textual `reveals' the fullest meaning of the images and, ultimately, ensures that seeing 
is not reading 
- 
that is, not a proper reading: `a pesar del caräcter visual de las 
imägenes, su estructura y articulaciön son literarias' (1999: 13). Notwithstanding the 
importance of bookish literacy in reading protocols of Los Caprichos, in particular the 
close attention to the `text' (whether the captions, the commentaries, or the 
illustrations as discourse), some critics have tended to overlook a larger picture: a 
model of education through vision. Such a model, explicitly mentioned in Maravall's 
comments on the series, is not, or is only marginally, explored in studies on Los 
Caprichos, and is usually subordinated, as in the case of Maravall, to a wider 
discussion of philosophical, political and socioeconomic literature. As a result of this 
disregard, criticism on the etchings presents a series of shortcomings: firstly, reformist 
literature, in particular satirical writings, seems to account for an explanation of the 
images (indeed, what shaped most contemporary and future readings of Los 
Caprichos as a whole is the familiar vernacular of satire); 45 secondly, by favouring the 
`textual', critics ascribe specific, limited political intentions to visual images, which 
means, it could be argued, that an emphasis on the literary/verbal has reinforced 
Enlightenment readings of the series; and, thirdly, an investment in the primacy of 
`high culture' 
- 
bookish literacy 
- 
delegitimizes inquiry into popular culture. Goya's 
collection has been isolated from other artistic traditions that preceded him and that 
relied on visualization for didactic purposes. As part of Goya's `highly self-conscious 
rethinking and response to multiple traditions of representation' (Tomlinson, 1992: 8), 
an engagement with these images necessarily demands an analysis of a local visual 
tradition whose Medieval, Counter-Reformational and Baroque imagery was still so 
pervasive among great sectors of the population. Despite the changes throughout the 
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eighteenth-century in cultural and social relations across Europe and in Spain, Spain 
still remained a culturally Catholic society. As argued in the previous section, 
Christian traditions and imagery, a long-standing tradition of instruction (religious 
didacticism, religious doctrine), and the art of Catholic persuasion are strong 
reminders that Spanish culture still remained steeped in what Stafford has described 
as `a "papist" oral visual culture' (1994: 129). Goya seemed to be aware, unlike other 
Spanish enlightened reformers, that visual education in a predominantly `cultura 
eidetica' such as the Spanish one might still be valid and closer to the unenlightened 
masses. For instance, the Society of Jesus, so influential in the intellectual and 
cultural life of the seventeenth and the first two thirds of the eighteenth century till 
their expulsion, might arguably enable us to recognize a much richer perspective 
inscribed in Los Caprichos. 
In the same way that Medieval and Counter-Reformational traditions can be 
seen at work in a broader consideration of the collection, the presence of Baroque 
elements in the series sets in motion the possibility of looking at (and reading) the 
images in different ways. The apparent significance of the Announcement demarcates 
a text which is neoclassical in its statement of aims, satirical in its intention, and 
contemporary in its use of a familiar vernacular. Yet to consider only the literal sense 
of the text is to lose sight of what might be said to be deliberately ambigous textual 
signs, which elicit from the reader a different set of interpretative questions. In (2000: 
176), Stoichita and Coderch have emphasized the presence of Baroque elements in the 
Announcement, revealing the indebtedness of the text to a `conceptista' tradition 
rooted in Baroque culture. Stoichita and Coderch's nuanced reading casts new light 
on the intention behind the lines of the text, particularly with regard to the addressee. 
Drawing upon Baltasar Graciän's notion of the `buen entendedor', the addressee of 
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the Announcement would be that viewer and reader capable of deciphering the 
nuances of expression, a competent decoder of signs 
- 
`los inteligentes'. Despite the 
unknown authorship of the Announcement, the text seems to imply different kinds of 
readers (and viewers); the implications of having different audiences mean that, when 
one analyzes the etchings, different patterns of reading and looking at them emerge. 
Meaning rather different things to each audience, interpreted differently, the etchings, 
for instance, veer between the literary and the popular. To accept the literariness of 
the series as well as the allusive readability of the collection as a whole is not to 
overlook the use of imagery deriving from traditions of popular culture. The 
combination of the erudite and the popular, the high and the low, lends Los Caprichos 
different readings whether the viewer is a reformer, a connoisseur, or the `public': `el 
ciclo sugiere y soporta multiples lecturas cuyos niveles dependen de las aptitudes e 
instrumentos interpretativos del espectador' (Stoichita and Coderch, 2000: 219). As 
Glendinning has observed, `when Goya refers to his art as "idioma universal" (a 
universal language) in the preliminary drawing for No. 43, `The Sleep of Reason 
Produces Monsters', he is presumably implying, as Palomino had done before him, 
that `art could speak to the illiterate majority as well as to the literate minority, and to 
people in many countries' (1973: 526). I shall be discussing these points in the final 
two chapters. 
My turn to the visual in the remainder of the chapter is informed by the works 
of critics such as Licht and Tomlinson. Licht has observed that the originality of Los 
Caprichos lies in perception: `a new logic of seeing [... ] a radically new concept of 
composition, of seeing, and of transmitting perceptions' (1973: 93); in other words, in 
the visual. I shall return to this point time and again in Chapters 4 and 5- `exponer ä 
los ojos', demonstrating to the eyes, monstrare 
- 
in order to examine, on the one 
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hand, the apparent contradictions between the visible enlightened ideals of the themes 
and the deliberate ambiguity of the etchings; and, on the other, the critical function of 
Goya's art. By focusing on vernacular visuality in the following pages, I wish to 
consider: firstly, the visual arts in the Spanish Enlightenment; secondly, the 
institutional practices and artistic traditions within and against which Goya was 
working during the production of Los Caprichos, in particular as they relate to the art 
of engraving; and, finally, the creative process that led to the publication of the series 
in 1799. 
Little is known about the role and the meaning of the visual arts for Spanish 
enlightened reformers. Tomlinson observes that 
there is little evidence that reformers in Spain were at all concerned with the 
contribution that could be made by the visual arts, and it is not 
methodologically sound to bridge the gap between aesthetic and intellectual 
movements by supposing that the artist was, like Jovellanos or Moratin, an 
avid reader of the progressive publications. (1992: 5) 
Nonetheless, during the Spanish eighteenth-century the importance of visual 
representations 
- 
public ceremonies, engravings, prints, theatre performance 
- 
helped 
in the transmission of ideas and attitudes to wider audiences beyond the social elite, as 
religious images had done for centuries too. Society demanded new forms of 
representation. `The Bourbon House', writes Tomlinson, `seemed determined to 
create a new public image and to establish a comfortable lyfestyle by building new 
palaces' (1997: 14), and this new image was to stand in `diametric opposition to that 
of the preceding dynasty' (1997: 15). There was a need to find new aesthetic 
formulas that would reflect the ideas of the new monarchy. The creation of the 
Academies, for instance, `helped to establish a standardized taste in Spain on a 
national rather than a regional basis' (Glendinning, 1973: 522). Moreover, French 
and Italian artists working for the Bourbon regime established the artistic trends of the 
127 
day, mainly in architecture. Carlos III brought the Venetian Giovanni Battista 
Tiepolo (1696-1770) and the Bohemian Anton Raphael Mengs (1728-1779) to work 
in the royal palaces and churches; both of these artists had already worked in the court 
of Naples where Carlos (as Carlos VIII, King of the Two Sicilies) had been a monarch 
between 1734 and 1759. As the theoretician of neo-classicism, Mengs looked back to 
Greek and Roman classical art as ideal models after being inspired by the discovery of 
the archaelogical sites of Pompeii and Herculaneum. For Mengs, naturalness, order, 
simplicity, legibility and beauty were the norms that should dictate any work of art. 
The aesthetic and ideological affinities between Mengs and the directors of the 
Academy (Floridablanca, Marques de la Florida, Antonio Ponz) were expressed by 
Jovellanos in `Elogio de la Bellas Artes' (14 July 1781): 
Cuando recomendamos tan encarecidamente a nuestros jövenes artistas la 
imitaciön de la bella Naturaleza, no se crea que pretendemos retraerlos de 
trabajar sobre lo antiguo: antes por el contrario quisieramos que observändole 
y estudiändole a todas horas aprendiesen a buscar en la Naturaleza misma 
aquellas sublimes perfecciones que tan bien imitaron en ella los griegos. 
(cited in Bedat, 1989: 230-31). 
During his period in Spain, Mengs, advocate of academicism, reformed the Academy 
of Arts, became director of the Real Fabrica de Tapices de Santa Barbara and 
established the tastes of the Bourbon monarchy: 
El academicismo optö por el clasicismo como el estilo mäs acorde con la 
epoca de la llustraciön, imponiendo las nuevas formas a partir de los palacios 
reales, los establecimientos de artes aplicadas, la pintura de camara y las 
instituciones industriales, docentes o militares promovidas por la Corona. 
(Martinez Shaw, 1996: 81) 
By 1799, the year in which Los Caprichos were published, royal commissions, 
portraits and commissions for the aristocracy, paintings of religious subjects, and 
tapestry designs for the Real Fäbrica de Tapices had earned Goya a reputation in the 
court entourage. In October 1799 his achievements as a Court painter since April 
1789 were acknowledged when he was named First Court Painter. By then Goya was 
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established also in academic circles; he was appointed Director of Painting at the Real 
Academia de San Fernando in 1795 after the death of Francisco Bayeu (1734-1795), a 
post he would resign from two years later for reasons of health. During these years 
Goya also produced portraits of enlightened reformers holding ministerial posts 
(Melendez Valdes (1797) and Jovellanos (1798)), as well as of aristocratic figures 
close to enlightened ideals (the Duke and the Duchess of Alba (1795) and the 
Marquesa de Solana (1795)). Thus knowledge of both his commissioned and 
uncommissioned work placed Goya in a position whereby `people who were 
interested could have known about his Caprichos and Tauromaquia as soon as they 
appeared (1799 and 1816, respectively), as well as his earlier prints after Velazquez 
(1788) since they were all advertised in Madrid newspapers' (Glendinning, 1977: 10). 
Goya, however, distanced himself from the prevalent stylistic trends. The recognition 
of the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando and the Calcograffa Real as 
legitimate academic institutions by the Bourbon monarchy did not stop Goya from 
developing new approaches to painting and to etching at the turn of the eighteenth 
century. Parallel to the experimental innovations carried out by Goya in his graphic 
work is the flouting of conventions in religious paintings (for instance, the 
commissioned decoration of San Antonio de la Florida in 1798) as well as his 
personal response to more conventional genres such as portraits. During the time of 
the conception of Los Caprichos, Goya worked simultaneously in different media and 
for a variety of employers. Nonetheless, as Tomlinson reminds us, `Goya began to 
experiment with commissioned projects only when his position within the court 
hierarchy and system of patronage was secure' (1997: 24). 
During Goya's lifetime greater importance came to be attached to the personal 
vision of the artist. In his report to the Royal Academy on the teaching of art on 14 
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October 1792, Goya establishes his own aesthetic position and expresses his general 
concern with the liberty of the individual artist: `I know of no better ways to advance 
the arts than by allowing students of art to develop their own abilities in their own 
way, without forcing them to go in one particular direction, and without making them 
adopt a particular style of painting if it is against their inclination' (Goya in 
Glendinning, 1977: 46). The Aragonese artist did much to encourage the movement 
away from Neo-classical principles in art 
- 
harmony, beauty, decorum and restraint 
- 
that gave priority to the idealization of subjects and the representation of heroic pasts 
and mythological narratives that equated virtue with beauty and truth in true 
pedagogical fashion. Bedat refers to Goya's radical aesthetic position against Mengs 
in these terms: his report `revela cömo reaccionaba violentamente contra las ideas 
neocläsicas de Mengs, sublevändose tambien contra los que 
- 
sin ser profesores 
- 
quer an aleccionar a los artistas por las ideas de Mengs' (1989: 222). However, while 
the aesthetic assumptions underlying the Announcement place Goya in opposition to 
institutionalised academic principles, the author inserts his project into age-old artistic 
traditions in the history of engraving, as I shall go on to discuss. Without entirely 
breaking with the past, `Goya forged a way forward to the new' by transcending `the 
aesthetic ideas of the age in which he lived' (Mena, 1989: 20). Scholarly work over 
the last two centuries has shown that Los Caprichos are informed by diverse, indeed 
divergent, cultural practices. The series therefore can be seen as a challenging 
palimpsest of traditions. Experimenting with new forms, drawing on artistic 
conventions while simultaneously challenging them, appropriating imaginatively a 
variety of idioms, Goya reverses generic expectations (always alive as he was to the 
possibilities within image reversal). The various aesthetic possibilities, which will be 
examined in more depth in the analysis of the etchings in the following chapters, 
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conjured up by the visual images are already suggested in the Announcement. In 
`Capriccio: Goya and a Graphic Tradition', David Rosand (1989: 8) argues that the 
project responds to `the aesthetic of fantasy inherent to the genre' of `capricho', and 
belongs to an artistic tradition which goes back to the first printmakers of the 
Renaissance, who saw the new art of engraving not only as a means of testing and 
exploring novel ideas, but also as a way of asserting their inventive powers and 
demonstrating their technique. Therefore any attempt to harness the images to 
explicit historical and literary events goes against the genre's defining features 
- 
invention and imagination. To seek a direct relation between etching and actual event 
tends `to isolate from the series those etchings for which historical and literary 
parallels can be found, thus limiting interpretation and reducing Los Caprichos to 
illustrations of a text to be pieced together by scholars' (1989a: 15), and to fix the 
meaning of a collection in which the dialectical relation between image and word is of 
some importance. 
Goya was the first Spanish artist to undertake a graphic work of the scope of 
Los Caprichos. Such an ambitious work placed him with the great masters of 
engraving, Dürer (1471-1528) and Rembrandt (1606-1669). During the Renaissance, 
Dürer raised woodcutting and copper engraving techniques to the status of art, while 
Rembrandt's use of etching to produce chiaroscuro would be fully exploited in 
Goya's further experimentation with other techniques. Etching and aquatint were 
techniques generally underestimated by Spanish artists, who favoured burin 
engraving: `in the 1790s', as Wilson-Bureau notes, `printmakers were still using the 
aquatint technique in a rather limited way for decorative, historical and topographical 
subjects' (1981: 32). Considered in its purely pictorial and reproductive sense, the art 
of engraving could be said to have been mainly practical or `useful', as Sayre (1974: 
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3) has put it, or, in Carrete Parrondo's words, `el utilfsimo arte del grabado' (1996: 
19). Thus the production of prints was related mainly to technical improvements and 
cartographical information, rather than more artistically oriented production. 
Aesthetically, such production across Europe was associated with low art since 
engravings were considered `lowly graphic carriers, or mere illustrations, of scientific 
and technical information' (Stafford, 1993: 56). 
Since the fifteenth century engraving had been considered to be the best way 
of disseminating and popularizing graphic work in mass production. A more popular 
art form than painting or sculpture, it fulfilled educational, religious and 
propagandistic functions. Eighteenth-century Spanish monarchs, in particular Carlos 
III and his ministers, were very aware of the possibilities of the medium, namely the 
propagandistic value of images. Apart from official portraits and allegories of the 
kings that consolidated and propagated royal authority, the monarchy was interested 
in the diffusion of science and the circulation of the latest infrastructural 
improvements (such as the construction of roads and canals), on the one hand, and, on 
the other, in making the national artistic heritage known to a wider public. 46 Whilst 
still considered a primarily utilitarian medium, Carlos HI's establishment of a project 
concerned with the diffusion of art led to the reproduction of the masterpieces of 
Spanish painting-47 Throughout the eighteenth century, successive Spanish monarchs, 
as well as other institutions such as the Real Academia de San Fernando and the 
Sociedades Econömicas de Amigos del Pais, supported the utilitarian development of 
engraving by providing scholarships for Spanish artists to go to France as 
`pensionados' so that they would learn their trade under the supervision of the 
Encyclopedie master engravers. 48 Fernando VI inaugurated the Real Academia de 
San Fernando on 12 April 1752, and, as Sayre reminds us, `printmaking was taught 
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from the beginning' (1974: 1), Juan Bernabe Palomino (1692-1777) being the first 
academic to teach it. 49 (An important fact, bearing in mind that painting, sculpture 
and architecture were considered the only `noble arts'). Institutional support 
continued during the reign of Carlos III under whose auspices the Real Calcografia 
was set up in 1789. Engraving therefore was recognized in Spain as an academic 
discipline from the second half of the eighteenth century. The institutionalization of 
engraving via the Real Academia de San Fernando and the Real Calcografia conferred 
status and legitimacy on a discipline which, like any other institution, established 
norms and aesthetic standards, and, in the words of Carrete Parrondo, `impuso el 
Ilamado buen gusto' (1990: 8). 
Although Goya's graphic output after Los Caprichos is prolific (Desastres de 
la Guerra (c. 1810-1815, published 1863), Tauromaquia (1816) and Los Disparates 
(c. 1815-1820, published in 1894 as Los proverbios), his production until the mid- 
1790s was limited to a small number of works. It amounts to some copies of 
Veläzquez's paintings (c. 1778), 50 a print entitled El agarrotado (c. 1778-80), and a 
few religious engravings (La huida de Egipto, San Francisco de Paula, and San 
Isidro). Do Goya's first prints conform to or stray from aesthetic standards? Whilst 
the series of etchings after Veläzquez's works responded to the need for reproductions 
of the masterpieces of Spanish art and belonged to the wider Enlightenment project 
supported by Carlos III whereby engravings had a role to play in the instruction and 
diffusion of knowledge as well as in the recuperation of a `Spanish' artistic tradition, 
the religious etchings might be said to belong to a larger tradition of popular 
engraving which represented biblical or genre scenes, or commemorated historical 
events. For the set of prints after Velazquez, Goya followed the academic fashion not 
only in terms of publication but also in the reproductive nature of this work, whose 
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main purpose was to disseminate the images of the seventeenth-century painter: Goya 
`tratö de comportarse como un grabador tradicional en la manera de presentar su obra: 
buscö el reconocimiento de la Academia y lo obtuvo, puso a la yenta las estampas en 
una librerfa bien conocida, bien por cuadernos, bien por estampas sueltas y las 
anunciö en la Gazeta de Madrid' (Vega, 1992: 113). 51 More than twenty years later, 
the circumstances surrounding the publication of Los Caprichos, as has already been 
argued, were very different. The prospective buyer of the collection would have had 
to go to a shop selling perfume and spirits, an unusual trip since prints were normally 
sold in bookshops or acquired by subscription. The religious etchings that Goya 
produced bear witness to the interests of the society of the time, and their demand and 
commercial viability was met by the production of Spanish engravers. More than half 
of the prints produced in the second half of the eighteenth century were religious, that 
is, devotional images, `most of the rest could be classified as useful: portraits of 
sovereigns, and occasional, general maps, and technical innovations, with a slight 
leavening of regional custom, exotic animals, and monstrous humans' (Sayre, 1974: 
3). 52 As one can see from this list of topics, the main function of engraving, mainly 
burin engraving, was of a reproductive nature. Whether it was royal or religious 
patronage or private enterprise, prints responded to institutional and popular demands. 
The influence of these trends as a direct source of inspiration for Goya is a matter of 
constant debate and scholarship. They nevertheless formed part of the cultural milieu 
in which Goya was working. 
The traditional process of engraving entailed a draughtsman copying the 
object to be reproduced, then an engraver transferring it to the plate. Goya breaks 
away from the accepted code of procedure since the innovation and experimentation 
present in Los Caprichos was not only at the level of technique, theme and 
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composition but also in his original and inventive approach to the medium. The artist 
moved away from a reproductive craft to an original and creative art, from the more 
academic burin engraving to the newly discovered technique of aquatint. In this 
process, the Aragonese artist used the technique of etching as a laboratory of ideas, as 
a way of representing the rapidly changing world around him, and as an important 
instrument in the transmission of ideas and the communication of complex thoughts. 
Los Caprichos were based on experimentation, observation, and questioning. 
According to Stafford, the eighteenth century saw an increasing distinction between 
these two approaches to the medium 
- 
mere reproduction and original invention: 'there 
was a public medium, devoted to unimaginative copying and transmitting of 
secondary imagery for an educational or "reference" purpose. And then there was a 
seemingly "irresponsible" private medium, free to register the capricious notions of an 
individual artist's fantasia' (1993: 56). It is in this wider context that one needs to 
consider Goya's first approaches to the graphic world. 
Throughout his life, Goya experimented with different techniques and 
rigorously investigated their aesthetic possibilities. 53 Los Caprichos, created over a 
period of three years, form part of the artist's continuous engagement with the 
language of engraving. A description of the engraving techniques employed by Goya 
features in almost any exhibition brochure or catalogue on Los Caprichos. Unlike 
burin or drypoint, techniques which require the use of a needle for engraving, both 
etching and aquatint are `biting' processes. In the etching process, 
the artist covers a metal plate (traditionally of copper; more recently, zinc 
plates are also used) with an acid-resistant etching ground. Using an etching 
needle, the artist draws the image on the prepared plate, and in so doing 
removes the ground to expose the metal. The plate is then covered with acid 
which "bites" the exposed surface, corroding the metal to create crevices or 
indentations which hold ink. The etching ground is then removed, and the 
plate is inked; the excess is wiped off (although some may be left on at the 
discretion of the artist or printer), and the plate is covered with moistened 
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paper. When plate and paper are put through a press, the paper absorbs the ink 
held by the plate. Thus the etching is produced: its embossed margin reflects 
the pressure of the metal plate. (Tomlinson, 1989: 16) 
Aquatint, on the other hand, a type of etching, is `a method for biting tones instead of 
lines' (Lumsden, 1962: 118): 
The aquatint method is a means of etching a continuous tone. A porous 
ground of powdered resin is dusted onto the copper plate and fused to it by 
heat. The metal that remains exposed around these droplets of acid-resistant 
resin is bitten, creating a reticulated pattern of crevices. These crevices hold 
the ink and print as a tone. The variety of aquatint tones that can be achieved 
depends upon the type of resin, the size of the grains (from fine to coarse), 
their density, the duration of biting time, and the amount of stopping-out that 
is employed. (Sayre, 1974: 176) 
In broad terms, the technical differences between the techniques 
- 
burin engraving, 
etching and aquatint 
- 
reside in their use. Reproductive engravers resorted to burin 
engraving for the mere duplication of images, though it required severe discipline 
from the engraver in order to produce a faithful copy. Etching, by contrast, although a 
technique of line alone, allowed a greater sense of ease in the delineation of figures 
and objects. With no line-work at all, aquatint provided the etcher with the possibility 
of attaining subtle gradations of tone; aesthetically, it gives the print an effect similar 
to wash drawing, establishing a playful relationship between light and shade. Taking 
into account Goya's combination of these techniques, the tonal and textural effects of 
aquatint are exploited by Goya to their full advantage. (As we shall see, for Los 
Caprichos Goya would use a combination of etching and aquatint for most of the 
plates. ) His prints 
- 
`inventadas y grabadas al aguafuerte' 
- 
nevertheless relied on the 
creative effects of this newly developed technique. When using aquatint, once the 
plate is in the acid bath the artist cannot anticipate with exactitude the outcome of the 
final image. Significantly, the in-built uncertainty of the technical process is 
transferred onto the final print and, ultimately, onto the interpretive process. More 
recently, Stochita and Coderch (2000: 178-181) have dwelled on the `iconologia del 
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aguafuerte' by reading the biting process metaphorically 
- 
the `äcidos' and `vinagres' 
mentioned in contemporary manuals such as Instruccion para gravar en cobre (1761) 
written by Manuel Rueda. The language of engraving was resolutely manual in its 
'reliance on gouging burins and scrapers, puncturing needles and corrosive acids, 
burnished surfaces and varnished depth' (Stafford, 1993: 54); in the hands of Goya, 
`printmaking techniques embodied the surgical, indeed the instrumental capacities of 
the visual arts to exhibit and display mercilessly' (1993: 54). In other words, the 
expressive possibilities of the medium to offer incisive images of the cultural context 
in which they were produced. Not just as works of art, but rather as cultural products. 
Across Europe and in Spain the print media opened up the target audience for 
politicians and social reformers, as well as artists, who saw the chance of expanding 
income, sales, and markets. The value of printmaking as a medium for the 
transmission of ideas grew not only from the eighteenth century's belief in education 
and cultural diffusion but also from the changing conditions in the production process 
over the century. In the same way that the written word was being spread in the form 
of books, journals, newspapers and pamphlets, visual images could be disseminated to 
wider audiences through reproductive work 
- 
prints. Mechanical reproduction and 
the opening of markets meant that both printed words and printed images 
- 
cultural, 
but nevertheless consumer goods 
- 
reached more possible consumers. A developing 
commercial market in portable cultural products was the target of entrepreneurial 
publishers, as well as artists, across Europe. 
Perhaps one could argue that Goya reclaims for the visual arts their moral 
force in the enlightened age of reform, a move that would certainly align the artist 
with enlightened reformers: the reform of style follows the reform of morality. 
However, the critical function of Goya's art cannot be explained only in terms of the 
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`textual', that is, by invoking literary analogues. The link established by the author of 
the Announcement between poetry and painting locates the collection also within the 
tradition of the ut pictora poesis established by Horace in his Ars Poetica, taking us to 
a consideration of the function of pictorial art. The Horatian parallel confers on 
painting, and by extension on the visual arts, the moral value granted to poetry. Thus 
the author of the Announcement (not necessarily Goya as explained earlier) 
acknowledges the significance of pictorial representation in the reform of morality 
and the contribution that could be made by the visual arts in the contemporary social 
and political context, thereby moving away from the more commemorative and 
decorative artwork commissioned by kings, nobles and religious orders. Another 
Horatian doctrine underlying the text is that of `teaching and delighting'. Of profound 
relevance in classical and Spanish neo-classical theory, the `aprovechar deleitando', 
as expressed by Luzän (1702-1754) in his Poetica (1737), is linked to the explicit 
aesthetic of the author of the Announcement. Horace, a notable satirist and literary 
critic, serves as a model to those eighteenth-century writers and artists who applied 
themselves to social satire, in the same way that he had done for fifteenth-, and 
sixteenth-century authors, such as Cervantes. 
Let us go back to that vital `turning point' in Goya's life in order to situate the 
genesis of the collection. Described as `la grave enfermedad de Goya del bienio 
1792-93' or, more poetically, `la misteriosa enfermedad de Goya' (Alonso-Fernandez, 
1999: 69) by biographers and critics alike, it has acted as a dividing line between the 
work leading to Los Caprichos and his previous work, as a helpful way of separating 
the public from the private Goya, or, regarding his post-1793 work, as a total break 
with tradition. The correlation between life, illness and art is undeniable; however, it 
has to be seen in the light of a larger context. Critics as disparate as Alonso- 
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Fernandez and Tomlinson have convincingly argued for a continuum in Goya's life 
and art, respectively. The former, a psychiatrist, offers a fascinating psychological 
diagnosis of the personality of the artist in order to understand the changes and 
ruptures in his artistic creation; 54 the latter, an art critic and art historian, sees Goya's 
artistic production as having a continuity from the early 1790s to the publication of 
Los Caprichos. 55 
According to Janis Tomlinson, the 1790s are `a period of withdrawal and 
resignation' (1994: 9) in the life of the painter. After his report to the Academy, his 
links to this institution steadily weakened for obvious health reasons, namely his 
deafness; as to commissioned works, there are no documented works for his patrons 
between 1792 and 1798; 56 and, since his personal correspondence provides us with 
few facts, very little is known about his private life. What we are left with is some 
information about his illness and subsequent convalescence at the house of Sebastian 
Martinez, his correspondence with Martin Zapater, two letters addressed to Bernardo 
de Iriarte, Vice-Protector of the Royal Academy of San Fernando, the first on 4 
January 1794, informing him about some new cabinet paintings, the second one on 7 
January describing a final painting to be added to the other eleven, 57 and, above all, 
notebooks of drawings sketched both on his return to Madrid and during his stay in 
the estate house of the Duchess of Alba at Sanlücar de Barrameda in 1796 (referred to 
as the Album de Madrid or Album B (1794-96) and the Album de Sanlücar or Album A 
(1796-97), respectively). Together with preparatory drawings, and printing proofs, it 
is possible to create a picture of the work in progress that led to Los Caprichos as we 
know them. 
What Goya sketches in these notebooks differs from his commissioned works 
up to 1792 but shares aesthetic intentions and investigative purposes with the series of 
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cabinet paintings he sent to Bernardo de Iriarte early in 1794.58 The letter to Iriarte is 
as much an aesthetic statement as the ideas expressed in his report to the Academy 
two years before and in the Announcement that accompanied the sale of Los 
Caprichos: 
para ocupar la imaginaciön mortificada en la consideraciön de mis males, y 
para resarcir en parte los grandes dispendios que me an ocasionado, me 
dedique a pintar un juego de quadros de gabinete, en que he logrado hacer 
observaciones a que regularmente no dan Lugar las obras encargadas, y en que 
el capricho y la invenciön no tienen ensanches. 59 
Albeit an altogether different medium and technique, 60 these `quadros de gabinete' 
anticipate some of the artistic innovations more commonly seen in Los Caprichos: 
their resistance to traditional categorization, their questioning of convention and 
subject matter, and, in the words of Tomlinson, their `search for an anti-ideal' (1994: 
98)61- aspects that will become clearer as the analysis of the series in Chapters 4 and 
5 progresses. At this juncture, it is only necessary to pinpoint the (at the time) 
`monstrous' character of the collection in terms of its generic unclassifiability, the 
visual refashioning undertaken by the Aragonese artist or the anti-classicism of his 
figures. The notions `capricho' and `invenciön' are of crucial importance since Goya 
inserts his work in a tradition that asserts `artistic imagination and the demonstration 
of inventive skill' (David Rosand, 1994: 8). As I have already pointed out, the word 
`capricho' was already used in the 1797 Suenos 
- 
`esta obra de caprichos' 
- 
and 
reappears in the payment order for the Osunas 
- 
`quatro livros de caprichos'. In the 
art world of the eighteenth century, `capricho' is associated with originality, `no solo 
en los asuntos, sino en el medio de concebirlos y ejecutarlos' (Helman, 1993: 163). 
Moreover, in the words of Blas, `el artista toma conciencia de que el arte no debe ser 
imitativo sino fruto de su capricho' (1999: 28). According to the Diccionario of the 
Real Academia Espanola, `capricho' is that `obra de arte en que el ingenio o la 
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fantasia rompen la observancia de las reglas' 
-a definition that suffices for the 
purposes of this section. 62 In the 1799 Announcement the words `asuntos 
caprichosos' articulate the author's aesthetic positioning; the aesthetic idiom of the 
text is established by references to the author's aesthetic imagination and creativity 
(`fantasia del artifice'), to his inventive skills ('inventadas', `ni ha seguido los 
exemplos de otro, ni ha podido copiar tampoco de la naturaleza') and to the creative 
role of his own genius (`el titulo de inventor y no de copiante servil'). These are 
words that echo both in Goya's letter to Iriarte in 1794, in which he refers to the series 
of cabinet paintings in terms of `capricho' and `invenciön', and in his report to the 
Academy. 
Gassier and Wilson (1971), Sayre (1974), Tomlinson (1989a) and Wilson- 
Bureau (1992), among other critics, have traced Goya's creative process by examining 
the albums and the twenty-seven drawings carrying the inscription sueno in order to 
understand the first conceptions behind the 1799 prints. Sayre (1989), for instance, 
has described Goya's drawings as visual equivalents to literary journals. In an earlier 
work, The Changing Image, Sayre traces `the development of an idea from drawing to 
print' (1974: vii), providing us with preparatory drawings, working proofs, successive 
changes and modifications of the plates; Tomlinson's Graphic Evolutions is an 
attempt to approach the `series' internal chronology, which in turn should illuminate 
Goya's changing technique and intent' (1989a: 15). 63 Some of the characters 
populating Los Caprichos are traceable to the album sketchbooks, and some titles 
used by Goya in the final prints appear in the first drawings, although `the more 
explanatory captions of the early sueno drawings are finally abandoned in favour of 
pithier, evocative captions that often stand in dialectical relation to the image, rather 
than fix the meaning' (Tomlinson, 1989b: 448). The scenes captured by Goya in the 
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Album de Sanlücar are of young women engaged in their everyday activities; their 
movements (lifting of their skirts, pulling up of the stockings, tearing of the hair, or 
bathing) and postures (sitting or standing in the `paseo', lying naked on bed or having 
a siesta) will reappear in those prints depicting relationships between men and 
women. Those portrayed in Album B (page 3 `Couple making love in the dark', page 
22 `Maja and an officer', page 24 `Young man beating an officer', page 37 `Couple 
with a parasol in the paseo') parallel those represented in Los Caprichos (Capricho 5 
`Tal para cual', Capricho 7 'Ni asi la distingue', or Capricho 27 `Quien mäs 
rendido'); the looming presence of `celestinas' in the drawings (page 4 `Maja and 
celestina waiting under an arch', page 38 `Two majas parading in the paseo') 
resurfaces in the etchings (Capricho 15 `Bellos consejos', Capricho 17 `Bien tirada 
estä'). The masquerading asses of the sketchbook (page 72 `Mascaras de B. Tambien 
ay mascaras de borricos', page 93 `Conöcelos el aceitero') anticipate the ass 
sequences of the 1799 collection (Caprichos 37 to 42); witches and goblins (Album B 
page 56 and 57) haunt the viewer at several points of Los Caprichos (Capricho 44 to 
48, Capricho 51, and Caprichos 59 to 71). Of all the drawings known, `once [... ] 
estän en el origen de algunos caprichos y, en general, el ambiente de los grabados se 
vislumbra ya en el älbum'(Bozal, 1994: 118). Closer analysis of the changes 
underlying specific images are present in almost every discussion of the collection, 
Capricho 43 `El sueno de la razön produce monstruos' (fig. 1) and its preparatory 
drawings being the object of individual inquiry (Dowling (1985), Soufas (1986), 
Sayre (1989), The (1985 / 1995, I)). Sayre (1989) has traced the development of two 
caprichos: `San Fernando icömo hilan! '(fig. 49) from drawing (Album B, page 84, 
1796-97) to etching (Capricho 44 `Hilan delgado'), and Capricho 70 `Devota 
Profesiön' (fig. 51), from Album B (page 56 `Brujas ä bolar' (fig. 52)) to the first 
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drawings for Suenos (`Sueno. De brujas', 1797-98), and finally to the copper plate; 
Bozal (1987) looks at Capricho 5 `Tal para cual'; Tomlinson (1994) examines the 
changes to Capricho 13 `Estän calientes' (fig. 11), originally entitled `Caricatura 
alegre' in Album B and then `Sueno / De unos hombres que nos comian' in the Sueno 
drawings; and Stoichita and Coderch (2000) describe the origins of Capricho 57 `La 
filiaciön', whose antecedent in the albums is `La apunta por ermafrodita' (1796-97) 
and later on known as Sueno 11 `Mascara de caricaturas que apuntan por su 
significado' (1797-98). The series, therefore, was `the result of a process of creativity 
and experiment that probably began as early as 1796, and was not concluded until the 
publication in 1799' (Tomlinson, 1994: 125). 
Goya was interested in the commercial viability of his work, and Los 
Caprichos were intended as a profitable venture; in fact, the edition was conceived 
and marketed as a portable cultural product, a book: a paperbound album bound in 
leather, bearing the title `Caprichos de Goya' on the spine. The artist himself figures 
in a self-portrait in the first of the eighty prints, his name and occupation engraved in 
the lower margin; this first image is preceded by neither a title page nor a printed 
explanation. What the public would have made of such a product is not known since 
the illiterate lower social classes were accustomed `to buying prints of religious 
images, portraits and recent events' in the street or on the steps of churches 
(Tomlinson, 1989: 143), whereas the more privileged social groups would have 
purchased prints representing traditional customs and diversions in bookshops. 
Furthermore, `the public', Tomlinson observes, `could hardly have comprehended the 
weird cast of evil and debauched characters' (1989: 143) populating the series. On 
the other hand, the critic suggests that Goya's circle of friends would have understood 
the intentions and references, which takes us back once again to the Enlightened 
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circle. Preparatory drawings, proofs, and finalized etchings might have been seen and 
commented on privately among the circle of Enlightened friends, which included 
leading Spanish intellectuals as well as critical representatives of the aristocracy, such 
as the Altamiras and the Osunas (a payment order dated on 17 January 1799 and 
signed by the Duke of Osuna for `quatro livros de caprichos y grabados a la aqua 
fuerte' attests to this). 
To conclude this final section, I would like to refer to two contemporary 
reactions to Goya's series. Pedro Gonzalez de Sepulveda, Professor of Engraving at 
the Real Academia de San Fernando and court engraver, wrote the following, almost 
immediately after the publication of Los Caprichos: `I have seen the book of witches 
and satires by Goya, I didn't like it, it is very licentious' (cited in Wilson-Bureau, 
1981: 36). On 27 March 1811 the first known review of the series is published in 
Cadiz in the Semanario Patri6tico; 64 the author, Gregorio Gonzalez Azaola, describes 
Los Caprichos as: `esta colecci6n compuesta de 80 estampas con mäs de 400 figuras 
de toda especie, no es otra cosa que un libro instructivo de 80 poesfas morales 
gravadas, 6 un tratado satfrico de 80 vicios y preocupaciones de las que mas afligen a 
la sociedad' (cited in Harris, 1964: 42). 65 Of these contemporary reactions, two 
aspects seem to be especially significant: firstly, both emphasize the generic quality of 
Goya's work 
- 
`satires' and `tratado satfrico'; secondly, both agree on the nature of 
Los Caprichos as a book 
- 
`book of witches and satires' in the disapproving 
comments of Gonzalez de Sepulveda and `libro instructivo de 80 poesfas morales 
gravadas' in the more perceptive words of Gonzalez Azaola. For these contemporary 
commentators, the series belongs to already established traditions, that of the satiric 
print and that of the emblem book. Aesthetic and political issues are also raised by 
Gonzalez de Sepülveda's and Gonzalez Azaola's remarks. Whilst the former points 
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explicitly to the deviant aesthetics of the prints, expressing academic tastes and 
passing judgement, the latter adopts a reformist stance which recognizes the 
educational character of the series as well as its moral value. Other discerning 
insights by Gonzalez Azaola prepare the ground for future writing on Los Caprichos; 
for instance, their `enigmatic meaning' and, most interestingly, their value for 
different types of viewers (and the possibility of accounting for different readers): he 
is aware of the potential didacticism inscribed in the eighty prints 
- 
`if I am not 
mistaken it is the most suitable work to sharpen the minds of the young, and an 
appropriate touchstone by which to judge the percipience and intellectual agility of all 
kinds of people' 
-, of its importance as a source of material for fellow artists - 
`painters and engravers will find it a veritable text-book of their professions, given its 
infinite variety of heads, unusual situations, well-drawn dress, original faces and 
anatomical knowledge' 
-, and of the literary possibilities for poets and men of letters, 
for they `will find in each satire a rich mine of ideas to stimulate their minds and 
spark off an infinite number of moral reflections' (cited in Glendinning, 1977: 60-1). 
Besides the image and the textual elements that accompany the series from its 
inception to its final publication and, later, the manuscripts, critical and historical 
writing produced over the last two centuries has exploited this mine. But, if the 
dependence of text upon image is inadequate, as critics such as Tomlinson have 
vehemently claimed 
- 
`Goya clearly subordinated the written language to the 
pictorial, and in approaching these etchings we must be careful to guard that 
relationship' (1989a: 13) 
- 
then it seems to me that focusing on the visual construction 
of the image and interrogating what practice of seeing is at work in the series could 
help us to look at the familiar in new ways and could prove instrumental in the 
understanding of Goya's work. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a consideration of the period in which Goya was 
producing Los Caprichos. One of the main issues raised in these pages has been how 
far the collection was responding to the ideas, cultural policies and artistic tastes of 
the reforming movement. A further objective has been to offer a general overview of 
the main critical writings that have aligned the series to the ilustrados. There is no 
doubt that the collection can be read in Enlightenment ways yet there are elements of 
an ideological, cultural and artistic nature that problematize these readings, pointing 
beyond the limits and contradictions of the Spanish Enlightenment. Thus Los 
Caprichos highlight the paradoxical aspirations and reflections of the Spanish 
Enlightenment. Goya reasoned new answers to new questions and a consideration of 
his relation to the central Enlightenment concept of reason needs to bear this in mind. 
The next chapter opens with a reference to Capricho 43 `El sueno de la razön 
produce monstruos' (fig. 1) as a way of setting up many of the premises on which my 
readings of the prints depend. If, as I have been arguing in this chapter, Los 
Caprichos are traditionally tied to a discourse of reform which supports 
Enlightenment constructions of a reasoned or reasonable subject, it is my contention 
in the remainder of this thesis that Goya's collection destabilises enlightened 
conceptions of reason and enlightened configurations of the corporeal. The last two 
chapters will focus on the series through two main strands of analysis: unruly bodies 
and institutional bodies. 
1 For reading on the Enlightenment, see the classical studies of Cassirer (1932 (trans. 1951)), Gay 
(1967), and Hampson (1968), or the more recent work of Dorinda Outram (1995) and Roy Porter 
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(1996). 
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48 The following `pensionados' were sent to Paris in 1752: `Manuel Salvador Carmona para el 
"grabado de retratos e historia", Juan Carlos de la Cruz y Tomas Lopez para "el de arquitectura, cartas 
geogräficas y adornos" y Alfonso Cruzado para el de "sellos de piedras finas"' (Carrete Parrondo, 
1996: 8). Another decision taken by the government of Carlos III was the centralization of all the 
ministerial graphic production through the Real Imprenta in Plan de grabadores del Rey (Manuel 
Monfort, 1788). 
49 See Carrete Parrondo, Checa Cremades and Bozal (1987) for further reading on printing in Spain 
during the eighteenth century. See also Carrete Parrondo (1996) for further reading on the Real 
Academia de San Fernando and engraving between 1752 and 1844. 
50 According to Glendinning, `a total of seventeen etchings are known, and there are four additional 
drawings unrelated to existing prints (1977: 24). For the etchings after Velazquez, see Vega (1995). 
51 The set of prints was advertised on Tuesday 28 July 1778 and on Tuesday 22 December of the same 
year. 
52 Some titles are Colecciön de trajes de Espana (1777-78) by Juan de la Cruz, Colecciön de las 
principales suertes de una corrida de toros (c. 1795) by Luis Fernandez Noseret, and Carta de las 
Costas de California (1771) by Tomas Lopez. 
53The 
work marking a watershed in the study of Goya's graphic oeuvre is Tomas Harris' Catalogue 
raisonne, Goya: Engraving and Lithographs (1964,2 vols). Experimentation with aquatint is already 
present, Harris argues, in some of the prints after Velazquez, such as `Infante Don Fernando' and 
`Ochoa' (1964: 85), since the prints of religious subjects were engraved in `pure etching' (1964: 82). 
On Goya's working methods, see also Sayre (1974). 
sa See El enigma Goya. La personalidad de Goya y su pintura tenebrosa (1999). 
55 See Goya in the Twilight of the Enlightenment (1992) and Francisco Goya y Lucientes (1994). 
56 Tomlinson (1994: 9) cites an equestrian portrait of Manuel Godoy as the only record. After 1790 
Goya received no royal commissions until 1799; instead he painted his last tapestry cartoons, assisted 
in the inventory of paintings in the royal collection, and decorated the church of San Antonio de la 
Florida (1798). Note that I am referring here to commissioned works. 
57 `
... it represents a yard with lunatics and two of them fighting completely naked while their warder 
beats them, and others in sacks: it is a scene which I saw at Zaragoza. ' Goya refers in these terms to 
the twelfth picture, `A Yard with Lunatics' (1793-94). 
58 The eleven cabinet pictures were shown to the Academy on 5 January 1794. Six of them are devoted 
to subjects of national diversions 
- 
`Las mulillas' (1793), 'Banderillas en el campo' (1793), 'Despeje 
de la capa' (1793), 'Cogida del Picador' (1793), 'Suerte de capa' (1793), and `Suerte de matar' (1793) 
-, whereas the other six represent more personalized visions of the world - 'Yncendios, un fuego de 
noche' (1793-4), 'Asalto de ladrones' (1793-4), 'Interior of a Prison' (1793-4), 'El naufragio' (1793-4), 
'Strolling Players' (1793-4), and the already mentioned 'Corral de locos'. 
s9 In Gassier and Wilson (1971: 382). 
60 `Thin metal sheets plated with almost pure tin, scissor-cut and slightly uneven, but measuring about 
43 x 32 cm and covered with a thickly brushed, beige-pink preparation over a thin red ground' (Juliet 
Wilson-Bareau, 1994: 201). 
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61 Tomlinson is referring here to the anti-idealism represented in the figures of thieves, of commoners 
and of madmen in Assault on a Coach (1793-4), Strolling Players (1793-4), and Yard with Lunatics 
(1793-94). 
62 For the meanings of the term capricho in eighteenth-century Spain, see Ilie's `Capricho / 
Caprichoso: A Glossary of Eighteenth-Century Usages' (1976) and Dowling's `Capricho as Style in 
Life, Literature and Art from Zamora to Goya' (1977). 
63 Tomlinson's acknowledged point of departure is the work of Enrico Crispolti (1963). 
64 Glendinning has explained that the review 'in part acted as an advertisement for copies of the work 
which were then on sale in the city' (1977: 59). It is worth noting that the year 1811 falls within the 
period of the Cortes of Cadiz during the Peninsular War. 
65 The review was first published in the Burlington Magazine by Enriqueta Harris. See Glendinning 
(1977: 60-1) for a translated version. 
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Chapter 4 
Los Caprichos: Unruly Bodies 
Introduction 
These last two chapters retake the question posed in my introduction: how can 
monstrosity and corporeality be thought together in the analysis of these etchings? In 
an attempt to undo the critical habits surrounding Los Caprichos, it is necessary to 
return to the issue of corporeality, of the bodily, which may provide entry into a larger 
physical and institutional 
- 
and not only moral 
- 
universe, the `faces' or `masks' of 
Reason `defined partly as the neglected underside of Reason' (Ilie, 1995, I: 1). The 
individual body will be explored in the present chapter while the institutional body 
will be the focus of Chapter 5. In the words of Nicholas Mirzoeff, `at all times of 
social uncertainty in the West, the representation of the body has been a key concern' 
(1995: 1). The late eighteenth-century in Spain was, as I argued in Chapter 3, a time 
of extreme controversies and uncertainties. Changes and reforms affected not only 
the collective body but also the individual body. Yet change is always met by 
resistance since the (individual or institutional) body affected by change is at the same 
time a point of resistance. In the case of Spain, the importance of traditional cultural 
forms and the dominant presence of Catholic religious beliefs characterised resistance 
to change. What I propose in the remaining chapters of this thesis is therefore to 
examine the ways in which the Goyaesque body bears the mark of its historical and 
cultural location. Questions that will concern us are: to what extent and in what ways 
do these monstrous bodies respond to the larger cultural, religious, political 
- 
necessarily ideological- contradictions of the Spanish Enlightenment? How are these 
monstrous bodies representative of wider cultural anxieties and fears about social 
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change and moral reform? My aim is to re-evaluate our cultural assumptions 
concerning monstrosity and the monstrous body in Los Caprichos. As we shall see, 
the (monstrous) body is the vexed site through which Goya explores the individual's 
relation to a contradictory period. By focusing on individual and institutional bodies, 
Goya is very much highlighting material aspects of `concrete human problems', to use 
Canguilhem's phrase. 
Los Caprichos, I argued in Chapter 3, are traditionally tied to a discourse of 
reform which supports Enlightenment constructions of a reasoned or reasonable 
subject. Like the writings of moralists and satirists contemporary to him, Goya gives 
pictorial form to the errors, vices and irrational conducts of specific sectors of Spanish 
society. By offering images of unruly bodies and disorderly behaviours, the viewer 
recognizes objectionable beliefs and comportments and draws a lesson. Through the 
grid of a physiognomics of difference, the bodies depicted are marked as a monstrous 
site, a strategic visibility serving to distance and differentiate the enlightened from the 
unenlightened. Such reasoning places the collection of prints squarely within the 
reformist project of the ilustrados. But while Goya participates in figurative 
traditions which fix the body as the site of exploration of a cultural problematic, 
traditions which necessarily stabilize reading positions, representations of corporeality 
and monstrosity in Los Caprichos can arguably be read as destabilizing 
Enlightenment conceptions of reason and Enlightened configurations of the corporeal. 
The monstrous bodies in Los Caprichos respond also to changes in 
representation at the end of the eighteenth century. Representational issues are not 
generally `on view' within the context of the enlightened subordination of the body. 
The first section of this chapter will focus on Ilie's analysis of Capricho 43 `El sueno 
de la raz6n produce monstruos' and his concept of counter-rational Reason, which he 
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defines as the opposite of a uniform centre of rationality in representative thought. 
Thus I will be considering throughout the chapter Goya's problematization of 
representation. If for eighteenth-century aesthetics `the body is both the site of ideal 
beauty and the limit of what can and may be represented' (Kelly and Mücke, 1994: 
11), then Goya's panoply of monsters provides a way of understanding other modes of 
reason(ing), other ways of representing the body and its function(s) within culture. 
My argument in what follows is that Goya dissects the Enlightenment way of looking 
at and explaining the body. In Los Caprichos there is a recuperation of those 
elements that seem to lie outside the ken of the Enlightenment project: irrationality, 
physicality, animality, hybridity, the grotesque, the popular; a recognition of the 
animal nature of the body and of the products of bodily impulses and forces. In short, 
Goya calls attention to the bodiliness and the corporeal reality of the human figures 
populating the series. Goya depicts these human figures engaging in irrationally 
motivated activities, displaying the effects of excess and passion, and lurking in a 
dark universe; he shows man's animal nature, the embarrassing needs of the human 
body, and the fallibility of the senses; and he acknowledges the presence of popular 
beliefs and cultural forms, alternative traditions that evolve side by side with 
enlightened reforms. This chapter will show how these elements irrupt in Goya's 
images and how they force a disruption of a perceived normativizing function. The 
title of this chapter points to those disorderly and unruly bodies and behaviours which 
are not amenable to discipline and control. In fact, Goya's work after 1793 engages 
more with `unruly, contradictory and asocial forms, which he looks at from 
everchanging points of view' (Held, 1987: 44) than with `normal' representations of 
the human body. Human actions spring not only from beliefs but also from desires, 
as Goya's etchings attest. These complex monstrous bodies can be read symbolically, 
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allegorically and abstractly, of course. But they are also bodies, bodiliness is part of 
their existence; their physical nature is heavily inscribed in the etchings. As Schulz 
has noted, physicality pervades the actions of these bodies: `swallowing, blowing, 
vomiting, sucking, yawning, shouting, snoring, and, most commonly, eating and 
drinking' (2000: 167). Irredeemably physical, they signify in their own right as if 
asserting their materiality. 
Goya's monstrous bodies will be read against classical ideals of the body as 
well as against enlightened epistemic constructions of the body examined in the social 
constructionist theories of Foucault and Elias, which see the body as both a biological 
and a political-historical construct. The first part of the chapter looks at the ways in 
which Goya reconfigures the (neo)classical body by focusing, firstly, on 
contemporary aesthetic standards of ideal beauty, and, secondly, on civilized 
standards of an ideal bodily comportment and behaviour in the context of the 
reformation of manners during the Spanish Enlightenment. Such considerations 
provide the frame for the second part of the chapter in which I examine the collection 
in relation to physiognomical traditions and physiognomical modes of reasoning in 
order to show how the promotion of reforms and the reformation of manners in the 
Spanish Enlightenment were informed by classical epistemologies. As a traditional 
way of organizing knowledge, physiognomical body criticism claimed authority in 
reading the normal and the monstrous body. It is my contention that, by not 
conforming to pre-existing academic practice and by contesting traditional ways of 
seeing, Goya teases out the metaphysical presuppositions of such artistic traditions 
and foregrounds the shortcomings of certain reformist educational practices and 
pedagogical ideals. 
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In the following chapters the `physical' and the `institutional' should not be 
considered as discrete aspects of my concerns with issues on the body; rather they are 
inextricably bound. I would like to recall here Maravall's words: it is necessary to 
understand `the reform of the human being as the basis for general reform' (1987: 39). 
Individuals cannot be divorced from the larger institutions in which they live their 
lives. The changes in and reformation of bodily behaviours are linked to economic 
and cultural reforms as well as to the ideological underpinnings of institutional power. 
The writings of Spanish enlightened reformers such as Campomanes and Jovellanos, 
alluded to in Chapter 3, sought to improve the use of a person's natural reason and 
participation in the reform of institutions and practices while at the same time 
attempting to regulate and control the body of the populace in various social contexts. 
The ensuing analyses attempt to bring the Goyaesque body back into enlightened 
debates about reform. In the process I shall be returning to the theoretical issues 
exposed in Chapter 2, namely Goya's critique of reason and the problem of human 
perception and knowledge. My first point of entry is Goya's most emblematic 
etching, `El sueflo de la razön produce monstruos'. 
'El sueno de la razon produce monstruos' 
Reason, knowledge and monstrosity are part of the modern experience. For 
Paul The, Goya's Capricho 43 (fig. 1) is a `paradigmatic statement in the perception of 
reality' (1995: I, 17). The eighteenth-century's grand metaphor of continuity took 
Reason as its guarantor; the belief in a continuous universe and the belief in cognitive 
continuity underlay the spirit of the age. The eighteenth century retained a paradoxical 
approach to monsters: used as transitional forms in the theory of a continuous Chain 
of Being, `their existence made it easier for the mind to conceive of continuity' 
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(Canguilhem, 1962: 35). Modern, rational science shared this belief and concealed 
the structural discontinuity of the universe. Whether the Great Chain of Being, the 
clock, or the tree of knowledge, universal, empirical, or cognitive metaphors tended to 
obscure the structural discontinuity of the universe and to represent the `unbroken 
intelligibility of a universe composed of perfectly fitting parts' (1995: II, 14). Ilie's 
argument in The Age of Minerva. Counter-Rational Reason in the Eighteenth Century 
(1995) and The Age of Minerva. Cognitive Discontinuities in Eighteenth-Century 
Thought (1995), is that `eighteenth-century Reason displayed an alter ego capable of 
protean powers' (1995: H, 18), that is, that a counter-rational discourse pervaded the 
century. The mythic figure of Minerva, Goddess of Wisdom, a complex, multivalent 
symbol unobtrusive and all-pervasive in the visual arts in France and Spain, yet hardly 
alluded to in current eighteenth-century studies, is, for Ilie, symptomatic of the 
century's failure `to reach its ideal of continuity' (1995: I, 4). In ancient mythology 
Minerva wove a tapestry; regarded as the supreme weaver of knowledge, keeper of 
secrets, only Minerva knew how to unite contradictions into a harmonious whole. 
The spinster Arachne, after a failed attempt to steal the secret of Minerva's weaving 
science and dethrone the Goddess, was turned into a spider. Minerva as the perfect 
weaver of tapestries was an excellent emblem of the century's pursuit of a Universal 
Language, `the uninterrupted thread of wisdom' (1995: I, 6) uniting artists, 
philosophers, and scientists. But Minerva, iconographically ambiguous in lie's 
analysis of Spanish culture, also figures as the simultaneous, subtextual disruption of 
the Enlightenment project. Taking his cue from poststructuralist inquiry, in particular 
the works of Foucault and Derrida, what interests Ilie is both the disruption of the 
traditional methods of organizing knowledge and human perception and the 
supplementarity of alternative traditions that evolved side by side with Minervan 
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reason; in particular, the symbolic and social implications of the absence or 
`vanishing' of Minerva in Goya's `El sueno de la razön produce monstruos'. The 
pertinence of llie's reading for my own argument lies precisely in his concern with the 
displacement of Minervan reason, or its re-configuration in Goya's etching, to which 
we have already referred as `a paradigmatic statement in the perception of reality'. 
Let us turn now to Ilie's comparative analysis of Capricho 43 and Goya's 
earlier (1798) portrait of the Spanish ilustrado Jovellanos (fig. 22). Whereas in the 
`Portrait of Jovellanos' Minerva's political and civic attributes act as an icon for the 
politician and philosopher's Enlightenment ideals, the displacement of the goddess in 
the capricho is represented iconographically by the owl. The idealized form of 
Minerva is not only reconfigured, that is, substituted by that other figure or 
conventional emblem of rationality / wisdom, the owl, but disfigured in the owl's 
monstrous reproduction 
-the quartet of owls- and by the taxonomical monstrosity of 
the bats that defy rational understanding. The bat, neither bird nor mammal, `upsets 
the paradigm of continuity and its taxonomical groundwork' ([lie 1995: II, 61). 1 The 
appearance of three additional owls behind the human figure evokes conventional 
Minervan attributes 
-practical Reason, sage guardian of kingdoms, shield against the 
irrational. 2 At the same time, it evokes Ancient philosophy and hermetic and 
hierophantic cults. The detailed analysis of the partitioned shield of the goddess in 
the `Portrait of Jovellanos' 
-llie reminds us of its indecipherability for art historians- 
indicates too Minerva's bipartite character: half of it depicts a warrior, the other half 
an indecipherable oval of darkness with arcane resonance. Whether her dualism and 
ambiguous symbolism signifies `a perversion of rational wisdom or a knowledge that 
is more occult and perhaps more sinister than that the awakened mind knows by 
daylight' (llie, 1995: I, 40), we cannot say; only Minerva could bring together Reason 
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and Unreason, order and chaos. 
Reason, as the central and illuminating faculty of eighteenth-century, 
philosophy permeated all forms of knowledge; its figurative method was violently 
anatomical, dissecting appearance, enunciating depth, and uncovering the duplicity of 
the world. What the truth-claims of modern rational science concealed was the 
exorbitance of its own rhetoric: the fact that the monsters of the mind are a product of 
reason itself, a result of its own dreams, of its own excess. What Capricho 43 sets up 
in the ambiguity of its title, of the human figure, and of the morphologically 
unclassifiable bats circling the dreamer slumped at his desk, is the paradox of 
knowledge itself. Deliberately uncertain, the etching's ambiguity suspends the 
principle of difference and identity that marks rational discourse. It reveals the 
discontinuities and ambiguities in both the natural world and in the perceptual 
process. When Reason sleeps, monsters appear (social, political, moral), but, 
inversely, the rationalism of the Enlightenment mind betrays its own necessarily 
monstrous positioning. Knowledge is contaminated by an irreducible irrational 
component at its core: Reason has infinite faces, already imbued and pre-figured by 
Unreason. Given Ilie's parallel between the mortal Arachne and the Enlightenment's 
equally flawed aspiration to absolute knowledge, I shall argue that it is the body that 
Reason traps in its tenuous and arbitrary web. 
The classical body reconfigured 
Capricho 65 `LDonde vä mama? ' (fig. 23) and Capricho 52 `iLo que puede un 
sastre! ' (fig. 18) serve here as a point of entry for an examination of Goya's 
reconfiguration of the classical body. But before I commence my analysis it is 
necessary to establish a definition of the classical body, however unattainable this 
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ideal form might be. Perhaps Leonardo da Vinci's The Vitruvian Man (1490), which 
embodied `the thesis of the perfectly expressive human form' and became `the 
expression of a belief in the perfect form of the human body' (Mirzoeff, 1995: 19) 
contained in the symmetry of the circle and the elegant lines of the square, or the 
neoclassical aesthetic treatises of eighteenth-century scholars Johann Joachim 
Winckelmann (1717-1768) 
-On the Imitation of the Painting and Sculpture of the 
Greeks (1755)- and his disciple Anton Raphael Mengs (1728-1779) 
-Reflections on 
Beauty and Taste in Painting (1762)-, which established Greek classical sculpture as 
representative of ideal beauty and perfection, are valid points of departure. According 
to neoclassical aesthetics, the ideal body stands upright and centred, is proportioned 
and symmetrical, shows restraint, conveys intellect and virtue, and is male: for the 
Enlightenment the perfect embodiment of the self-determined individual. `The body 
in art [Greek statuary] becomes the body by which to measure the body in flesh' 
(Leppert, 1996: 207), the very perfection of the norm. In his writings Mengs 
`cautioned against the imitation in painting of violent passions that "wound" the 
sensibility through their rupturing and ugly lines. It was only a healthy reasoning -a 
Neoclassical decorum- that could rightly gauge bodily beauty' (Stafford, 1991: 162). 
Mengs' distinction between the ugly and the beautiful, the normal and the monstrous, 
established a normative aesthetics that attached value to the imitation of decorous 
human behaviour. 
As an art apprentice Goya would have had access to the prints of his teacher 
Josh Luzän y Martinez (1710-1785), which reproduced the paintings of the masters, 
and to pedagogical manuals3 or loose engravings which presented studies of the 
human form; as a court painter and as academician, the Royal collection and the 
Royal Academy of San Fernando became part of his visual formation (Fig. 1). 4 
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(Needless to say, Goya was also aware of the fantastic imagery of Hyeronimus Bosch 
and Domenico Tiepolo. ) Matfas de Irala's `Modelos del cuerpo humano' (Metodo 
sucinto y compendioso, Madrid, 1730) provides prints with back, side and frontal 
views of the human body, as well as individual body parts (fig. 24). Various bodies, 
adult and child, male and female, are contained in individual grids, in which clear 
geometrical shapes delimit the proper measures of the human body and clear outlines 
sharply delineate the contour of the body. Proportioned, symmetrical and in classical 
poses, these human figures provided artists with naked diagrams of abstract bodies. 
`Dictionaries, technical tracts, model books, penmanship and drawing manuals 
promoted', as Stafford has observed, `a logic, or universal characteristic, of essential, 
teachable elements' (1997: 131). Goya, then, was familiar with works of classical 
sculpture through both engraved reproductions and casts after classical sculptures. 
His trip to Italy in the early 1770s provides art historians with another source: his 
drawings of sculptures of antiquity, namely the `Farnese Hercules' (fig. 25) and the 
`Belvedere Torso', recorded in the Cuaderno italiano (ca. 1770-71). 5 These 
drawings show `how conscious he was, even in his early career, of the new style 
dominating artistic circles in Madrid' (Symmons, 1998: 28), while, at the same time, 
they also already reflect the development of an artistic idiom closer to Los Caprichos, 
`scenes of violence and despair, grotesque masks and close-ups of sculpture reliefs of 
a particularly emotional or tormented nature' (1998: 33). His journey through and 
against artistic traditions began to take shape in his Italian sketchbook. As Stoichita 
and Coderch have pointed out, Goya returned to the material of the Cuaderno, in 
particular `copies and versions in the style of the Ancients, and [... ] copies in the style 
of Renaissance and Baroque religious art (1999: 86). I shall be exploring the latter in 
my analysis of Capricho 52 and Capricho 65, arguing that these prints engage in a 
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dialogue with Counter-reformation art. The notion of the ideal also needs to be seen 
in the light of the Announcement, discussed in the Introduction and in Chapter 3, 
where Goya's reference to the ideal, `formed by a selection and combination of parts 
that prove the artist's capacity for invention [... ], carried a certain irony, since in Los 
Caprichos the combination of parts contributes, more often than not, to the formation 
of an anti-ideal' (Tomlinson, 1994: 142). Goya's main point of departure from 
contemporary aesthetic standard is his challenge to common rules, in particular to the 
classical body. 
If we compare the anatomical illustrations of the encyclopaedia or the classical 
figures from model books (it is worth reminding ourselves here of the academic 
formation of Spanish artists in France under the supervision of the Encyclopedia 
master engravers, as well as the mainly utilitarian understanding of engraving in 
academic circles), both visual paradigms of the rational shape, to many of the bodies 
populating Los Caprichos, we find ourselves confronted with alternative accounts of 
the body. Unlike the classical body 
-clearly legible in its pure and seamless contour- 
or the anatomical illustrations 
-accurate representation for the representation of the 
knowable body-, we cannot attach totalizing meanings to Goya's images as the 
analyses of the following plates will show. Amalgamations of contorted and 
grotesque bodies (Capricho 65 `LD6nde vä mama? '), hybrid bodies (Capricho 63 
`Miren que graves' (fig. 26) and Capricho 51 `Se repulen' (fig. 27)), or entangled 
bodies (Capricho 62 `iQuien to creyera! ' (fig. 28), Capricho 75 `i, No hay quien nos 
desate? '(fig. 29)) defy notions of correct anatomical representation and, by extension, 
the ideal serenity, composure and stasis of the classical body. Other caricaturesque 
figures emphasise individual, exaggerated deviations from standard bodies (Capricho 
52 `Duendecitos' (fig. 30), Capricho 54 `El vergonzoso' (fig. 31)). Among the eighty 
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etchings, there are also those which portray the human figure in more naturalistic 
terms, such as those in which young women are the central protagonists of the plate 
(Capricho 16 `Dios la perdone: y era su madre', Capricho 17 `Bien tirada esta', 
Capricho 32 `Por que fue sensible') or part of a couple (Capricho 5 `Tal para qual', 
Capricho 7 `Ni asi la distingue') or a group (Capricho 2 `El sf pronuncian y la mano 
alargan al primero que llega', Capricho 14 `Que sacrificio', Capricho 72 `No to 
escaparäs', Capricho 73 `Mejor es holgar') 
. 
But the figurative element of the 
compositions is unavoidably visible for the human body commands the page; one 
cannot fail to notice the multiplicity of physical types or the dramatic physicality of 
the figures, in other words, the centrality given to the body. 
Although Capricho 65 `LDönde va mama? ' (fig. 23) is traditionally considered 
a witchcraft scene, as its preliminary conception in Album B indicates, 6 my purpose 
here is to focus on the misshapen human figures delineated by Goya. Capricho 65 
represents an intricate amalgamation of bodies in which four naked figures rest on one 
another in acrobatic, impossible postures against a diffuse rural landscape. The 
central position of the etching is occupied by a rotundly baroque female figure, almost 
Rubensesque, whose mound of fat flesh is effortlessly sustained by her acolytes who 
carry her as if she is seated in a sedan chair, or a throne. A plausible image is rendered 
fantastical by Goya, who places an ordinary object, a parasol, in the hands of a cat, the 
fourth servant; the parasol might be interpreted as a displaced crown for this queen of 
witches. This voluptuous female body is sprawled and leaning against other bodies, 
unable to carry herself and lacking composure. Acting like the pedestal for a statue, 
the figure at the bottom of the plate, upper body hunched and head bent forward, 
resembles a monstrous inhabitant, face in his torso, of exotic lands as portrayed by the 
classical and the Medieval mind and later on in early sixteenth-century prints of the 
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New World. All the other bodies rest on him. His spread legs connote a primitive 
bodily posture that is replicated in the other two figures on either side of the womanly 
figure and given an animal replica in the feline creature at the top corner of the 
etching. Bodies viewed as `primitive' traditionally suggest otherness, as printed 
images of native cultures have done through the centuries, shaping the European 
understanding of other peoples but also representing the concerns and anxieties of the 
European civilized viewers. Such images were fundamentally constitutive of the 
categorical sets through which viewers made sense of the world, and necessary to the 
discursive order upon which a culture is founded. Images of the `other' and the `self' 
are mutually constructed and (de)formed in a dialectical signifying process. The 
flawed configuration of the classical body in Capricho 65 is supported by a human 
pedestal 
- 
primitive other 
- 
on which the other bodies are mounted. 
The mixture of animalistic and primitivist elements also foregrounds the 
carnality inscribed in this etching. The iconographic codes of decorum, in particular 
feminine decorum, are not being observed by Goya. The gender of the figures in 
direct physical contact with `mama' is uncertain, and their sexuality is enigmatic since 
there is no direct view of their genitals, or in the case of the figure at the bottom, it is 
not specified since an owl is in their place. The motherly figure alluded to in the title 
is certainly not a source of nurture and support, but rather a bloated and flaccid mass. 
What I propose here is a comparison to a more sacred, mother figure, that of the 
Madonna enthroned, the visual prototype for idealized virtuous women, since the 
composition of the print might be said to model itself on religious imagery, so 
pervasive in Spanish culture during the baroque period. The demonic acolytes have 
replaced the formal perfection of angels, too. In representations of the Immaculate 
Conception and female saints, the female figures are generally depicted `as standing 
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figures, elevated on platforms above their kneeling adherents, and trampling a 
monster' (Cohen, 2004: 44). Mary is traditionally transported in a supreme throne, 
located in mid-air, moving up to heaven, flanked by angels; her body, `being assumed 
into heaven' (Katz, 2001: 99), represented purity: `Mary's assumption and 
immaculate conception, like her freedom from sin, sex, and bodily decay, further 
distanced her from human experience and, in some minds, from all humanity' (Katz, 
2001: 99). Visual representations of the mystery of the Immaculate Conception were 
a common staple of Spanish religious art from the fifteenth-century onwards. After 
the Council of Trent, they became a classic of Counter-Reformation imagery, and, as 
an exemplary subject, their presence was still pervasive in eighteenth-century 
religious art. During the reign of Carlos III, the Virgin of the Immaculate Conception 
was proclaimed `the monarchy's sole and special patroness' (Martinez Cuesta, 1997: 
203), as announced in the opening session of the Cortes on 17 July 1760 and decreed 
on 16 January 1761. In order to commemorate the proclamation, the monarchy 
commissioned a painting on the subject from Mariano Salvador Maella (The 
Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary). Maella followed the iconography 
already fixed by baroque painters such as Peter Paul Rubens (1577-1640), Jusepe de 
Ribera (1591-1652), Bartolome Esteban Murillo (1617-1682). A brief glance at 
examples from these painters confirms the pictorial conventions mentioned above: 
Rubens' Immaculate Conception (1628) (fig. 32), Ribera's Virgin of the Immaculate 
Conception (1635) (fig. 33), Murillo's Immaculate Conception (ca. 1665-1670) (fig. 
34) conform to classical depictions of this devotional image: a gracious Mary, 
crowned with an aura of stars, stands on a crescent moon surrounded by putti in her 
majestic assumption; her physical beauty expresses her purity and humility. The 
beholder of this image would have been delighted, instructed and moved. As part of 
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its propaganda fide, the Counter-Reformation encouraged a return to more traditional 
forms of art. The Council of Trent restored the fundamental function of sacred 
imagery in the instruction of the Catholic faith and its role in animating devotion, and, 
in its propagandistic and didactic function, devotional imagery had to present `clarity 
in subject matter, logic and order in narrative exposition, a classical sense of decorum, 
and dramatic effects encouraging the viewer's empathy and participation' (Moffit, 
1999: 119). 
A look at Goya's Capricho 65 shows how the artist worked within and against 
artistic traditions. This print contrasts with the conventions of religious painting in a 
manner which departs drastically from the norms of idealized beauty and absolute 
purity and sets up an ironic visual parallel. The depiction of this mother or queen of 
witches goes beyond conventional witchcraft imagery and acquires a more subversive 
tone once Goya inscribes religious iconography into the composition of the print. 
Goya replays in this print both representations of baroque religiosity and Rubenesque 
female forms while at the same time offering a deformed and debased version of these 
visual traditions, tipping them over into the monstrous. Unlike the Virgins, Goya's 
figure does not seem to get off the ground; as such, the image is more rooted in 
earthiness, physicality and bodiliness. In Capricho 65 the corporeal perfection of the 
radiant prototype has been replaced by a grotesque amalgamation of bodies. 
Culturally endorsed imagery and culturally ingrained attitudes of the Counter- 
Reformation are also important in my analysis of Capricho 52 `iLo que puede un 
sastre! ' (fig. 18). Catholicism had been shaping the bodies and minds of the Spanish 
population since Medieval times; from the sixteenth-century onwards the Counter- 
Reformation provided more orthodox (and militant) religious attitudes. As I argued in 
Chapter 3, Catholicism was the dominant and normative ideology in eighteenth- 
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century Spain, shaping the everyday life of aristocracy and populace alike. The 
reforms of the ilustrados came up against `una sociedad culturalmente catölica [... ] y 
medieval' (Jimenez Lozano, 1989: 142). Minds and bodies were inextricably bound 
in responses to sacred images, as well as folk belief, or, to put it differently, human 
flesh was closely engaged with religious imagery and superstition. In Re-forming the 
Body. Religion, Community and Modernity (1997), Philip A. Mellor and Chris 
Shilling trace three major reformations of the body 
- 
`the medieval body', the 
`Protestant modern body' and `the baroque modern body' 
- 
across particular eras and 
cultures. Taking their cue from Elias' work on the civilizing process (1939), Mellor 
and Shilling describe the Medieval body as volatile: `medieval persons possessed 
instinctual and emotional responses to experiences and events which tended to be 
more impulsive, volatile and unpredictable than those of their modern counterparts' 
(1989: 36). A comparison can be drawn between this description and the Spanish 
society of the eighteenth century in order to understand not only the attempts of the 
Spanish ilustrados to reform modes of behaviour but also the individual and collective 
engagement of the populace with religious experiences. Capricho 52 `iLo que puede 
un sastre! ' is the print I shall be analyzing in this context. 
Generically, Capricho 52 can be interpreted as a devotional print of sorts, a 
meta-commentary on the part of Goya on contemporary religious prints so popular 
among different sectors of the population. This religious scene portrays a pious 
young woman kneeling in front of a gigantic figure, looking at it with ecstatic 
devotion. Other believers show the same religious fervour for the priest-like figure; 
their facial expressions convey their devoutness, their bodies their submissiveness and 
humility. This crowd of worshippers arguably represents a communal experience of 
the sacred. But the object of their faith, though, is not a `real' priest. Concealed 
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behind the habit, there is a tree, trunk and branches giving human form to the pious 
fraud. The branches of this tree stand for the risen arms of a priest in preaching mode. 
The uneducated masses, the image seems to tell us, are seduced by deceptive visual 
appearances which perpetuate the (in)visibility of tradition. 7 The monstrous flying 
creatures flanking the `priest' convey an eerie, supernatural air to the scene. 8 
Admittedly, Goya is criticizing the priesthood's exploitation of popular faith. The 
cloaked tree, as the title indicates, is a human fabrication, `iLo que puede un sastre! '; 
in other words, this fraudulent `body' is a discursive construction of Catholicism. The 
scene is reminiscent of baroque paintings of apparitions: `the formula adopted by 
Goya is similar to those found in Counter-Reformation paintings that portray 
apparitions, except that the theophany is shown to be an illusion' (Stoichita and 
Coderch, 1999: 88). External appearances and excessive, superstitious forms of 
religious fervour are therefore the targets of Goya's attack according to the 
manuscript commentaries: `en el mundo se adora un leno vestido por un sastre, 
porque solo nos contentamos con la exterioridad' (Calcograf a Nacional in Carrete 
Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np); `la supersticion hace adorar un tronco 
vestido al püblico ignorante' (Lopez de Ayala in Sayre, 1974: 108). The Biblioteca 
Nacional calls attention to the idolatrous attitudes not only of worshippers but also of 
producers of religious imagery: `la supersticion general hace que todo un pueblo se 
prosterne y adore con temor a un tronco cualquiera vestido de tronco'. 9 Idolatry, 
superstition and witchcraft are conflated in Goya's etching. But I would like to 
redirect our attention to the group of worshippers being portrayed in this image since 
Goya provides an affective and empirical moment in the real lives of the populace, 
reminding us of the somatic experience of the sacred, of the emotional engagement of 
the populace with sacred imagery. The volatile bodies of Medieval Europe, immersed 
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`in the natural and supernatural world of demons, spirits and angels' (Mellor and 
Shilling, 1997: 8), are not that far away from the mindset and corporeal experiences of 
the volatile bodies of eighteenth-century Spain. It seems to me that overlooking and 
disavowing the role of these bodies in the production of knowledge is to deny other 
ways of behaving and gaining knowledge. Their desire to believe is what forms their 
rationale. Goya borrows the affective moments inscribed in devotional art as if to 
`awaken strong emotions and make the beholder understand, believe, desire' 
(Knudsen, 2000: 15). 
One can intuit another disquieting image in which the roots of the tree are 
firmly embedded in the ground: the `arbre encyclopedique'. As we shall see later on 
in this chapter, modern, rational science also depends on a fictitious structure, the tree 
of knowledge, which can only manifest itself under the guise of abstract and ideal 
representations. As I discussed in reference to model books and anatomical plates at 
the beginning of this section, the body was ideated in the abstract. The 
insurmountable tension between the abstract concept of the Enlightenment (as well as 
of religion) and the concrete body is being addressed by Goya in this etching. In its 
privileging of mind over flesh, of disembodied reason over `troublesome emotions, 
feelings and intuitions which race around the body' (Mellor and Shilling, 1997: 46), 
the Enlightened reformers did not engage other bodies: the illiterate, the superstitious 
and the impoverished. I shall return to this point in Chapter 5 in the context of Goya's 
engagement with the notions of `engano' (deception) and the enlightened project of 
`desengano' (discovery of deception) 
Hybridization 
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The hybrid is perhaps the most familiar type of imaginary monster as it is 
represented in different religious, mythological and artistic traditions. In these 
discourses hybrid creatures and physical deformities are to be interpreted as a sign of 
moral corruption and come to concretise moral abstractions or allegories; however, 
the hybrid in its intermixture of different categories introduces ontological uncertainty 
and the questioning of boundaries (human / animal, ideal / monstrous). My 
theoretical engagement with Canguilhem, Foucault and Derrida in Chapter 2 comes 
into play here. Monsters always defy categories, norms, rules, systems of thought; the 
images analysed in this section represent `disturbing hybrids whose externally 
incoherent bodies resist attempts to include them in the classificatory order of things' 
(Cohen, 1996: 6). To be faced with the monstrous hybrids of Los Caprichos is to 
enter a ceaseless questioning, to establish provisional responses and conclusions, and 
hence to affirm provisional meanings. 
In the same way that for the Medieval viewer the hybrid might have looked 
ridiculous and provoked laughter, as well as incarnating sinfulness and moral 
impurity, the Enlightened viewer might also have had a mixed response to hybrid 
creatures: on the one hand, they might have regarded them with derision and disbelief 
as reminders of superstitious and popular beliefs, while, on the other, their rationalist 
desire for established taxonomies and regulated order would have been unsettled. 
Notwithstanding their spiritual, moral, or comical effect on the viewer, `crude 
hybrids, and their monstrous behaviour, belong to the world of the body and its basest 
functions' (Bovey, 2002: 44-5), to the bestial nature within humans. The conflictual 
status of the hybrid calls attention to the desires of the body. In a reference to the 
Great Chain of Being in Chapter 2, I argued that man in a sense is a strange hybrid 
monster for he is placed as a member of two orders of being at the same time, human 
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and animal, and he is not at home in either order(see Lovejoy, 1985: 199). Los 
Caprichos abound in hybrid creatures that disrupt the integrity of the human form and 
draw attention to this anxiety. Hybridisation is manifested in manifold ways in the 
collection; however, for the purposes of my discussion and for clarity, I shall refer to 
two different types of representations of the hybrid: hybrid creatures, which are 
composites of different animals, and intertwined bodies, in which two human bodies 
come together. In the first group, human and bestial features are blended together in 
Capricho 63 `Miren que graves' (fig. 26), humans are transmogrified into terrifying 
otherworldly creatures in Capricho 48 `Soplones' (fig. 35), Capricho 51 `Se repulen' 
(fig. 27) and Capricho 64 `Buen viaje (fig. 36)', or disfigured human figures cross 
over into the monstrous in Capricho 67 `Aguarda que to unten' (fig. 37). Others, like 
Capricho 19 `Todos caerän' (fig. 38), 20 `Ya van desplumados' (fig. 39) and 21 `Cuäl 
la descaflonan' (fig. 40), portray bird-men and bird-women as protagonists of scenes 
of prostitution and sexual guile in which women prey on men and men prey on 
women. Let us focus first on `Miren que graves'. 
In `Miren que graves' (fig. 26), the mixture of species is taken to extremes: 
two beasts, with the bodies of bears and the heads of mules, carry their burdens, one a 
human body with the head and talons of an eagle, the other a human body with the 
head of a donkey. They are placed in an indeterminate space 
-an arena? a fair? - in 
which a blurred crowd is witness to their bestial display. The deformation of human 
form in Capricho 63 epitomizes the violation of categorical norms; in their corporeal 
monstrosity, the hybrid creatures depicted here are an anathema to enlightened reason, 
as I shall shortly argue. But first we should briefly consider traditional readings of 
this print in order to understand some of the meanings it articulates. Capricho 63 can 
be placed in relation to learned and popular images and sayings criticizing social 
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abuse10 and representing the theme of the world turned upside down. 11 The artist 
proposes a similar visual take in another print, Capricho 42 'Td que no puedes' (fig. 
6), where two peasants are carrying two donkeys, albeit this image is conveyed in 
more familiar terms than `Miren que graves'. Allegorical readings of the etchings are 
unquestionable, for Goya offers visions of an unnatural social order and vicious 
deformations of human failings such as idleness12 and ignorance. What have critics 
said about the crowd in the distant background? Very little, in fact, they either seem 
to be acclaiming the bestial creatures, and, by extension, participating in their errors, 
or crying out against them (`j, Es cierto que les aclaman? LNo es posible que clamen 
contra ellos? ' (Helman, 1993: 109)). They might be, on the other hand, mere 
spectators in an arena or a market square 
- 
indeed, popular lore for monsters in fairs 
and shows is well documented. Or, in a more politically inflected reading, it could be 
said that the populace is voicing their protest against power. Thus the print is at the 
confluence of several discourses, among them, reformist critiques of relations of 
power and dominance, symbolic associations with morality, and popular taste for 
monsters. However, conceptually, the monstrous is operating as a deeply disruptive 
force which displaces and troubles familiar readings. The hybrid creatures in 
Capricho 63 epistemologically undermine the separation of the human and the 
animal, of the normal and the monstrous. In their display of human aspects, they are 
all too human. The ontological and epistemological uncertainty introduced by these 
hybrid monsters, therefore, unsettles any fixed binarism, questioning static categories 
of knowledge and systematic structurations. 
In order to complete my discussion on hybrid creatures, I now turn to 
Capricho 51 `Se repulen' (fig. 27), where the corporeal monstrosity depicted by Goya 
is again all too human. On a first view, the image calls into question the boundary 
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between human and other animals. Two human-like figures are sprucing themselves 
up, while a hybrid creature, half-eagle, half-human, oversees the pedicure (or is just 
waiting its turn) or screens their unsightly activities. Critics rightly interpret these 
figures as representations of goblins, spirits, or witches, thereby inserting the print 
within the theme of witchcraft13 or anticlerical criticism. 14 The ghoulish figures of 
Capricho 51 also stand, according to the manuscripts, for specific social types, which 
are the target of Goya's satire. Two examples should suffice to illustrate such 
identifications: `Los empleados que roban al estado, se ayudan unos a otros. El jefe de 
ellos levanta erguido su cuello, y les hace sombra con sus alas monstruosas' 
(Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo, 1993: np); `Los ladrones y 
pfcaros, se tapan y disculpan unos a otros' (Calcograffa Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete 
Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np). 15 As we can see from these 
interpretations, the ghoulish figures of Capricho 51 become discursively mobile, 
refusing to stay in place. I would like to shift our attention to issues of corporeality 
and monstrosity inscribed in the image, and a first step is to consider the hybrid 
creatures depicted by Goya as instances of vice. Tomlison follows this line of 
argument in her reading of Capricho 51 for she sees the etching as a grotesque 
portrayal of sensual `delight and vanity' (1994: 140) in which Goya is arguably 
providing the viewer with a moral lesson by pointing out that vanity is `a trait 
observed in others, but one that we rarely notice in ourselves' (1994: 140). 16 These 
goblins, as Tomlinson defines the figures, become embodiments of vice. 
But let us attempt a different reading of the etching. In The Civilizing Process 
(1939), Elias taught us that the paring of one's fingernails, like the performance and 
the speaking about other bodily functions, were part of `historical transformations in 
behavioural codes and forms of affect control' (Shilling, 2003: 151) in which bodily 
173 
parts and functions, as well as impulses and emotions, are progressively hidden from 
public view. Purging the body of its corporeality and regulating passions and 
emotions has been a fundamental aspect of the restructuring of manners and the 
creation of civilized bodies throughout the centuries. 17 And the Spanish eighteenth 
century is no exception to this process. 18 (Note I say `process', for the civilized, as 
Elias observes, `has grown out of that which we call uncivilized' (Elias, 1978: 59)). 
In `Se repulen', the figure on the left makes a very `civilized' use of the instrument in 
his hand, a pair of scissors, while he is carefully and deftly paring the toenails of his 
`uncivilized' companion. The process of sprucing themselves up is conveyed in the 
feet of the figures, one neat and tidy at the bottom right hand corner of the image, the 
other in the process of becoming a clean and proper body. I shall return to this notion 
of the clean and proper body in my discussion of Capricho 59 `Y aun no se van' fig. 
41) in the context of Julia Kristeva's notion of abjection; for the time being suffice to 
say that nail clippings are among those bodily excretions that are produced within the 
body to be expelled from it: as Grosz says, "`proper" sociality and subjectivity are 
based on the expulsion of the improper, the unclean, and the disorderly elements of its 
corporeal existence' (Grosz, 1990: 86). The learning and performing of socially 
appropriate skills which delineate civilized conduct is inextricably linked to the 
unclean and the corrupt. 
As abstract embodiments of vice, if one follows Tomlinson's interpretation, 
the figures of `Se repulen' are to be interpreted as monstrously different: their bodily 
actions embody absolute otherness. But absolute otherness would reinstate a binary 
opposition for the civilized body can only take up a position by assuming himself free 
from the uncivilized, monstrous other, denying or repressing other possibilities. But 
this claim itself is dependent upon what is denied or repressed. As Shildrick notes, 
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So long as the monstrous remains the absolute other in its corporeal difference 
it poses few problems; in other words it is so distanced in its difference that it 
can be clearly put into an oppositional category of not me. Once, however, it 
begins to resemble those of us who lay claim to the primary term of the 
identity, or to reflect back aspects of ourselves that are repressed, then its 
indeterminate status 
- 
neither wholly self nor wholly other 
- 
becomes deeply 
disturbing. (Shildrick, 2002: 2-3) 
The hybrid creatures, unnatural couplings and conjoined twins captured in 
Medieval bestiaries, wonder books, medical treatises and popular prints are 
reconfigured and reappropriated in Los Caprichos. While they retain early religious 
connotations, Goya inscribes them in the sociopolitical context of late eighteenth- 
century Spain. Capricho 2 `El sf pronuncian y la mano alargan al primero que llega' 
(fig. 42) and Capricho 14 `Que sacrificio' (fig. 43) arguably represent unnatural 
couplings, albeit of a social type. Among the second group of hybrid bodies, that is, 
intertwined bodies, Capricho 62 `iQuien lo creyera! ' (fig. 28) and Capricho 75 `LNo 
hay quien nos desate? ' (fig. 29) present entangled couples, whose union is presided by 
monstrous creatures, unidentifiable feline animals in the case of the former, a gigantic 
owl in the latter. Whereas Capricho 75 clearly depicts a man and a woman tied to 
each other at the waist, Capricho 62, like Capricho 65, poses a similar enigma as to 
the gender of the entwined figures. 19 Whether fighting or copulating, these two 
figures clutch each other's bodies violently unaware (or fully aware) of the monsters 
about to prey on them; perhaps the abominable creatures can be said to give concrete 
form to the predatory aspects of their passion and, by extension, their moral depravity. 
Some critics (Helman, 1993: 126-127; Wilson-Bureau, 1992: 282) have suggested a 
visual representation of a literary source, the Spanish translations of Milton's 
Paradise Lost by Cadalso, Jovellanos and Melendez Valdes: the moment in which the 
fallen angels are cast out from Heaven and on their way to Hell. There is no heroic 
fight nor a balanced, orchestrated movement in the characters depicted here, just the 
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sheer physicality of the body and its bestiality. `i, No hay quidn nos desate? ' portrays 
the union of man and woman in an unusual manner tied to a trunk. This is the 
excruciating image of two tied-up bodies. Compositionally, the male and the female 
body are represented as two intersecting lines that form a cross, a shape prolonged by 
the extended wings of the owl. Are they a husband and a wife pulling in different 
directions? Is this the representation of an unwanted union? 20 If so, Goya does not tie 
them to the convention of contemporary satirical imagery of marriages of 
convenience (which are arguably parodied in the aforementioned Capricho 2 and 
Capricho 14). 21 Or, is this a scene of rape as the rope tied around the woman's ankles 
and the despairing expression in her face seems to suggest? The male figure, in fact, 
seems to be carrying her off by force. If hybridization is traditionally understood as 
signifying abnormal or sinful behaviours, Goya makes visible and denounces the 
deformities and vices of unenlightened eighteenth-century Spain. But these bodies 
are `fused' together, they are locked in a mutually constitutive relationship. Like the 
conjoined twins represented in prodigy books and broadsheets or displayed in the 
marketplace, their inseparability poses a challenge as to the body-image of the 
singular individual subject. 
In the age of encyclopedism, the (uniform) human body represented `the 
organic paradigm of all complex unions' (Stafford, 1991: 12). As a privileged model 
or model object, the body, more specifically the classical body, acquired the status of 
keeper of meaning and essential secrets. Analytic dissection and synthetic 
reconstruction became an objective standard against which the body, affective and 
mutable, was judged. Yet the paradigmatic anatomical method of the Enlightenment, 
a violent, adversarial `opening up' of the subject, not only created truths but also 
administered the powers of exclusion and control, as our discussion of Foucault's 
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work demonstrated. Through the work of Foucault on the asylum, the clinic and the 
prison, I traced how the classical age saw the development of disciplinary techniques 
of power to establish social control of the body. Modern, rational discourses 
established dividing practices (mad/sane, sick/healthy, criminal/law-abiding) which 
framed and determined which bodies were normal and which were abnormal. Normal 
bodies therefore became the (normative) standard against which other bodies 
- 
abnormal, deviant- were defined. The body is a victim of the Enlightenment project 
in that it is already secondary to the mind. 
Natural science and the language of empiricism was the epistemic ideal of the 
eighteenth century. This resulted in a drive towards biological epitomization, a 
reductive and essentialist representation of the body shed of its materiality. It is 
precisely the Reasoned corrective of an immutable bodily form that Goya questions. 
Stafford's argument that the anatomical figure is `turned into a lithic, even 
mineralogical specimen' is particularly pertinent for the analysis of Goya's Capricho 
59 `Y An no se van' (fig. 41), which sets up an antagonism between the 
Enlightenment's ideal and its fleshy approximation. In the print, a ghoulish assembly 
of figures is depicted pushing against a huge tombstone which seems about to crush 
them. In Spanish the word `losa' also means `burden', which brings into the etching 
another meaning: the crushing burden of human mortality. 
The dramatic contrast between the huddled, bent figures and the sheer 
diagonal `spine' of the stone, suggests the artist's dispute with the textual / 
representational ideals of the time. Science as a displaced theology, as the Reader of 
the Book of Nature, might be seen as denying or building over the inchoate mass of 
human fallibility. The tombstone might be seen as pronouncing death upon the 
superstitious and irrational beliefs of the populace. Open to metaphorical readings, 
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the figures become embodiments of abstract notions such as death, superstition, or the 
supernatural. But these bodies are irremediably physical: Goya recuperates their 
bodiliness. My analysis of Capricho 59 derives from Julia Kristeva's concept of 
abjection in Powers of Horror (1982). The bodily excess of the unsightly human 
mass portrayed in this capricho provokes horror and disgust. This reaction `is 
symptomatic of our cultural inability to accept the body's materiality, its limits, its 
"natural" cycles and its mortality' (Grosz, 1990: 91). The tombstone acts as a border 
for those monstrous figures that threaten to cross it, possibly a moral limit if we are to 
accept one of the texts accompanying the etching, which reads `La muerte va dejando 
caer sobre nosotros la losa del sepulcro, y con todo, no nos enmendamos'. 22 The 
contorted shape of the figure leaning against the stone struggles against its weight: 
feet, hands, and chest exert all their fragile force. An old woman cowers in fear; 
amidst gaping eyes and mouths, a convulsing body lies on the ground 
-a corpse? 
23 It 
is as if the bodies had crawled out from under this rock; yet it is unclear whether the 
stone is being raised 
-along with the resurrected figures- or dropped. There is no 
epitaph written on this stone, no engravings on its surface, but there is a caption: `Y 
atin no se van' (And Still They Don't Go). Roberto Alcalä Flecha's `Vampirism in 
the work of Goya' (1993: 258-267) is an example of a reading of Capricho 59 as a 
satirical commentary on contemporary beliefs in vampires 
- 
hence a reading which 
takes for granted the `resurrection' of the figures. He situates and reads the etching 
within the period's intellectual and popular consideration of the vampire in Europe 
and its reception in Spain in the works of Feijoo, Cadalso, and Fernandez de Moratfn. 
According to Alcalä Flecha, the ambiguity of the title might be clarified by the titles 
of preparatory drafts, `La Trampa' ('The trap') and `Salga lo que saliere' ('Whatever 
May Emerge'), which draw attention to the huge slab. This would be a reference to 
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the belief of cultivated minds in the impossibility of a dead body rising from the grave 
and then coming back to it without removing the gravestone. Alcalä Flecha admits 
that, although Goya's ultimate intention is out of our reach, the artist's point of 
departure is the visualization of a graphic joke (1993: 263). Goya's etching, then, 
would be an illustration of this absurd belief. Alcalä Flecha traces the literature and 
the cultural ideas of Goya's contemporary milieu in order to find a rational and 
cohesive explanation for the vampiric figures: the origin, the point of departure, for 
Capricho 59 would respond to a graphically literal and metaphorical use of the word 
`vampire' in reference to political and religious classes. To follow this line of 
argument would be to miss the capricho's interrogation of representation itself. 
Alcalä Flecha's concern with the genealogy of the work fixes its scope and its 
boundaries. How are we to view the deliberate ambiguity of the Goyaesque vampire 
as well as the caption? The discontinuity between picture and text is arguably an 
instance of Reason and its alter-ego Unreason. 
The Spine of the Book 
-Symbolic order, religious discourse, discursive 
rectitude, the scientific lexicon- would bind the body, delimiting its boundaries. 
Abjection is a relationship to a boundary and represents what has been jettisoned out 
of that boundary, its other side. In Kristeva's words, abjection is: 
[a] weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and 
which crushes me. On the edge of nonexistence and hallucination, of a reality 
that, if I acknowledge it, annihilates me. There, abject and abjection are my 
safeguards. The primers of my culture. (1982: 2) 
What threatens the `clean and proper' 
-the paradigm of the `clean and proper body'- 
must be cast out, excluded. For Kristeva, the symbolic order, and the acquisition of a 
sexual and psychical identity within it, can only exist by delimiting the body. The 
activity of exclusion is necessary to guarantee that the subject takes up his or her 
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proper place in relation to the symbolic. The impossibility of purity is the paradox of 
the abject: what you seek to exclude is constitutive of you. In Grosz's words, 
`abjection is a reaction to the recognition of the impossible but necessary 
transcendence of the subject's corporeality, and the impure, defiling elements of its 
uncontrollable materiality' (1990: 108). The body is a neglected entity in that its 
nature is cleared of the dung of life, and `it is divorced from any sense of the fleshed 
"natural" body' (1990: 108). Kristeva's notion of the abject straddles themes and 
methods established in Chapter 2, namely acts of structuration and exclusionary 
practices that mark and exclude the monstrous body. As the unacknowledged 
condition of the dominant term, reason, the excluded term body returns `as material 
and theoretical protagonist in [... ] resistance to an authority already in place' (Smith, 
1992: 2). Goya reminds us in `Y aün no se van' that, despite the privileging of an 
abstract consideration of a uniform human body over the unruly body, corporeality 
and the materiality of the flesh do not go away. Bodies as bodies still do not go away. 
As the analysis of these plates has shown, the ideal form of neo-classicism was 
haunted by uncontrollable somatic desires, the suffering fact of the human condition, 
in other words, the possibility of disease, death, anomaly, monstrosity. Once again 
critics invoke Capricho 43 `El sueno de la razön produce monstruos' (fig. 1) not only 
to highlight Goya's reconfiguration of, or challenge to, the classical body but also to 
refer to his work as paradigmatic of the fault lines inherent in neo-classical 
representations of the body: 
The Neo-Classical drawing of the body was fraught with danger, sexuality and 
potential failure, expressed in Goya's famous print The Sleep of Reason 
Produces Monsters. If Reason were to slip for a moment and the dangerous 
excesses of the imagination allowed free rein, then the cautious construction of 
a perfect body by the elimination of imperfect detail could break down, 
releasing the monsters of Unreason. (Mirzoeff, 1995: 192) 
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Enlightenment thought aimed, in Stafford's words, `to even out the odd' (1997: 466). 
That was its moral task whether in art or medicine. Setting its ideal according to the 
model and pattern of the contemporary natural sciences, the physiology of man 
-our 
physical organization- embodied the ideal of morphological perfection, representing 
Enlightenment's belief in the invisible, innate property shared by all individuals 
belonging to the same category. Thus biological anomalies, monstrous organizations 
destabilised the mimetic maxim of `like produces like'. Attempts to construct a 
perfect body, to know the truth about the body could be achieved through the 
imitation of decorous human behaviour or alternatively informing the beholder about 
appropriate bodily behaviours and the proper management of appetites. The ancient 
and classical language of physiognomy provided ruling elites with a way of learning 
about, as well as seeing, unruly and disorderly behaviours. It is to this interpretative 
science that I now turn in the context of the Spanish Enlightenment. 
Physiognomical modes of reasoning / Body criticism 
The previous pages have considered Goya's reconfigurations of the classical 
body as well as notions of an ideal bodily comportment and behaviour so that in the 
remainder of the chapter I can locate the collection in relation to physiognomical 
traditions and physiognomical modes of reasoning. Physiognomy as body criticism 
was a `rational' method of constructing knowledge. But in the pursuit of essences, its 
abstract, anatomical method offered a reductive image of the body. And a sinister one 
too, `since its adherents claimed privileged powers of detection' (Stafford, 1997: 84). 
Goya was fully aware of the thematic and methodological consequences governing 
such body criticism. 
181 
The somatic has provided a point of entry into a larger physical and moral 
universe since the beginnings of Western civilization. Writers and painters have 
linked bodily qualities, the physical, to certain behaviours, the moral. There is a long 
tradition 
- 
and certainly a human impulse 
- 
in linking beauty with virtue and ugliness 
with vice: from Aristotle to the Medieval world right to the Enlightenment, the 
ancient Greco-Roman tradition relating the outer appearance of man to signs of his 
character resurfaces in Essays on Physiognomy (1781), a ten-volume study on 
physiognomy by the Swiss Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741-1801). Here I understand 
physiognomy as an `indication of character through the facial features and forms of 
the head and body' (Cowling, 1989: 9). Within physiognomical modes of reasoning, 
vice resembled such formless, ill-defined multiplicity, and was deemed both evil and 
ugly. During the Enlightenment, Stafford notes, `the body was intimately tied to the 
establishment and upholding of ethical norms for ugliness and beauty' (1991: 16). It 
also served opposing political and cultural projects in their communication of moral 
messages since the belief in a relationship between physical and moral traits was 
shared alike by conservative and revolutionary forces. 
In the case of Spain, the Enlightened reformers saw the traditionalists as an 
obstacle to the reformation of the individual and social body, while the traditionalists, 
in turn, perceived the reformers as a threat to their beliefs and values. The cultural, 
political and ideological differences between reformists and traditionalists have 
already been addressed in Chapter 3. In their constructions of normal and deviant 
bodies, the body became a key site for the communication of meaning and for the 
legitimation of us / them constructions. Representations of the `other' (whether 
reformers or traditionalists) reflected the fears and anxieties of specific social groups 
and mobilized different cultural modes of seeing, which encouraged viewers to see 
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and think in terms of binary distinctions. I shall be focusing on the reformists' 
discursive production of monsters through the grid of phsyiognomics. But before I 
turn to Goya's engagement with physiognomical modes of reasoning, it is important 
to bear in mind how traditionalists perceived the Enlightened reformer so that Los 
Caprichos can be seen in relation to this conflicting contextual frame. My analysis of 
Capricho 39 `Hasta su abuelo' (fig. 9) and Capricho 37 `Si sabrd mäs el discipulo' 
(fig. 44) will show how Goya inscribes reformist and traditionalist ways of seeing 
within the same etching since the image depicted represents both the nobility's 
perception of themselves and the reformers' perception of the aristocracy. 
In the words of Jimenez Lozano, a whole way of life, Spanish Catholicism 
- 
`la espafiolidad-catolicidad' 
- 
was under threat for the `cristiano viejo', the `hidalgo', 
the regular clergy and the populace: 
esa identidad absoluta entre la catolicidad y espanolidad se habfa originado a 
finales del siglo XV y, luego, se habfa consolidado inmediatamente hasta un 
punto en que los signa fidei eran los mismos signos de la pertenencia a la 
espanolidad: senales biolögicas y antropolögicas, castizas. (1989: 145) 
Facing the `enlightened other', the traditionalists would look for those external signs 
- 
`palabras, gestos, vestidos, olores, y peinados negadores de su propia manera de ser, 
su identidad, su antropologia' (1989: 146), as well as those cultural artefacts - 
`pinturas, laminas, estampas, y objetos varios en los que hay una figuraciön er6tica, 
politica o anticlerical' (1989: 148) - that threatened their ways of life and cultural 
forms. A body signalling difference was to be regarded as a threat to the putative 
(traditionalist or reformist) norm. Such body criticism also played a prominent role in 
the reformist project. 
The promotion of reforms in education and the reformation of manners during 
the Spanish Enlightenment was informed, as Rebecca Haidt claims in Embodying 
Enlightenment (1998), by classical epistemologies, which conditioned 
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both the kinds of questions asked about bodies by authors whose productions 
aimed at the reform of institutions (such as those implicated in the training of 
doctors) and practices (such as comportment), and the ways in which bodily 
experiences might be represented in both authoritative and popular texts 
generated towards these ends. (1998: 2) 
Haidt focuses solely on representations of the male body and constructions of 
masculinity in the works of Enlightened reformers in order to show how 
Enlightenment is inscribed in and designated, that is, embodied, by the virtuous or 
aberrant male body. One example of the use of physiognomics as body criticism in 
the Spanish Enlightenment is the `literatura de petimetres', which counter-posed, 
Haidt argues, the `hombre de bien' (the gentleman, marked by an ideal of bodily 
comportment) to the `petimetre' (the fop, transgressively feminine, animal, or foreign) 
in order to construct the `ideal' subject, the `hombre de bien', who conformed to 
dominant modes of `proper' behaviour. 24 Physiognomical approaches to the 
depiction, and knowledge, of man could be seen as a way of bringing bodies 
- 
and 
minds 
- 
into alignment, thus legitimising various us-them constructions. The cultural 
problematic explored through such an instance of embodiment might be said to 
exemplify the Enlightenment project: brought face-to-face with the figures, a 
contemporary reader would draw salutary lessons from the described disorderly 
bodies: reasoned forms facing unreasoned desires, reasoned forms versus unruly 
pleasures. `Those who are irrational, who are not controlled by logos', writes Haidt, 
`fall outside that system of mutual recognizance sustaining virtue and the 
development of "good men"' (1998: 173). In this respect, the rhetorical politics of 
physiognomy functioned to recognize and categorize the monstrous other by 
establishing the civilized gentleman in opposition to an uncivilized `other' by making 
that other monstrous and thereby fixed and characterizable. This line of argument 
sees monstrous bodies as pedagogical tools that help ensure that viewers will not be 
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like them, otherwise punishment awaits. But, as we have argued, the difference 
between civilized and uncivilized originates in process. 
As Leppert has observed, the science of physiognomy `was not only widely 
practiced as a social science, it was as well an art project about bodies' (1996: 206, 
my italics). Visual aesthetics, therefore, also participated in a public and moralistic 
agenda in its effort to define a normative human nature by producing representations 
that would serve as (utilitarian) instruments for the dissemination of enlightened 
ideals, as I argued in Chapter 3, and for the ideological and moral regeneration of 
individuals (and by extension the nation), as Haidt claims. Although mainly 
concerned with literature, Embodying Enlightenment touches upon the visual arts too 
in the context of philosophical ideas concerning the role of the senses in the 
acquisition of knowledge and refers explicitly to Goya's paintings the `Maja desnuda' 
(1798-1800) and the `Maja vestida' (1798-1805), though no reference is made to Los 
Caprichos. According to Haidt, these two paintings participated in `the private 
production and consumption' (1998: 64) of erotic tales, erotic poetry, and erotic 
images among the ilustrados. Samaniego's Jardin de Venus, Nicolas Fernandez de 
Moratin's Arte de las putas, or Melendez Valdes's Los besos de amor are amongst the 
texts written (and read) as `a means of production of enlightened knowledge about the 
sensing body's truth' (1998: 64). Haidt's concerns with the body, however, may 
arguably offer a different shading to Goya's engagement with the body criticism 
attached to physiognomy in general. 
By looking at physiognomical traditions I will be treading familiar territory 
since the physiognomical grid has been applied to readings of Los Caprichos by 
critics and art historians throughout the decades. 25 In his 1953 seminal study Goya's 
Caprichos: Beauty, Reason, and Caricature, Jost Lopez Rey authoritatively asserted 
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that the series, as well as others of Goya's contemporaneous works such as `The 
Magic Mirror' drawings (1797-9), `must be linked with the contemporary interest in 
the physiognomical characterization of human passions' (1973: 115). In Goya's use 
of physiognomical traditions, Lopez Rey saw an unproblematic `rationalist attitude' 
(1973: 128), for the artist 
-and here the critic reads the series through the 
Announcement- `expressed his conviction that human failings were the result of lack 
of enlightenment and the prevalence of reason over passion' (1973: 134). Held, on 
her part, links Goya's use of physiognomics to pre-literate and folkloric forms of 
knowledge ('belief in animistic ties with nature' (1987: 53)). More recently, Stoichita 
and Coderch have considered Goya's interest in the physiognomic analogy between 
man and animals in their analysis of `The Magic Mirror' series (1999: 59-73), 
highlighting Goya's innovative interpretation of Lavaterian physiognomical methods 
through the collapsing of a classical method of representation, since Goya suppresses 
in his specular metaphors the `step by step, face by face' gradual transformation from 
animal to human, thus `revealing the gap between "illusion" and "truth"' (1999: 68). 
Through an analysis of two etchings of the asinine series, Capricho 39 `Hasta su 
abuelo' and Capricho 37 `Si sabrä mäs el discipulo', 26 I would like to take Stoichita's 
and Coderch's views further by taking issue with 17th-century and early to mid-18te- 
century concepts of representation (Foucault's `classical' episteme), as well as with 
certain epistemological assumptions underlying the science of physiognomy. 
A few physiognomical or `type' representations which read for identification 
will be the focus of our analysis. The theme of the asinine in Los Caprichos, directed 
to exposing and condemning the Spanish nobility at the end of the century, lends itself 
most obviously to a social and moral reading. 27 Education and ignorance, social 
abuse and oppression, or the genealogical obsessions of a sector of the population are 
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among Goya's ostensible targets in the plates devoted to the asinine subject. Even the 
moral responsibility of the artist is at stake in Capricho 39 for some critics: `the 
maintenance of such an aristocratic system is also the responsibility of artists whose 
transformations of its ugliness into more pleasing images also acquiesces in its 
irrationality' (Soufas, 1986: 322). As a metaphorical representation of popular 
sayings, `No seas burro' (Don't be an ass) and `el muy burro' (the great oaf), the 
etchings can be understood within a tradition that partakes, in Teresa Lorenzo's 
words, of the `symbols and peculiar logic of Carnival language' (1989: xciii). 28 These 
etchings belong, of course, to a long tradition of poking fun at man's foibles and 
pretensions. On the other hand, it depicts in a metaphorical and satirical way how 
people understand reality in accordance with their own assumptions. Let us focus on 
Capricho 39 `Hasta su abuelo', resisting however the invitation to take the literal 
meanings offered by the manuscript captions and explanations: `A este pobre animal 
le han vuelto loco los genealogistas y reyes de armas. No es el solo' (Biblioteca 
Universitaria de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 
1999: np) and `Los preciados de nobles, suelen ser todos burros hasta el quinto 
abuelo' (Calcograffa Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 
1999: np). 
Such scriptorial pointers do not contain or exhaust the scope of Goya's dispute 
with the institutional preoccupations of his time. In particular, I wish to argue that the 
170'-century and early to mid-180'-century concept of representation is being 
potentially challenged. The drawings, preparatory drafts, and final etching of 
Capricho 39, which details a mule in human attire uncomfortably seated in his study, 
`reading' a book, might be linked back to conventional portraits of contemplative 
figures in conventional settings for meditation and reflection. The final version of the 
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etching, as in several of the early drafts, depicts the mule looking out towards the 
viewer. The continuity between the donkey's eye and the page, between vision and 
text, is broken by the momentary pose of the model. The only exception to this pose 
is the preparatory drawing of 1797-98, in which the anthropomorphic figure, hooves 
on text as if reading braille, is shown in profile. This scene of self-absorption, with its 
hint at the blindness of the reader (the pages of the pictured text are blank), is in 
keeping with the theme of ignorant self-assurance running through the compositions. 
In the final version of the etching, the book held open to view displays a pictorial 
taxonomy of asinine figures. The mimetic relationship established between the 
pictured reader and the `words' in the text corresponds to eighteenth-century 
assumptions on the nature of the sign and signification. It does not only correspond, 
then, to `genealogy' in its obsessive courtly guise of pure lineages and noble roots 
(the heraldic emblem figured on the study desk suggests as much), but also to a 
discursive organization symptomatic of the logocentric drive towards 
uncontaminated, unproblematized categories. Like the bats' morphological 
ambiguity in Capricho 43, the hybrid creature disrupts the continuity of identifiable 
categories. Identifying itself in the book, performing the cognitive operation of 
reading for identification, the anthropomorphic figure seems assured of the semiotic 
transparency of language. The figure of Capricho 39 is looking for sameness and 
difference, which suggests Foucault's thesis concerning the altered representation of 
reality in the eighteenth century and the shift from a discourse of resemblance to a 
discourse of identity and difference. The humanized donkey, a manifest 
contradiction, destabilizes the rational representation of reality; a legible methodology 
whose organization and homogeneity portrayed in the monochromatic uniformity and 
linear disposition of the asinine figures on the page is coextensive with representation 
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itself. Goya's altered representations of the body fracture the classical body and 
parallel in the same way `the cognitive fault-lines detected by Foucault in both 
Classical and Enlightenment mentalities' (Ilie, I, 1995: 194). Such contradictions and 
fault-lines open up the possibility of reconfiguring received meanings of the 
monstrous in Los Caprichos. 
The genealogical theme of `Hasta su abuelo' relates, as I have been arguing, 
among other issues, to inherited conceptual systems. The print represents the 
idealized and absolutized self-willed perception of a specific sector of the population, 
the noble, the `hidalgo' or, more generally, the `castizo', as Jimenez Lozano puts it: 
`la imagen de la propia identidad individual y colectiva absolutamente idealizada ya 
la que se presta una adhesion vital' (1989: 140). The same operation of reading for 
identification is at work in Capricho 37 `Si sabrä mäs ei discipulo' (fig. 44). 
Capricho 37, however, offers a different version of genealogical forms of identity 
within the context of a more general view on education, namely, the relationship 
between master and disciples. 29 The print depicts a visual lesson in which an ass- 
donkey is teaching a class of young ass-pupils. There is an air of gravity about this 
teacher: he looks self-assured and lofty, his elegance is sartorial, his manners are 
solemn, and the cane in his left hoof is a sign of authority. This is the first lesson as 
the multiple imprint of the letter `A' in the open book indicates, as well as an early 
impression of auctoritas on the younger generation. One can assume that the textual 
authority of classical authors, the pedagogical method here depicted, will inform the 
conduct and habits of these ass-pupils, as well as legitimate a certain way of 
understanding and perceiving the world. Authority and Tradition, the image seems to 
suggest, will be firmly imprinted in the bodies and minds. of these pupils. The 
repeated bray of the `A' grounds their knowledge and perception; conduct arises by 
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habit, Goya tells us. The notion of `habitus', as developed by Elias (1939) (and later 
on by Pierre Bourdieu (1984)), is central for the understanding of the body 
-a 
reminder that the reform of the human being is the basis for social reform. `Habitus', 
write Mellor and Shilling, are `those pre-cognitive, embodied dispositions which 
promote particular forms of human orientation to the world, organize each 
generations' senses and sensualities into particular hierarchies, and predispose people 
into particular ways of knowing and acting' (1997: 19-20). Admittedly, a certain 
pedagogical idea is at stake in this capricho. Both contemporary interpreters and 
recent critics have rightly identified the explicit critique of education. It is addressed 
in the manuscripts: `un maestro burro, solo puede sacar burriquitos' (Calcografia 
Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np); `un 
maestro burro no puede ensenar mäs que a rebuznar' (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, 
Carrete Par-rondo, 1994: np); and accounted for in recent criticism: the print represents 
`the limitations of the teaching process, and foregrounds the role of teaching in the 
[... ] passing down of behaviours, practices and traditions' (Wolf, 2000: 81-82). 
Capricho 37 points out those concepts and constructs of language, culture and the 
mind that govern traditional modes of seeing and proposes through the figure of the 
"monster" the collapsing of these very same concepts and constructs. As I argued in 
Chapter 2, Derrida's critique of Western metaphysics challenges the grounding 
principle on which it is founded, namely, the logic of non-contradiction, the idea that 
something cannot simultaneously be `A' and `not-A'. In the same way that the 
deconstructive project of Derrida seeks to displace habitual modes of thought, Goya 
works within and against familiar conventions and representations in order to 
dismantle and expose the ideological and cultural forces at play in the production of 
knowledge and in the construction of identities during the Spanish eighteenth century. 
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The letter `A' has brought into play various meanings, as well as different 
lines of argument, thus multiplying its representational possibilities. It can signify 
`Animal', `Asno', `Autoridad', `Aristocracia', `Aplicado', as my analysis has been 
suggesting. Let us pursue other meanings, `A' for `Arte', for `Academia' and for 
`Abstracciön', and their relation to issues of artistic representation. In his 
problematization of the practices and institutions that determine and re-enact the 
conceptual paradigms aforementioned, I am already anticipating Goya's engagement 
with institutional bodies, the focus of my final chapter. At this point, it is not my 
purpose to discuss the artist's participation in the debates on the pedagogical reform 
of the Royal Academy of San Fernando, `a truly anti-academic manifesto' (Stoichita 
and Coderch, 1999: 85), since this has been done elsewhere (Tomlinson reads Goya's 
report of October 1792 against the institutionalisation of artistic training and the 
uniformity of style (1992: 38-47)). Rather I would like to return to the academic and 
classical representation of bodies examined in the first half of this chapter. Linear 
grids and geometrical dissection contained the bodies depicted in pedagogical 
manuals and anatomical plates. The preliminary drawing for Capricho 37 features a 
pair of compasses and a ruler, fundamental instruments - techne - for conveying 
abstract perfection and geometrical proportion. The drawing of straight lines and 
circles gave shape, as I argued, to the body classical. Technical instruments played a 
crucial role in the construction of ideal, virtuous bodies, establishing a fundamental 
link between geometry and pedagogy. On the other hand, `those that were not 
susceptible to geometrical analysis, and excessive, or conventionally "disorderly" 
features were deemed sure signs not only of aesthetic deformity but of inner 
irrationality and ethical monstrosity' (Stafford, La Puma and Schiedermayer, 1989: 
216). The rational imposition of an abstract method on the human frame was not 
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surprising in an era that witnessed social upheaval and social incertitude. Thus the 
taxonomical impulse of physiognomic discourse literalised and obscured the 
intangibles of human variation, it contained physical difference within the diagnostic 
categories of empiricism and participated in the social construction of difference. By 
contesting traditional ways of representing the body and contaminating cultural 
conventions, Los Caprichos do not conform to pre-existing academic practice. What 
is undeniable is that the somatic of the monstrous in Goya challenges and transgresses 
the compensatory illusions of beauty, integrity, purity and reason so central to the 
Enlightenment. Goya's representations of monstrous bodies recuperate the other side 
of experience, the expressive possibilities of the human body, and the lived 
materiality of the flesh. 
Conclusion 
The construction of the ideal body 
- 
the classical `norm' 
- 
depends for its 
existence on the categorization of other 
- 
deviant 
- 
bodies. Such a model of binarized 
oppositions understands the body as ahistorical and non-cultural, through the 
repression and disavowal of its role in the production of knowledge. Though 
intractable, bodies have suffered both conceptual and actual dismemberments that 
have placed them at the service of totalising visual rhetorics. While Goya partakes of 
figural traditions such as physiognomics and satire, where embodiment serves the 
physiognomic values of the public realm, monstrosity in Los Caprichos suggests that 
knowledge is contaminated by an irreducibly irrational component at its core: Reason 
has infinite faces, all of them already imbued and pre-figured by the body. Against 
the ideal or classical form, Goya invokes dreams, superstitions, fanaticism, and 
occultism: the elusive and monstrous subject of irrationality. In this chapter I have 
192 
argued that Goya's portrayal of the body in its grotesque and monstrous materiality, 
though generally read as a satire on the vices of Spanish society, may also be 
considered as an antidote to Enlightened configurations and aspirations. By 
countering Reason and its modes of representation, the Goyaesque body upsets the 
frameworks by which binary thinking conventionally represented the corporeal. 
Goya's depiction of bodies as bodies urges us to read the body differently. This 
rethinking would also involve an investigation of the body in relation to its 
institutions, a matter to which I now turn in Chapter 5. 
1 Ilie devotes Chapter 2 ('Metamorphosis of the Bat') of his second volume to the myths, emblems, 
icons, literary tradition, and scientific data surrounding bats (1995: 1,57-77). 
2 As part of her multiple roles, Ilie surveys the different representations of Minerva within Spain: 
defender of the Spanish Church, synonym for spiritual and imperial hegemony, protector of 
enlightened despots (1995: I, 41). See also Ilie (1991). 
s Here I am thinking of studies such as Principios para estudiar el nobilisimo y real arte de la pintura, 
con todo y partes del cuerpo humano, siguiendo la mejor escuela y simetria, con demostraciones 
matemäticas que ajustan y enseflan la proporciön y perfecciön del rostro y de ciertos perfiles del 
hombre, mujer y nino (Jose Garcia Hidalgo, Madrid, 1693) and Metodo sucinto y compendioso en 
cinco simetrias apropiadas a los cinco 6rdenes de arquitectura, adornada con otras reglas ütiles 
(Matias de Irala, Madrid, 1730), in particular 'Modelos del cuerpo humano'. 
a Among the publications of the Royal Academy, we find drawing manuals such as Colecciön de 
vaciados de estatuas antiguas que posee la Real Academia de las Tres Nobles Artes de Madrid (Jose 
Lopez Enguidanos, Madrid, 1794); the Real Imprenta published works such as Modelos del cuerpo 
humano. Leonardo da Vinci, el tratado de la pintura (Juan Barcel6n, Madrid, 1784) and Cartilla de 
principios de dibujo (Jose Lopez Enguidanos, Madrid, 1797) (see Carrete Parrondo, 1987: 628). 
5 See Wilson-Bureau (2000) for an analysis of the Cuaderno italiano: 'it shows the young artist 
grappling with representations of the real and the supernatural worlds, with flesh and blood figures and 
the concrete examples of art, as well as with figures and compositions of his own invention' (2000: 53). 
6 'Bruja poderosa que por ydropica 
... 
' (Mighty witch who because of her dropsy is taken for an outing 
by the best flyers 
... 
' is the title given by Goya to this preliminary drawing (1797-98), which was part 
of the suenos and related to the '6 quadros de composici6n de asuntos de brujas' for the Duke and the 
Duchess of Osuna (Wilson-Bureau, 1992: 50)). 
Schulz has read the image as the depiction of a `metaphorical type of blindness' (2000: 163). 
Although the female figure enjoys normal sight, her devoutness `indicates an inability to see beneath 
the clothing of the true, arboreal identity of the object of reverence' (2000: 163). 
8 As Sayre has observed in The Changing Image, Goya `added in chalk a topknot to the monk's hood 
and lightly sketched in witches hovering in the sky' (1974: 108). These elements 'permit interpretation 
of the print as a scene of witchcraft' (1974: 108). 
9 See http: //goya. unizar. es/InfoGoya/Obra/Catalogo /Grabado /C5212. html (accessed 3/08/04). 
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10 See Helman (1993 106-109) and Wilson-Bureau (1996), for whom Capricho 42 might be expressing 
visually a contemporary 'desilusi6n en la reforma agraria' (1996: 198). 
11 As the visual representation of the popular saying `Tü que no puedes, Ildvame a cuestas', Bozal 
observes that the etching is an example of the world turned upside down where 'asnos y hombres 
intercambian sus papeles, sobre los hombres, humildes, caen todas las cargas y los palos que venian 
cayendo sobre los asnos' (Bozal, 1994: 131). On this point, see Tomlinson (1994: 125). 
12 Helman (1993: 107) refers to the title of the preparatory drawing, `Zänganos de las brujas', to 
interpret the image as a critique of the unproductive sectors of society. 
13 `El tema de la brujeria es propio de un compacto grupo de estampas a partir del Capricho 43, `El 
sueno de la razön produce monstruos'. Aparece de forma clara en 19 estampas (ndmeros 44-48,51,59- 
71)' (Bozal, 1994: 123). Various manuscripts, among them the Museo de Pontevedra and the 
Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, confirm the witchcraft theme: `Esto de tener las unas largas, es 
tan perjudicial, que aun en la brujeria estä prohibido' (Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: 
np). 
14 For Wilson-Bureau, Goya must have gone through a process of self-censorship since the original 
idea `debia haber lido una feroz sätira contra las impias practicas de la Iglesia, y un irönico comentario 
sobre las ventajas que sacan de su astuta apariencia. El significado se ha reducido a su contenido 
secundario como una sätira sobre la importancia de tener el aspecto adecuado' (1992: 271). 
15 Sayre brings our attention to the visual and verbal puns implicit in the image: `the eighteenth-century 
expression "ser capa de maldades de ladrones, picaros, etc. " meant literally "to act as a cape for the evil 
deeds of thieves, knaves, etc. [... ]", "meter la una" (to apply the claw) meant to take advantage of, to 
defraud' (1974: np). 
16 Similar explorations of this theme are Capricho 29 'Esto sf que es leer' and Capricho 55 `Hasta la 
muerte', where the two old people portrayed, man and woman respectively, might be said to represent 
the excessive attention to external appearance and dress, as well as a reminder to the beholder of the 
inevitability of aging and death. 
"Elias describes socialization, rationalization and individuation as the three main characteristics of the 
civilizing process (see Shilling (2003: 131-151) for a summary of Elias' theory of the civilizing 
process). 
'$Campomanes and Jovellanos devoted an important part of their treatises to the public regulation of 
the body. The former instilled in artisans the importance of proper hygienic habits and respectable 
conduct. In a section entitled "De los conocimientos cristianos, morales, y dtiles, en que conviene 
instruir la juventud, dedicada a los oficios, ya las artes", Campomanes wrote: `El aseo y decencia en su 
porte de vestir, se halla muy descuidada por to comün entre estas gentes [... ] saliendo a la calle 
desgrenados, sin peinarse, ni lavarse las manos ni la cara [... ] descuiäando de todo punto su aseo; 
rasgando ellos sus vestidos con las luchas, y otros juegos violentos en que se entretienen, y son poco 
convenientes a los racionales' 
(http: //www. cervantesvirtual. com/servletISirve0brasl536961720957147774900461index. html). The 
latter attempted to regulate unruly passions and emotions in spectators: `El gobierno no debe considerar 
el teatro solamente como una diversion püblica, sino como un espectliculo capaz de instruir o extraviar 
el espfritu, y de perfeccionar y corromper el coraz6n de los ciudadanos. Se deduce tambi6n que un 
teatro que aleje los animos del conocimiento fomentando doctrinas y preocupaciones err6neas, o que 
desvfe los corazones de la prdctica de la virtud excitando pasiones y sentimientos viciosos, lejos de 
merecer la protecci6n püblica merecerd el odio y la censura de la püblica autoridad' (Jovellanos, 1997: 
198). 
19 Interestingly, the riddle of their gender is further complicated by the commentaries in the different 
manuscripts. According to the commentaries in the Museo de Pontevedra and the Biblioteca 
Universitaria de Zaragoza, these are two witches (`Ve aquf una pelotera cruel sobre cull es mis bruja 
de las dos. LQui6n dirla que la Pitaflosa y la Crespa se repelaran asf? La amistad es hija de la virtud: los 
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malvados pueden ser cömplices, pero amigos no', whereas the Calcografia Nacional reads: `Dos viejos 
lascivos, son despedazados por dos monstruos abominables'. 
20 For Wilson-Bureau, Capricho 75 represents the `tema del matrimonio desgraciado' (1992: 40). For 
other critics such as Soufas (1986: 325) and Alcalä Flecha (1989: 300-304), the image is a criticism of 
divorce laws in Spain. 
2" Identified respectively with satirical texts of Jovellanos, A Arnesto, and the comedies of Leandro 
Fernandez de Moratin by Helman (1993: 119-124). 
22 This is the commentary in the manuscript of the Calcograffa Nacional; the other two, Biblioteca 
Universitaria de Zaragoza and Museo de Pontevedra, say: `El que no reflexiona sobre la inestabilidad 
de la fortuna duerme tranquilo rodeado de peligros: ni sabe evitar el dano que le amenaza, ni hay 
desgracia que no le sorprenda'. 
23 Theophile Gautier's Romantic appreciation of this capricho in 1842 focuses on the human tragedy 
embodied in these figures: `there is something profoundly tragic about the expression of despair in all 
these cadaverous faces, in the empty sockets of all their eyes, as they realize that they have striven in 
vain. It is the most painful symbol of impotent effort, the most sombre piece of poetry and bitter 
derision ever produced on the subject of the dead' (cited in Glendinning, 1977: 79-80). 
24 As a deviation from the ideal masculine character, 'the petimetre is the figuring of an eighteenth- 
century anxiety about the disciplining of gendered subjects' (Haidt, 1998: 110). 
25 See for instance Folke Nordstrom (1962) for a study of the correspondences between human beings 
and animals in Goya's art and Alcalä Flecha (1996) for an examination of the tradition of physiognomy 
and body language in Goya's work. 
26 The other etchings completing this series are Capricho38 'Bravisimo', 40 'LDe qub mal morirä? ' and 
41 'Ni mäs ni menos'. 
27 In her tracing of literary sources for the asinine theme, Helman (1963) observes that Goya might 
have been aware of a satirical treatise entitled Memorias de la Insigne Academia Asnal (Bayona, 1792), 
which was illustrated with a series of prints portraying asses performing different professional and 
artistic activities such as medicine, music, or astrology (1993: 69). Helman also cites Padre Isla's 
Fray Gerundio de Campazas as a possible literary source, in particular the episode in which the 
`maestro ensenaba a sus alumnos entre otras novedades, que no se debia emplear en la conversaciön 
palabras que empiezan con "arre", como arrepentirse, arremangarse, arreglarse, porque esto seria dar a 
seres humans el trato que se daba a los burros' (1993: 76). See also Sayre (1992) for an examination 
of the ass sequence in the light of contemporary satirical literature; Nilson (1977) places the sequence 
in the popular iconographic tradition of the World Upside-Down. 
28 `The language of folly, buffoonery, and Carnival remained in the 18`s-century the only possible voice 
to express a moral judgment freely and without concessions' (Lorenzo, 1989: xciii). The translation of 
proverbs or colloquial expressions into visual forms, then, will have a moral and satirical value. 
29 Wolf (2000) and Schulz (2000) have focused on the relationship between teacher and pupils. Both 
identify those images depicting scenes of witchcraft and those portraying prostitutes and `celestinas' as 
examples of this relationship. 
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Chapter 5 
Los Caprichos: Institutional Bodies 
Introduction 
Corporeality and monstrosity were central to my analysis of unruly bodies in 
the previous chapter and will remain a major preoccupation in the following pages. A 
wider and more complex conception of monstrosity comes to the foreground in this 
chapter: monstrosity applied not just to human beings but also to social systems, 
systems of thought and institutional practices. 
The theoretical encounter between the history of sciences and deconstructive 
criticism in Chapter 2 established a dialogue between the works of Canguilhem, 
Foucault and Derrida. Their respective projects present critical reading practices 
which are concerned, I argued, with the workings of institutions and the imposition of 
institutional norms. Through the critical methods of Canguilhem and Foucault I 
showed how the normalizing gaze of enlightened rational thought and modem science 
designated that which did not conform to the norm 
-the abnormal, the deviant, the 
monstrous- and ordained its correction. Within the context of the philosophy of 
science and the life sciences, Canguilhem's critique of modem rationality sought to 
unmask the essentialist and idealist claims of reason, as well as the political and 
cultural forces at work in the production of scientific knowledge; in other words, the 
unmasking of the historical nature (and ruse) of reason. Foucault was also interested 
in unmasking the rules and practices governing social constructions of knowledge. 
His work, as I explained, builds on the Canguilhemian project since the Foucaldian 
critique of the human sciences and the history of scientific thought examined the 
underlying epistemic conditions that made various domains of scientific disciplines 
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possible. Foucault's study of specific institutions such as the asylum, the clinic and 
the prison focused on the way these institutions, in conjunction with economic, 
judicial and political practices, defined what was to be normal and what was to be 
classified as abnormal or deviant. The knowledge produced by these institutions 
shaped, according to Foucault, not only specific understandings of normality and 
abnormality but also claims to absolute truth. These discursive practices, to use 
Foucault's term, were located in powerful social, political and cultural institutions that 
assigned fixed meanings to individual and collective experiences, and disciplined 
subjects into certain ways of thinking and acting. Capricho 52 `iLo que puede un 
sastre! '(fig. 18), among other possible readings, offers an image which criticizes 
discursive constructions of Catholicism. 
Foucault's reading practice can be translated to the realm of the visual since 
the institutions aforementioned depended on various forms of surveillance: `modern 
forms of knowledge depend on a scopic regime that equates seeing with knowledge' 
(Rose, 2001: 7). Thus social constructions of knowledge and practices of seeing, 
discursivity and visibility, go hand in hand. These become embodied in `institutions, 
in patterns for general behaviour, in forms for transmission and diffusion and in 
pedagogical forms which impose and maintain them' (Foucault, 1977: 200). It might 
be argued that Capricho 37 `Si sabrä mäs el discipulo' (fig. 44), analysed in Chapter 
4, responds to a specific knowledge shaping the minds of certain individuals and 
collectives of eighteenth-century Spanish society. The image displays strategies with 
which to challenge notions such as `authority' and `academic practice' and allows 
Goya to criticize the habits and irrational principles that determine and re-enact the 
conceptual paradigms on which they depend. In this chapter I shall look at the 
tradition of the emblem and the devotional print as a pedagogical form at the service 
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of Church and State. With Derrida we learnt how deconstructive practice seeks to 
shake and displace those conceptual paradigms which govern our practices, claiming 
absolute knowledge and absolute visibility. In other words, deconstruction is 
concerned with `the conditions and assumptions of discourse, with frameworks of 
enquiry', and engages `the institutional structures governing our practices, 
competences, performances' (Culler, 1983: 56). 
At this juncture, it is necessary to remind ourselves that this study has already 
considered Los Caprichos in relation to institutions and institutional practices. 
Chapter 2 touched upon institutions and institutional bodies from a theoretical 
perspective, through the critical approaches of Canguilhem, Foucault and Derrida. 
Chapter 3 involved a historical and cultural consideration of the institutional, as well 
as the social and political, dynamics in which Los Caprichos were produced. Goya's 
prints, traditionally associated with the reformist project of the ilustrados, were 
considered in the context of a moderate Enlightened movement which in its attempt at 
reforming institutional practices failed to change the historical privileges of nobility 
and clergy, as well as the cultural norms legitimising them. Los Caprichos were also 
seen in the light of institutionalised academic practice within eighteenth-century 
Spanish art, in particular engraving; recognized as a legitimate academic discipline by 
the Bourbon monarchy, its institutional status did not stop Goya from developing new 
approaches to etching at the turn of the eighteenth century. As the analyses of several 
caprichos in Chapter 4 showed, the artist engaged with multiple traditions of 
representation. Finally, my consideration of unruly bodies in the previous chapter 
necessarily addressed institutional issues for, as I noted, the `physical' and the 
`institutional' are inextricably bound. By prescribing how the body is to act and also 
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prescribing how the body is perceived, institutions link the individual body to the 
body politic. 
Chapter 4 analysed the representation of monstrous bodies in Los Caprichos in 
order to show how the monster operates as a disruptive force both subverting 
enlightened epistemic constructions of the body and questioning received forms of 
cultural representation. Thus a consideration of physiognomy enabled me to examine 
one of the ways in which Goya teased out the contradictions of a scientific body 
criticism whose modes of reasoning attempted to construct social difference through a 
taxonomical model which characterised normal and monstrous bodies and characters 
through facial features and forms of the body. Physiognomics was at the heart of the 
cultural and moral agenda of the reformist project: a morality of principles that 
established normative views on the civilized and uncivilized, self and other, normal 
and monstrous. The production of monstrous / uncivilized bodies created a body of 
knowledge that allowed enlightened reformers to observe and shed light on normal / 
civilized bodily behaviours. Goya's visual critique of physiognomical discourse was 
directed, I argued, at showing this science's construction of claims to absolute truth. 
The monstrous bodies populating Los Caprichos certainly signal eighteenth-century 
Spanish society's moral downfall, but facing these monstrous bodies also reminds us 
that Goya was pointing to the concealment of metaphysical presuppositions and 
epistemological constructions underpinning Enlighetened institutional power. 
Goya's alternative accounts of the body provided also a productive way of 
engaging with issues of representation. His rethinking of different artistic traditions 
such as religious imagery, satirical prints, or popular prints, drew on both high and 
popular culture. Goya's reconfiguration of the classical body challenge aesthetic and 
moral restrictions since his style was not subjected either to religious tyranny or to 
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neoclassical precepts. For example, Capricho 65 `LDönde va mama? ' (fig. 23) might 
be interpreted as a deconstruction of a classical image of the Counter-Reformation, 
the representation of the Immaculate Conception. By inscribing subtle and subversive 
displacements within these traditions, Goya imposed an anti-academic, critical art 
upon the institutional conventions of his time. This chapter will continue to examine 
the artist's engagement with other traditions, as my analysis of Capricho 50 `Los 
Chinchillas' (fig. 10) and Capricho 11 `Muchachos al avio' (fig. 13) will show. The 
former will be discussed in relation to the emblem tradition; the latter will be 
considered as a revisiting on Goya's part of the Bourbons' visual propaganda, as 
conceived in the tapestry designs of the Royal Tapestry Factory of Santa Barbara. 
The chapter opens with an analysis of Capricho 53 `iQue pico de oro! ' (fig. 
19) as a way of establishing the paradoxical nature and limitations of Reason in the 
context of the Spanish Enlightenment. The reading of Capricho 53 (fig. 19) enables 
me to introduce a discussion of the insufficiencies of the Spanish Enlightenment 
through the notion of desengano following Eduardo Subirats' work La ilustraciön 
insuficiente (1981). There are two main aims that structure this discussion: firstly, 
Subirat's critique of Feijöo's reasoned representations in his study points to the 
compromise between (scientific) reason and institutional elites during the Spanish 
Enlightenment; and, secondly, this discussion also establishes a momentary 
comparison between Feijoo's project and Goya's Los Caprichos through the notion of 
`desengano' in order to show that Goya's critical art was closer in fact to radical, 
rather than moderate, reformism. My analysis will pay particular attention to those 
etchings, Capricho 23 `Aquellos polvos' (fig. 7) and Capricho 24 `No hubo remedio' 
(fig. 17), explicitly linked with the Inquisition, an institution which not only repressed 
individuals but also played an important role in the historical articulations of what 
201 
individuals are or should be. Then I shall extend my discussion to representations of 
the socio-political body 
-the nobility, the clerical body and the populace. The 
representation of the populace will be addressed through reformist policies on 
productivity and social reform. For moderate enlightened reformers the instruction 
and improvement of the nation, as discussed in Chapter 3, was to be carried out 
without altering the status quo and was justified in terms of productivity and 
rationalization. Political and institutional reforms, therefore, were clothed in an 
ambiguous attitude towards the populace. Goya's etchings reflect this ambiguity as 
the section on unproductive bodies will show. The chapter closes with an 
examination of the nobility and clergy through the lens of the emblem and the 
devotional print, respectively. I shall be arguing that the education of the dominant 
classes was still dependent on estatist and static pedagogical models. 
It is my contention that, as a modern cultural critic during the period with 
which we are concerned in this study, Goya embarks on a visual critique closer to the 
project of radical reformers who sought to dismantle traditional power structures and 
traditional social and cultural relations. While his work embodies the contradictions 
and paradoxes faced by Spanish reformers at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
namely the resistance of certain institutional bodies, his radical imagery also 
highlights the insufficiencies of the Spanish Enlightenment. In his exposing of the 
discursive formations 
-ways of seeing, institutionalised social gaze- that stabilised 
certain privileges, uses and customs, Goya's Los Caprichos provide an effective 
critique of those institutions within and against which his work is set. 
`Desengano' 
Capricho 53 `iQue pico de oro! ' (fig. 19), which follows 'iLo que puede un 
202 
sastre! ' (fig. 18) in the series, proposes a similar scenario of interpretation since the 
etching can be read as a visible critique of modes of behaviour typical of eighteenth- 
century Spain. In the religious scenario first proposed here, the preacher, a parrot, 
sermonizes an attentive congregation from the pulpit. The opened mouths of the 
parishioners suggest awe and gullibility, their closed eyes point to a lack of perception 
and discernment; Schulz, for instance, has argued that the print `satirizes blind 
reverence to authority' (2000: 166). The sermon, on the other hand, might be too long 
and tedious to catch their attention so the opened mouths and closed eyes might 
respond to the action of yawning, boredom might have struck the congregation. 
Critics, then, situate the image squarely as part of the critique of the regular clergy, in 
particular a visual representation of those sermonizers described in reformist works 
such as Fray Gerundio de Campazas, which was published in 1758 (Helman, 1993: 
85; Alcalä Flecha, 1988: 66-68). A second interpretation secularises the image, as 
suggested in the manuscript commentaries: `Esto tiene trazas de una junta academica. 
LQuien sabe si el papagayo estarä hablando de medicina? Pero no hay que creerle 
sobre su palabra. Medico hay que cuando habla, es un pico de oro, y cuando receta es 
un Herodes: discurre perfectamente de las dolencias, y no las cura: emboba a los 
enfermos, y atesta los cementerios de calaveras' (Biblioteca Universitaria de 
Zaragoza, Zaragoza, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1990: np). This 
critique of the medical body, like that of the clerical body, points to the mechanical 
repetition of knowledge derived from authority and tradition. As part of the asinine 
series, Capricho 40 `LDe que mal morirä? ' (fig. 45) explicitly portrays the result of 
this type of learning: an ass-doctor (mis)treats a patient lying on his deathbed. ' The 
lack of knowledge and ignorance of the patient's body is expressed in the resigned 
look of the ass. Should we interpret the animal in Capricho 53 (fig. 19) as a parrot- 
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doctor teaching his pupils the art of medicine, we might ask ourselves where the 
object of their study, a human corpse, is. (Perhaps, as the commentary intimates, the 
`enfermos' are at death's door). The answer lies in the fact that `the anatomical 
discoveries of the European Renaissance had not taken institutional root in Spain', 
since doctors, who trained through the scholastic method, as Haidt has explained in 
Embodying Enlightenment, had a `general lack of acquaintance with tangible physical 
gore' (1998: 24). 2 Moreover, `the word, not the burin or the scalpel, was the medium 
through which accurate knowledge of the body would have been transmitted to most' 
(1998: 17). Moving from the non-existent anatomical theatre to the more identifiable 
space of the orator's stage, a third interpretation of this image is plausible and relates 
to my discussion on physiognomics in Chapter 4: the loquacious bird might be said to 
portray a pedant of reformist ilk. The body posture and the gesture of the parrot bear 
resemblance to the erect, proud body of the orator whose beguiling rhetoric 
effectively persuades audiences. This audience might be already persuaded, though, 
and the parrot merely repeats what he has already learnt. In La derrota de los 
pedantes, Leandro Fernandez de Moratin, argues Ilie, attacks those reformers and 
ignorant critics who merely divulge knowledge mechanically in parrot-fashion: `an 
exaggerated Spanish devotion to the "methodical Encyclopedie" spawns pedantic 
epics, superficial compendia, and "Gallic" translations' (1995: I, 80). By claiming 
that an exaggerated devotion to the `methodical Encyclopedie' produced its own 
monsters, Leandro Fernandez de Moratin is satirizing certain dispensers of public 
enlightenment who `make knowledge available in a way that "anybody curious might 
learn it like a parrot"' (Hie, 1995: I, 83). These are diverging interpretations (and not, 
I would like to point out, diametrically opposed readings) of the way in which the 
parrot functions in Capricho 53 (fig. 19), for the animal comes to embody a priest, a 
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doctor or a pedantic reformer. But what they all have in common is their parrot-like 
repetition of received ideas, perceived truths, their belonging to elitist groups, and 
their use of a public space, religious or secular, which institutionalises authority, 
tradition and myth. By using a parrot, therefore, Goya points out that the qualities of 
this creature can be seen in traditionalist and reformist positions alike. A troubling 
familiarity, Goya seems to be telling us, is discernible in the rhetorical effects and the 
practices governing certain bodies of reformist knowledge during the Spanish 
Enlightenment. 
According to Vibeke Vibolt Knudsen, rhetoric should have an effect on the 
receiver by teaching, delighting and moving (2000: 34). `Knowledge and action', 
Knudsen writes, `cannot be divided according to rhetoric' (2000: 34). Knudsen 
discusses the use of rhetoric in art in the context of her article on Goya, 'Goya's 
Realism', where she argues that Goya's imagery `imparts knowledge [... ] which 
challenges the beholder to take action' (2000: 34). The purpose of rhetoric is `never 
just to inform; rather it seeks to alter as well' (2000: 34), therefore `it must employ 
formal devices which imitate emotional conditions, awake recognition and play on 
experience, thus involving the receiver emotionally in the cognitive process' (2000: 
34). This imitation of emotional conditions and recognition relies mainly on the 
`expression and movement of the body' so that `it speaks by expressing feelings' 
(2000: 35). If we translate these ideas to our reading of Capricho 53 (fig. 19), we 
could argue that Goya is drawing attention to a situation in which the knowledge 
being imparted by the parrot is of little substance and the involvement of the 
congregation / pupils / audience is passive. Already persuaded or dead bored, these 
figures are mere passive recipients of Tradition and Authority, or mere slaves to the 
dictates of Reason. The suppression of emotions and feelings at the expense of reason 
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characterizes the Spanish Enlightenment, as I shall go on to argue now in my 
discussion of the notion of `desengano'. As we shall see, the use and misuse of 
rhetoric by specific institutional bodies as depicted by Goya in `1Que pico de oro! ' 
(fig. 19) finds a parallel in the insufficient use of `desengano' during the Spanish 
Enlightenment. 
A series of preliminary connections between Los Caprichos and the term 
'desengaflo' serves here as a first point of entry for my discussion of Goya's radical 
critique of the Spanish Enlightenment. Firstly, an apparently marginal detail: the 
collection was sold on 6 February 1799 in the Calle del Desengano, a toponymic with 
a high cultural and symbolic value, as critics such as Stoichita and Coderch have 
observed (1999: 184). Secondly, Goya opens his series with a self-portrait that might 
be said to be the visual equivalent of the figure of the desenganado / desenganador, 
`the one who can see, and who reveals that the world is representation, spectacle, 
appearance and deception' (1999: 185), thus placing himself in relation to the moral 
project of reform. Goya inscribes himself simultaneously as a `desenganado (a 
disappointed, disenchanted person)' and a `desenganador (he who disenchants, who 
discovers a deception)' (1999: 185). His self-portrait (fig. 46) shows him in profile, a 
way of representing himself `in the form of the third person' which, according to 
Stoichita and Coderch, establishes the artist as both observed and observer, object and 
subject of the representation (1999: 176-78). 3 An etymological note on the term 
`desengano', which will be further qualified through Subirats' study La ilustracion 
insuficiente, is the last point of entry for my discussion: 
It is the opposite of the word engano (error, illusion, charm, deception, hoax, 
trickery, pretence) and covers a vast territory that ranges from `discovery' (as 
in `discover a deception'), `disillusion' or `disenchantment' to nuances such as 
`disappointment' and `sadness'. (Stoichita and Coderch, 1999: 189) 
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I shall be returning both to the figure of the desenganado / desenganador and to the 
plurality of meanings of this notion in my comparison of Feijoo's and Goya's 
enlightened projects. 
As I argued in Chapter 3, the Benedictine Feijoo shared Goya's concern for 
the eradication of popular and `learned' superstition. 4 In the interest of regenerating 
religious experience, as well as the clerical body, Feijoo takes on the role of 
`desenganador de errores communes', employing the word `desengano', that is, the 
negation of errors, in its most literal sense. Such is his aim in the letter `El caso de las 
florecillas milagrosas de San Luis', the focus of Subirats' critique, where Feijoo seeks 
to expose the irrational underpinnings of a miracle said to occur every 19`h August in 
a pilgrim village in Asturias. According to tradition, yellow flowers would 
inexplicably appear inside the local church, an event attracting huge crowds 
convinced of their supernatural and curative nature 
-a marvellous and extraordinary 
event. Feijoo decides to intervene and sets in motion an examination of Baconian 
proportions; a thorough investigation of records and testimonials, an examination of 
the hermitage and the observation of surrounding flora, reaches its climax one 19th 
August when the miracle is refuted. Rooting out appearance, the seeds of irrational 
belief, Feijoo stages and exhibits to public contemplation the non-appearance of the 
flowers 
-a metaphorical as well as literal cleansing of the church. Both the 
authorities (representatives of the Church, University, Bureaucracy and the Army) and 
the congregation attend this triumph of Reason. The intervention of Feijoo becomes a 
public representation sanctioned and supported by institutional hierarchies; his 
refutation of this false miracle is cloaked in authority and invested with truth. In `El 
caso de las florecillas milagrosas de San Luis', Feijoo therefore stages and constructs 
a modern, rational form of knowledge, in which superstition is supplanted by reason 
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and supernatural explanation gives way to a visual display of power and knowledge. 
The way in which this representation is constructed is as important as what is seen, or 
not seen in this case, that is, the non-appearance of the flowers. Feijoo's attack on 
irrationalism, superstition and ignorance is legitimised and institutionalised by those 
very same age-old hierarchies which had been consecrating and perpetuating 
Tradition, Authority and Revelation. Subirats' critique of Feijoo's reasoned 
representation teases out the underlying epistemological, social and cultural 
assumptions that structure his `disposiciön o exposiciön püblica y escenica' (1981: 
87). 
In his critique Subirats regards this episode as symptomatic of the compromise 
between scientific reason and institutional hierarchies which characterized the 
Spanish Enlightenment. In `El caso de las florecillas milagrosas de San Luis', 
scientific revelation replaces religious revelation, displacing magical and sacred ways 
of looking at and understanding the world. The parishioners do not acquire any 
individual knowledge after attending this representation. Moreover, Feijoo's 
representation `suprime profiläcticamente todos los conceptos empiricos y 
emocionales que lo pudieran convertir en una figura de la protesta individual y 
colectiva contra abusos o coacciones sociales' (1981; 94). Wherein lies, then, the 
insufficiency of the Spanish Enlightenment for Subirats? (One might well ask whether 
any Enlightenment project can be sufficient). As I discussed in Chapter 3, the term 
`ilustraciön' is mainly understood as divulgation of knowledge, privileging the 
didactic and the pedagogic; Subirats, for his part, adds that `por ilustrar nadie entiende 
la acciön de desvelar, mostrar, impugnar o denunciar' (1981: 13). The notion of 
'desengaflo' is also understood along the same lines, as Jesüs Magallön observes: 
`desengano' is mainly linked to `las noticias y luces püblicas, es decir a la difusiön de 
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la ciencia' (Magallön, 2002: 24). `A la palabra ilustraciön', Subirats writes, `se le 
oculta [... ] to que ella fue Como figura de pensamiento' (1981: 14). Its mitigated 
character does not make it equivalent to critique. And Subirats adds: `la represiön de 
la figura histörica de la Ilustraciön es uno de los requisitos del ocultamiento de los 
elementos constitutivos de la modernidad' (1981: 27). 5 Feijoo's use of the notion 
`desengano' in Teatro Critico Universal and Cartas eruditas y curiosas stops at the 
level of representation: used in the service of visibility, it reinstates a `pedagogia de la 
presencia' (pedagogy of presence), devoid of epistemological or metaphysical 
critique. Other meanings of `desengano' are effaced from Feijoo's project: 
`desilusiön', `amargura', `desconsuelo', `desesperanza', `desesperaciön' (1981: 44) 
- 
that is, its affective and empirical moments. My discussion of Capricho 52 `iLo que 
puede un sastre! ' (fig. 18) and Capricho 59 `Y aun no se van' (fig. 41) addressed such 
moments and drew attention to the erasure of the emotional from enlightened reason 
in the context of my analysis of unruly bodies in Chapter 4. In Capricho 53 `iQud 
pico de oro! ' (fig. 19), as I have been arguing, Goya not only parodied the priest and 
his congregation as representatives of a Church in which religion is taught and learned 
by rote but also questions that Enlightenment "preaching" which persisted in old 
habits and dogmatic practices. By the time at which Los Caprichos were published, 
as lie writes in the context of his analysis of Capricho 43 (fig. 1) in The Age of 
Minerva. Counter-Rational Reason in the Eighteenth Century, Reason had 
become an urban, institutional resource, specifically in Spain, but also in 
Europe. The instrument [of Reason] that the laity and the clergy valued 
equally undergoes deterioration. Goya parodies Reason's "progress" by 
means of its soaring, monstrous replication. (1995: I, 57) 
The monstrous replication in Capricho 43 `El sueno de la razön produce monstruos' 
(fig. 1) takes the form, as we argued in our previous chapter, of the quartet of owls 
and the taxonomical monstrosity of the bat. Likewise, Capricho 53 (fig. 19) depicts 
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such monstrous replication in secular and religious circles, this time embodied in the 
figure of the parrot. His congregation or audience, whether we interpret the animal as 
a religious preacher or a secular orator, remains unenlightened, `desenganada' in 
Feijoo's use of the term. 
The following section expands on these ideas, that is, the re-inscription of old 
institutional power and knowledge, by establishing a comparison between the 
reformist projects of Goya and Feijoo. The Aragonese artist, in the words of 
Cascardi, criticizes 
the persistence of archaism within the enlightened world in the Caprichos not 
as a revelation from an implicit stance on the failure of the (modern) 
enlightenment freely to penetrate archaic Spain, but rather as an indication of 
the Enlightenment's failure to subsume completely the authority of sacred 
institutions. (1991: 196) 
One of these sacred institutions was the Inquisition, whose ideological system and 
social function was still pervasive at the end of the eighteenth century. 
Representing institutions: the Inquisition 
In a tantalizingly brief section entitled `Goya y la ilustraciön' (1981: 123-24), 
Subirats compares Feijoo's project with Goya's Los Caprichos, arguing, however, for 
a much richer critical perspective inscribed in Goya's collection of etchings: 
[L]a sätira de Goya no conoce la escisiön entre el conocimiento y la realidad 
entera del individuo que es su portador. No hay en sus grabados un principio 
de abstracciön, de sublimaciön o purificaciön de la experiencia de la realidad. 
Y es que Goya no intenta legitimar nada, ni poner en escena algün principio 
nuevo, ni disponer una representaciön, ni invocar un orden universal. (1981: 
124) 
Feijoo's unreflective use of reason reinstates under a different guise the social and 
political power exerted by old hierarchies. `La critica feijoniana', writes Subirats, 
`persigue un objetivo normativo' (1981: 49). By showing indifference to the world of 
the populace ('al vulgo no se le queda mäs remedio que desengaflarle' (Alvarez de 
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Miranda, 1979: 370)), his disenchantment of monstrous mythology and superstition 
does not amount to the reform of the socio-political body but to a mere re-inscription 
of old institutional power. As Ilie observes, Feijoo's writings `address educated and 
lay and clerical readers who held opinion-forming social positions' (Ilie, 1995: I, 
332). It might be necessary to recall here Derrida's thoughts on deconstructive 
practice: `breaks are always, and fatally, re-inscribed in old cloth that must 
continually, interminably be undone' (Derrida, 1987: 29). A close look at the public 
exhibition of the powers of reason brings to mind the activities of that other Tribunal, 
whose presence was still firmly ingrained in eighteenth-century Spanish life. Indeed, 
as Subirats came to realize in a later meditation on his 1981 essay, `el vistoso proceso 
de Cangas [that is, Feijoo's "experiment" in San Luis, Asturias] recuerda en alguna 
incierta medida, en cuanto a su estructura escenica, a los viejos procesos 
inquisitoriales y las grandes escenificaciones teatrales que la Iglesia organizaba' 
(1993: 77). 6 Religion as spectacle 
- 
`idiotic public processions, incantatory 
spectacles, tableaux vivants, and mesmerizing floats' (Stafford, 1994: 10), to use 
Stafford's description of some Catholic public representations, was central to the 
visual communication of Catholic faith and the display of religious authority. I am 
not proposing here that Feijoo's public intervention is comparable to the proceedings 
of the Inquisition, for Feijoo himself advocated the reform of this and other religious 
institutional bodies (`denunciö los abusos de las instituciones eclesiästicas en aspectos 
econömicos, atacö las desviaciones de una religiosidad superficial, llena de 
supersticiones y milagrerias' (Fernandez Gonzalez, 1989: 29-30)), but I am rather 
pointing to the ideological operations underscoring both forms of representation. 
The institutionalised representations of the ecclesiastical tribunal of the 
Inquisition would be a constant concern in the art of Goya, especially the disruptive 
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and corrosive effect of religious power on individual and collective bodies. Goya's 
critique will come to the fore with the changing political circumstances that shook 
Spain during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, a period which falls 
outside the scope of this study. Goya returns to the Inquisition theme time and again, 
in particular during the restoration period in his painting `Inquisition Scene' (ca. 
1816), as well as in his drawings in Album C (1810-14), also known as the Inquisition 
Album, with works such as `Por mover la lengua de otro modo', `Por haber nacido en 
otra pane' or `Por linaje de hebreos'. In the context of our present discussion of Los 
Caprichos, two etchings will be the focus of my analysis, Capricho 23 `Aquellos 
polvos' (fig. 7) and Capricho 24 (fig. 17) `No hubo remedio'. 
Some manuscript commentaries refer to Capricho 23 (fig. 7) as depicting an 
`auto de fe', 8 others to the term `autillo'9 (an alternative to the `auto de fe' which was 
`held either in the church and attended by the general public or in the sala de la 
audiencia of the Inquisition, attended only by the prisoners, their families, and 
officials' (Tomlinson, 1992: 167)). Although `the public auto de fe [... ] had been 
done away with by the mid-eighteenth century' (Wolf, 2000: 80), 10 Goya's interest 
lies in showing the evidence of the disintegrative effects of institutional power upon 
real bodies. Unlike the documentary-like pictorial representations of `autos de fe' of 
the Golden Age period, such as Francisco Rizi's `Auto de Fe in the Plaza Mayor of 
Madrid' (1683), the artist draws our attention to the condemned body, to the imagery 
of punishment and sin. Both prints are devoid of the theatrical elements and the 
representational effects deployed by Feijoo in `El caso de las florecillas milagrosas de 
San Luis'. 
The caption in Capricho 23 (fig. 7) responds to the popular saying `Aquellos 
polvos, traerän estos lodos' (From that dust comes this mud), whose possible 
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meanings have been analysed by Helman (1993: 117) and Sayre (1974: 58-9). For 
both critics, the caption may be referring to an immediate cause (the accused 
committed a crime) and effect (he or she should be punished) or may be making a 
more veiled reference to the effects of inquisitorial power on the populace 
('ignorancia y supersticiön populares serian, pues, "los lodos" y "los polvos" en 
cuestiön, el poder y efecto lamentables del Santo Oficio que perduraban aün en pleno 
siglo de las luces' (Helman, 1993: 117)). Thus the print can be explained in terms of 
an explicit cause and effect. According to the manuscripts, the punished body is that 
of a woman, and once again the etching elicits different interpretations: `iA esta Santa 
senora la persiguen de muerte! Despues de escribirla la vida, la sacan en triunfo. 
Todo se to merece. Y si lo hacen para afrentarla e tiempo perdido. Nadie puede 
afrentar a quien no tiene vergüenza' (Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 
in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np) or the more caustic `Una 
mujer saliö encorbata: era pobre y no hubo remedio' (Calcograffa Nacional, Madrid, 
in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np). 
Capricho 23 (fig. 7) and Capricho 24 (fig. 17) can be read in conjunction 
since two different stages of the inquisitorial procedure are being depicted here by 
Goya: `Aquellos polvos' (fig. 7) portrays the moment in which the authorities read out 
the sentence while the condemned is exposed to public view on a scaffold, whereas 
`No hubo remedio' (fig. 17) represents the public humiliation of the condemned, who, 
mounted on a donkey, is brought to everybody's attention. " The inclusion of the 
crowd watching the proceedings in the case of the former and participating in the 
public humiliation in the case of the latter suggests that these ceremonies of ritual 
punishment are inseparable from forms of public entertainment. A volatile crowd, 
one might argue, recalling Shilling's and Mellor's description of the Catholic 
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medieval body as volatile, would have been drawn to the spectacle and followed it 
through the streets: witnessing the humiliation, insulting the victim, praying piously, 
shouting at or cheering the authorities. The `spectacle of the scaffold', 12 to use 
Foucault's phrase in Surveiller et punir (1975), is one of Goya's targets. 
Compositionally and technically the bodies of the condemned occupy the 
centre of the prints; the light falls on the central figures, who stand out in stark 
contrast to the figures of secular (Capricho 24) (fig. 17) and clerical (Capricho 23) 
(fig. 7) authority represented in the background and the surrounding crowd. As 
Alcalä Flecha aptly puts it, by bringing the condemned figures closer to the viewer, 
Goya `reduce el drama, con emblemätico esquematismo, a sus personajes principales, 
el reo y el secretario, que, situados frente a frente, emergen como islotes en medio del 
mar de la muchedumbre' (1988: 265). In Capricho 23 (fig. 7), the submissive body 
awaits seated, head slightly tilted forward, the reading of the accusation. In the eyes 
of the Spanish Inquisition this body is marked and deployed as monstrous: tied hands, 
body trapped in a sackcloth and a `sambenito' (vest), and the conical cap ('coroza') 
on which the crimes are most probably written. The condemnation and public display 
of these figures inscribe all too real signs of difference in their bodies. The framing of 
the monstrous body carries out an ideological function: the institutionalisation of 
power relations. This living `sambenito' has been branded heretic, morally deviant, in 
other words, a monstrous aberration within the political, religious and cultural reality 
of Catholic Spain. As embodiments of religious transgression, these bodies are the 
victims of the normative values of Catholicism. Goya highlights the monstrosity 
engendered by ideological normativity. Although torture and cruelty as inquisitorial 
methods of punishment had been in decline throughout the eighteenth century, the 
stigma attached to the condemned bodies represented in Caprichos 23 and 24 is in 
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itself a form of punishment. In the culturally specific context of Catholic Spain, the 
social stigmatisation created by the Inquisition is rooted in fear, a fear of difference 
which affects the viewers of the public spectacle. The fear of themselves becoming 
stigmatised might be conveyed by the facelessness of the crowd. Goya is representing 
the way the institution functioned culturally on a social and individual level. The 
collusion of religious and political ideologies, the hybrid of Church and State, central 
to the building of the Spanish nation for centuries, has generated this type of 
monstrosity. 
Reforming the unproductive body?: the populace 
Within the political, social and economic projects of moderate reformers, 
notions such as productivity and public utility guided the rational organization of the 
social body. From noble to clergyman to peasant, the Bourbon reformers sought to 
transform the attitudes of the Spanish population. Reforms, however, were met by the 
resistance of the privileged classes, the conservative bulk of the Church and the 
populace. As I explained in my historical contextualization of the Spanish 
Enlightenment in Chapter 3, the ilustrados considered production as a fundamental 
instrument of change and idleness ('ociosidad') as a burden to the State; we can recall 
here the words of reformers such as Campomanes (`el verdadero extranjero en su 
patria es el ocioso') or Arriquibar ('todo hombre ocioso debe ser objeto de Inquisiciön 
del Gobierno'). This exclusionary rhetoric carries with it a series of identifications 
whereby unproductivity and idleness become deviations from the norm: productivity 
and labour. Such oppositions were also invested with moral (good and evil) and 
philosophical values (reason and unreason). Los Caprichos are populated with those 
unproductive bodies (nobles, monks, prostitutes, criminals) targeted by enlightened 
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reformist policies. We might ask ourselves whether Goya made them visible as 
counterexamples of civilized, orderly bodies; or whether `el sumo de la razön' 
(re)produced specific social groups as monsters. In other words, to what extent are 
they the products of the reformists' own civilizing discursive practice? 
The representation of the socially unproductive will be the focus in this 
section; in particular, I shall be referring to the unproductive (as well as illicit) 
activities of the populace through Capricho 11 `Muchachos al avio' (fig. 13) and 
Capricho 73 `Mejor es holgar' (fig. 47). My reading could extend to caprichos 
depicting the excessive and parasitic body of the clergy (Capricho 79 `Nadie nos ha 
visto') (fig. 12) or the unproductivity of the nobility (Capricho 50 `Los chinchillas') 
(fig. 10), but I intend to engage with the nobility and clergy in the final section of this 
chapter, `Reinterpreting Emblems and Devotional Prints: Nobility and Clergy'. 
However, one could argue the nobles depicted by Goya in `Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10) 
emblematise stasis, physical and mental inactivity. Camilo Jose Cela's fictionalised 
account of the family history of Los Chinchillas emphasizes this aspect: `En la familia 
de los Chinchillas trabajar, lo que se dice trabajar, nadie trabaja; lo bueno que tienen 
es que ni se quejan ni les remuerde la conciencia' (1989: 112). Thus the print could 
also be read in the light of the reformist critique of those idle, non-productive bodies 
of different sectors of the Spanish population (nobility, regular clergy, women, 
beggars, criminals). As for Capricho 79 `Nadie nos ha visto' (fig. 12), idleness and 
sloth are among the transparent censures of Goya, drawing as the capricho does on 
body criticism of the time. In line with satirical and moral discourses on the 
rationalization of the State, the clerical body can be seen as parasitic upon a swollen 
body politic needing to rid itself of unproductive bodies. Indeed, as Teöfano Egido 
has noted, `la desamortizaciön que obsesiona a los ilustrados es la de las personas, la 
216 
del excesivo nümero de clerigos (regulares, se sobreentiende), improductivos e 
inütiles' (1989: 97). The etching brings to light literally `what no-one usually sees, 
that is to say the hidden vices' (Stoichita and Coderch, 1999: 198) of the religious 
orders. Let us focus now on the representation of the populace. 
In the context of eighteenth-century Spain, the scenes of Capricho 11 
`Muchachos al avio' (fig. 13) and Capricho 73 `Mejor es holgar' (fig. 47) can be 
regarded as representations of criminal activities: the former portrays a group of 
outlaws, the latter a prostitute and her procuresses. In their depiction of social 
outcasts, both images are inextricably linked with political and economic policies and 
the enforcement of social order, as we shall see. The ironic captions of Capricho 11 
`Muchachos al avio' (fig. 13) and Capricho 73 `Mejor es holgar' (fig. 47) place us 
squarely in the world of idleness: the former translates as `Lads Getting Ready', the 
latter as `Better To Be Idle'. The expression `al avio' conveys a readiness that is not 
matched by the inaction being portrayed: four male figures sitting around, two of 
them smoking, another sharpening a knife, muskets lying around. The manuscript 
commentators have readily associated their idleness with a crime waiting to happen, 
an illegal activity (`Los contrabandistas en acecho de cuantos pasan, cerca de un 
camino, poco se diferencian de los ladrones' (Biblioteca Nacional Madrid, Madrid, in 
Helman, 1993: 215)); in fact, their external appearance betrays them as social types 
('Las caras y el traje estän diciendo lo que ellos son' (Biblioteca Universitaria de 
Zaragoza, Zaragoza, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np)), and 
even betrays their geographical origin ('Los contrabandistas andaluces, cerca de un 
camino, pasan pronto a ser bandidos' (Lopez de Ayala, in Helman, 1993: 215)). Read 
as smugglers, bandits or rogues, these lads are outside the law. 13 Outlaws, in 
particular bandits, are the subject of several of Goya's contemporary paintings in the 
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years around 1798-1800: `Bandits Shooting Male Prisoners' (The Bandits' Attack I), 
`Bandits Stripping and Raping Two Women' (The Bandits' Attack II), `Bandit 
Attacking a Woman' (The Bandits' Attack III). The scene and the social types 
depicted by Goya in Capricho 11 (fig. 13) are also reminiscent of one of the 
numerous cartoons, `El resguardo del tabaco' (1780) (fig. 48), that the artist designed 
for the Royal Tapestry Factory of Santa Barbara. As I shall be arguing shortly when 
comparing the two images, Goya revisits one of his earlier works, albeit this time 
removed from the institutionalised visual art project of the Bourbon monarchy, which 
`functioned to give the country's Absolutist rulers a clear overview of the different 
groups of people under its rule' (Held, 1987: 41). 
During the second half of the eighteenth century, in particular during the reign 
of Carlos III, there was an interest in `documenting the customs, occupations and 
characteristics of the country inhabitants' (Held, 1987: 41), which provided the ruling 
classes with scenes of everyday life and social types. The visual representation of 
popular festivals and pastimes in tapestry designs, for instance, performed a symbolic 
role, since it provided `an ideal image of the Madrid reform politicians' plan to 
inculcate civilized standards of behaviour through education' (Held, 1987: 43). A 
more popular print idiom provided imagery of local, regional and social archetypes, 
portraying different costumes and deportments. 14 Goya's commissioned cartoon 
participates of both traditions. 
`El resguardo del tabaco' (fig. 48) is a genre scene which shows five guards 
having a break in the line of duty. As Goya himself described the scene, the guards 
are `sentados descansando y uno en pie dandoles conversaci6n, a mäs distancia 
reconociendo el terreno se ven a la orilla de un rio dos de ellos con todas las armas 
que regularmente llevaban' (cited in Helman, 1993: 98). According to Helman, the 
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representation of this subject aligns Goya with the reformist project of the ilustrados, 
more specifically with Jovellanos' concerns with the economic and legal 
consequences of smuggling, as well as the social reformer's views on the negative 
effect of real or semi-legendary outlaws in popular folklore for, as she argues, the 
image evokes contemporary romances and `tonadillas', which sang the praises of 
uncivilized and disorderly bodies. '5 
By establishing a dialogue between the tapestry design and the print, we find 
that they share compositional qualities: a group of young men, portrayed in a similar 
countryside setting, gather around a tree, their expressions and poses suggesting a 
break in their activity. The arrangement of the figures is similar for the bodies in both 
scenes form a circle in which one of them stands above the rest. As I have indicated 
previously, the men depicted in both images respond to stereotypes (guards in the case 
of the cartoon, smugglers in the etching). But while the image of the cartoon offers a 
panoramic view of the guards against a picturesque landscape, in `Muchachos al avio' 
(fig. 13) Goya has zoomed in onto the human bodies depicted; only the tree cutting 
diagonally across the scene reminds us of the presence of nature 
-a bleak, gloomy 
landscape, though. More interestingly, the bodies of Capricho 11 (fig. 13) seem to 
have lost the original documentary function and the `costumbrismo' of their 
counterparts in `El resguardo del tabaco' (fig. 48). Goya, therefore, re-works a well- 
established pictorial genre at the service of enlightened reformist aims and portrays a 
group of idle men who come to represent a specific set of contemporary anxieties 
concerning unproductivity and crime. The `idealized' image of the 1780s in which 
the guards are enforcing the government's policies has given way to a darker side of 
Spanish culture in the late 1790s. The title of the preliminary drawing for Capricho 
11 (fig. 13) hinted at the idea of morality, `Buena gente somos los moralistas'. But 
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who are the `moralistas' here? : The gathering being depicted? A group of moral 
reformers passing judgement on the group depicted? Is Goya asking the viewer to 
take up the position of moralist? These are questions and shifting perspectives which 
do not offer a stable viewpoint from which to interpret the image. 
Capricho 73 (fig. 47) depicts another clandestine meeting but of a different 
kind, as we shall see. The title of the print, `Mejor es holgar', has a popular ring to it, 
as some of the manuscript commentaries attest: `Si el que mäs trabaja es el que menos 
goza, tiene razön. Mejor es holgar' (Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, 
in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np). 16 What interests me is to 
focus on a series of inscriptions in the etching that will enable us to relate the print to 
contemporary discourses on prostitution and their relationship with social reform, the 
application of the law, and productivity. Prostitution is one of the main themes 
cutting across Los Caprichos; 17 indeed, not unlike William Hogarth's `A Harlot's 
Progress' (1732), one could spin out a narrative of the life and fate of prostitutes, 
stage by stage, in Goya's collection. Tomlinson summarizes it thus: `the recurrent 
figure of the prostitute 
-chatting with a potential customer, adjusting her stocking, 
taken into custody' (2002: 57)- can be seen in different contexts and situations. 18 But 
my purpose in the context of this present section on unproductive bodies, is rather to 
point out the connection between the prostitute and reforming institutions and 
productivity. In order to do this, I shall pick up two on moments in the life of the 
young female depicted in Capricho 73 (fig. 47): the first, the print that occupies us; 
the second, a 1796-97 drawing entitled `San Fernando. 1C6mo hilan! ' (fig. 49), which 
appeared in Album B. Visually, the three figures represented in Capricho 73 (fig. 47) 
are linked by a skein of wool: a man holds the loose wool, which a young woman is 
winding into a ball, which, in turn, is being wound around the spindle held by an old 
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woman in the background. The skein of wool, therefore, places the characters in an 
unspoken dialogue with one another. The pose of the young woman is that of the 
sexually available female, as her spread legs and the ball of wool in front of her 
pudendum suggest (is she a virgin we might ask ourselves? Or is her lost virginity 
being `restored'? ); the old woman is most certainly the `celestina' plotting the 
activities of the prostitute, whereas the huddled male figure on the left-hand side of 
the print could well be the procurer. As Wilson-Bureau observes, `todos los gestos y 
objetos representan un juego con los sfmbolos de la sexualidad' (1992: 259). For 
Wilson-Bureau, the young female is about to enter the world of prostitution since the 
implied meaning of `Mejor es holgar' (fig. 47) is that 'Si un trabajo ütil y productive 
es cansado, entonces "lo mejor es holgar" 
- 
con la implicaciön de que la muchacha 
puede pasar su vida de una manera menos honesta, y estä siendo animada a ella por 
los dos viejos' (1992: 259). Not earning her living through honest work means not 
abiding by the law and, in the context of the second half of the eighteenth-century, 
facing confinement. In the same way that the symbolism of the skein of wool 
conveys a sexual activity of an illegal nature, a contemporary viewer would have 
inferred the link between spinning and confinement, thus anticipating the fate of this 
prostitute ('hilar' means `to spin' but it also means `prostitution' in colloquial 
language). 19 `San Fernando. iC6mo hilan! ' (fig. 49) is an explicit reference to the 
hospice of San Fernando, an institution created in 1766 to house Madrid's beggars, 
vagabonds and prostitutes. The confinement of these unproductive bodies had a 
social and moral reformist dimension, although its economic significance cannot be 
underestimated. The main purpose of confinement was eventually to integrate them 
`into society as economically productive members' (Tomlinson, 1992: 100). Knudsen 
sees this drawing as an example of Goya's scepticism towards `some of the 
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institutional changes of the time' and `the population's resistance to change' (2000: 
20), for what the image posits in the dialogue established between the older woman 
on the left hand side and the two younger internees is the passing down of behaviours 
and practices even within the confines of a reforming institution. The women, 
Knudsen concludes, `are and will remain prostitutes' (2000: 22). 
Reinterpreting Emblems and Devotional Prints: Nobility and Clergy 
The next section of this chapter will be devoted to the emblem and the 
devotional print as cultural forms and modes of expression with which Goya takes 
issue in Los Caprichos. Traditionally, the use of these two cultural forms, the 
emblem and the devotional print, was at the service of two institutions, the Church 
and the Monarchy, and, by extension, the aristocracy. I shall be considering how 
Goya engages with both artistic traditions: firstly, through his parodic portrayal of the 
nobility as living emblems in Capricho 50 `Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10), and, secondly, 
through his visual critique of the clergy in Capricho 70 `Devota profesiön' (fig. 51), 
an etching modelled on traditional devotional prints. 
It is common knowledge that throughout the history of Western art, art has 
`conventionally functioned to extend and perpetuate institutional and personal power' 
(Leppert, 1996: 114), specifically the power of State and Church. Emblems were 
frequently adopted for aristocratic models of behaviour, serving simultaneously as 
instruments perpetuating economic and cultural difference and as educational tools. 
In Chapter 3, I discussed how in Spain education was controlled by the Catholic 
Church and how the Jesuits, in particular, occupied a privileged position within the 
educational system, forming the aristocratic elite and reaching the populace. The 
Jesuit order shaped patterns of thought and taste until 1767, the year of their 
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expulsion. Whether in academic environments and cultured settings 
-schools, 
colleges and universities-, where the decoding of emblems was a regular activity in 
the teaching of rhetoric as part of the Ratio Studiorum, or in more popular 
environments 
-street processions, public ceremonies and dramas-, in which the 
emblem was a foil to propagate religious and didactic-pedagogic messages in order to 
catch man's affections and ravish his understanding, imagistic epistemology occupied 
a privileged position in the Jesuitical method of education. The Society of Jesus 
redefined and reinterpreted mainstream sixteenth- and seventeenth-century emblem 
books, adapting them for their own purposes. In the visual pastoral programme of the 
Jesuits, emblems and devotional prints need to be seen as the books of the illiterate 
populace: `they aid the memory; they move the emotions; they have a ceremonial 
function in the practice of worship; they enhance the pedagogical process by making 
it more agreeable; they improve concentration; and they form part of the practice of 
meditation' (Porterman, 2000: 190). It was believed that they were more direct and 
easily comprehensible than words, and that they communicated truths to the mind 
intuitively, instructing through generating a powerful and vivid visual impression. 
Medieval folklore and popular culture not only infused emblems and devotional prints 
with images, motifs, symbols 
-that is, signs-, but also informed the rhetorical 
operations of such cultural forms. 
Despite the general `eighteenth-century critique of a "papist" oral visual 
culture' (Stafford, 1994: 129), Spain still remained an oral and a fundamentally visual 
culture firmly rooted in medieval and Counter-Reformation attitudes. Christian 
traditions and imagery, a long-standing tradition of instruction (religious doctrine, 
religious didacticism), and the art of Catholic persuasion remind us that Spanish 
culture was mainly `eidetica' (Jimenez Lozano, 1989: 141). The Counter- 
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Reformation movement emphasised the use of images in devotional and evangelical 
activities; adapted to the moral, religious and political thinking of orthodox 
Catholicism, `spiritual pictures', sacred images and moral emblems moulded Spanish 
culture for centuries. One might argue that emblems, as well as devotional prints, 
produced what Foucault refers to as a regime of truth. According to Foucault, `the 
most powerful discourses, in terms of the productiveness of their social effects, 
depend on assumptions and claims that their knowledge is true' (Rose, 2001: 138). 
As regimes of truth, the use of these cultural forms by the Spanish Catholic Church 
and State worked toward similar ends. It is within this context that devotional prints 
and emblems need to be considered. 
Arguably, Los Caprichos not only address reformers and literate sectors of the 
population but they also address the illiterate, the unenlightened through imagery. 
According to Stafford, the etchings `formed the secular antithesis to religious 
contemplation' (1994: 14), which was generally promoted by Catholic books of 
emblems and by religious imagery in general. Goya's generic otherness, as my 
analysis of Capricho 50 `Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10) and Capricho 70 `Devota 
profesiön' (fig. 51) will show, opens wider aesthetic and epistemological questions: 
what if Goya was retrieving a didactic function lost to `idiotic public processions, 
incantatory spectacles, tableaux vivants, and mesmerizing floats' (Stafford, 1994: 10), 
to use Stafford's description of some Catholic public representations? Goya's artistic 
tour de force retrieves the visual as a model of education; the creation of vivid and 
concrete imagery produced a kind of immediate cognitive experience: look and 
extract a lesson. This return to the popular, or recourse to the visual as a popular 
medium, does not necessarily define Goya as a `man of the people' as opposed to an 
`enlightened artist' (for such labels do not help in understanding artistic choices), but 
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rather shows him to be an artist who takes issue with representation and visuality. In 
Los Caprichos, Goya questions the revelatory mode behind the mechanism of 
perception and contemplation, the regime of truth that informs both political and 
religious discourses, which in the case of Spain had been historically associated. Los 
Caprichos admit a double-edged reading: on the one hand, Goya re-appropriates and 
reinterprets artistic forms whose religious function exerted an `ideological spell' on 
the populace, while, on the other, Goya seems to be aware, unlike other Spanish 
reformers, that visual education in a culture that is predominantly `eidetica' such as 
that of eighteenth-century Spain, might still be valid and more able to reach the 
unenlightened masses. 
The conjunction of monsters and emblematic imagery in Goya's Capricho 50 
`Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10) arouses the viewer's curiosity and demands that we pay 
close attention to it. The figures depicted in Capricho 50 (fig. 10) are living emblems. 
The familial coats of anus act as straitjackets which restrain their bodily movements; 
their heads are immobilized by a lock, which only allows them to open their mouths 
in a mechanical manner. The locked heads convey that these are, or are in the process 
of becoming, men of idees fixes. Indeed, they are living exemplars of family fixation. 
One of them is lying down on the ground; the other, leaning against a wall, is waiting 
to be fed by a figure in the background which could be described as a humanized 
donkey. This background figure is, according to Schulz, `borrowed directly from the 
emblematic traditions, where its attributes are associated with error and ignorance' 
(2000: 155). Ignorance is thus directly linked to their monstrosity. But other 
attributes and appendages catch our attention, in particular the rosary in the right hand 
of the lying figure and the sword on the one standing, 20 as well as the protuberance in 
their crotches. Their bodies are restricted and trapped, then, by the corset of the norm; 
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the dominant signs of Catholicism and nobility assign meaning by social hierarchy 
and religious practice. As members of the Spanish nobility, the bodies of Los 
Chinchillas have been constructed through (and here literally constrained by) 
discourse. 21 These are people of flesh and blood who are motionless representatives 
of traditionalist authority. Their world is shaped and perceived through heraldry. But 
Los Chinchillas are not depicted in a correct heraldic manner since the figures do not 
display their noble bearings; nor are they a moral or virtuous example for aristocratic 
models of behaviour. Goya has conspicuously emblazoned on them ignorance, 
gluttony and perversity. The artist sets before the beholder a monstrous 
representation of an exemplary model, thus parodying and subverting the culturally 
acceptable form of the traditional emblem. Los Chinchillas have become, therefore, 
antithetical embodiments of aristocratic models of behaviour. Like many of the 
etchings analysed in Chapter 4 (Capricho 37 `Si sabrä mäs el discipulo') (fig. 44) and 
in the present chapter (Capricho 53 `iQue pico de oro! ) (fig. 19), the transmission of 
knowledge and education are among the main concerns of the artist in this etching. 
Indeed, the explicit spoon-feeding22 depicted in the image `suggests the passive 
acceptance of received ideas based on tradition and social position' (Schulz, 2000: 
159), the inherited mental and corporal habits of the nobility. 
The representation of Los Chinchillas also evokes imagery related to insanity. 
Their unrestrained passions and perverse feelings might have landed them in the cell 
of an institution, most probably an asylum. They are reduced to mere physicality: 
eating and sexual arousal. Their desires, social and bodily, shape their identity: 
un tema recurrente en Los Caprichos es la atenciön producida en el concepto 
de verdad por el deseo, en donde el "deseo" debe ser entendido como la fuente 
de una serie de ilusiones de naturaleza social o sexual. Lo que estas imägenes 
sugieren es que los deseos, tanto sociales como sexuales, motivan una serie de 
distorsiones que obstruyen la clarividencia racional. El deseo frustra los 
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intentos de la mente por coincidir con su objeto o por llegar a un adecuado 
conocimiento de sf misma (Cascardi, 1996: 64) 
Whatever is being fed to them goes straight to their body without going through the 
faculty of reason. Are these cases of dementia? Of idiocy? Of feeble-mindedness? 
Open mouths and closed eyes suggest as much. As we have seen, Los Chinchillas 
might be read as monsters of ignorance and other vices but could we see them as 
madmen? Goya's art showed an interest in the figure of the lunatic and in 
representations of insanity, namely in `Yard with Lunatics' (1793-4), `Madhouse' (ca. 
1816) and a series of drawings in Album G (1824-8). 23 Goya first envisaged the 
image of what would be Capricho 50 (fig. 10) as an explicit reference to Reason: `La 
enfermedad de la raz6n'24 (fig. 50) was the title of the preparatory drawing (a more 
pathological metaphor than `El sueflo de la razön produce monstruos'). Some of the 
figures have disappeared and some of the motifs have been displaced in the 
movement from drawing to print. Under a clearly delineated architectural backdrop, 
which for Tomlinson `often signifies institutions of confinement in Goya's work' 
(1992: 100), the two central male figures are being nursed by three female figures, 
who will disappear in the final print; another male figure, looking to one side and 
oblivious to the scene, will be metamorphosed into the emblematic creature feeding 
Los Chinchillas. The preparatory drawing clearly elicits a reading in which Los 
Chinchillas are the passive members of an aristocracy constrained by their coats of 
arms. In the final print, however, the coats of arms have been replaced by a garment 
which iconographically resembles the straitjackets typical of representations of the 
insane. Why has Goya rubbed out the heraldic symbols? The erasure poses a series 
of questions as to the meaning of madness: Could the straitjacket be interpreted as a 
conceptual locus of insanity / monstrosity, in which case the madmen of the day are 
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nobles? Is the folly represented a comment on the human condition in general? Is it 
referring to the body politic of Spain? We can attempt to answer some of these 
questions by referring firstly to the particular historical context of the Spanish 
Enlightenment described in Chapter 3, and, secondly, by recalling briefly some of the 
theoretical paradigms established in Chapter 2. 
In a discussion of Cadalso's Cartas Marruecas, Ilie (1995, I) examines the 
writer's use of the figure of Spain as an insane asylum as part of a wider analysis 
which looks at the epistemology of madness in late eighteenth-century Spanish 
literary and philosophical texts. In the words of Ilie, `the very word infirmity appears 
often and in diverse contexts of national and moral decay. Even more this 
enfermedad accompanies the notion of disorder. If the mind is weak', Ilie argues, `so 
is the body's "machine", a convenient image for emphasizing physical and mental 
unreliability' (1995, I: 100). In the context of eighteenth-century Spain, the diagnosis 
would be the following: `the disease is national backwardness, the atraso caused by 
retrospective fixation' (1995, I: 101). Los Chinchillas are representatives of a 
diseased body politic fixated with and fixed in their privileges, lineages and histories. 
And, as indicated in Chapter 3, ideas on intellectual (as well as biological) 
backwardness appear and reappear in the texts of radical ilustrados such as Arroyal, 
Cafiuelo and Cabarrüs. The pretensions of `normal' society, that is, the privileged 
classes, and the delusions of the insane asylum, which Spain has come to be, are not 
too distant from each other. 
It was during the age of Enlightenment when, according to Foucault, the 
madman (the monster) came to be considered as mentally sick (see my discussion of 
Foucault's Histoire de la folie in Chapter 2). Madness, as well as crime, sexuality or 
illness, were fundamental experiences that needed to be analysed in relation to 
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discursive practices and technologies of power. Classified medically and visually, the 
madman was discredited; such classification dehumanised him and portrayed him as a 
being who could not be reasoned with. Read against the backdrop of emerging 
theories of insanity, Los Chinchillas are depicted as human beings who are alienated 
from their senses and unable to manage their own bodies. They cannot be reasoned 
with until they have received physical (and mental) treatment. Their confinement 
hides away their unreason, mechanical restraining subjugates their bodies to reason: 
`recourse to opiates, solitary confinement in darkened rooms, cold baths, a "lowering" 
diet, blood letting, purgatives and so on [... ] would pacify the body, so as to render 
the mind more receptive to reason' (Porter, 2003: 314). The portrayal of Los 
Chinchillas as emblems of madness at the turn of the nineteenth century `points out 
the weakness or failure of reason', the madman becomes useful `as a foil for reason' 
(Canguilhem, 1962: 35). If, as we indicated in Chapter 2, the reflection on normal / 
adult humans grew out of reflections on their converse, then the viewer when 
confronted with Los Chinchillas in Capricho 50 (fig. 10) may interpret these madmen 
as a foil for reason. But what Reason? For, as Porter perceptively observes, `there 
was always, waiting in the wings, the negation of that ideal [homo rationalis]: 
irrational man, the madman or lunatic, the dread warning of what was in store were 
man to divest himself of the use of his noblest gift 
- 
or, in the hands of satirists and 
print-makers, the mortifying critique of the abuse actually wrought by soi-disant 
rational man himself' (2003: 305). 
The most popular and disseminated form of engraving throughout the 
Renaissance, the Baroque and the Enlightenment, was the devotional print. It taught 
people the life of Christ and the sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church, promoted 
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the veneration of saints and the devotion of particular cults such as the Immaculate 
Conception, and acted as graphic sermons for worshippers. Devotional prints were 
also sold as indulgences for sinners; their acquisition not only granted remission of 
the temporal punishment in purgatory but also offered believers (divine) protection 
against natural disasters, epidemics, famine, and disease 
- 
signs of the wrath of God. 
The superstitious beliefs arising from indulgences and false miracles were, as Carrete 
Parrondo ('Censura y prohibiciones', 1987: 423-438) observes, persecuted and 
censored by ecclesiastical authorities throughout the centuries. In the eighteenth 
century, the reformist elite of the Spanish Church censored those prints which were 
`llenas de fanatismo, supersticiön y mentiras perniciosas para enganos de simples 
ancianos y de beatas fanäticas, que incluian falsas concesiones de indulgencias o que 
servian para precaverse de la peste, incendios o muerte repentinas' (1987: 424). 
Rooting out the superstitious beliefs and uses associated with this mode of cultural 
expression, the main function of the devotional print was to `impulsar las emociones 
piadosas de las gentes sencillas, en quienes inspiraban el mismo respeto y piedad que 
los retablos y pinturas de los templos' (Carrete Parrondo, 1987: 233). 
Capricho 70 `Devota profesiön' (fig. 51) has been consistently read as part of 
Goya's depiction of witchery in Los Caprichos, alongside other works produced 
during the same decade, such as drawings in Album B and the collection Suenos or 
six paintings of scenes of witches (1798) commissioned by the Duques de Osuna. 25 
Critics have also pointed how the scene enacts the subversion of Christian rituals. I 
shall be looking at these practices by considering the ways in which the image can be 
related both to religious and pagan practices. But, as I shall be arguing, the artist 
engagement with devotional prints as a genre has been overlooked. This solemn 
ceremony represents the act of ordination: a novice, who stands on the shoulders of a 
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monstrous creature, a satyr, is taking an oath of allegiance to two members of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy and, by extension, to the Divinity. The masters of ceremonies 
hold the book from which the novice is reading the solemn oath. Their holding of the 
sacred text attracts our attention immediately for they are not grasping it with their 
hands or arms but rather with a pair of pliers, an instrument to which I shall return. 
Present at the ceremony are also two silent witnesses, whose bodies are buried in the 
ground. A consideration of the graphic evolution of Capricho 70 (fig. 51) and its 
imagery shows that the ritual being depicted is a monstrous hybrid of Christian and 
satanic rituals. The graphic evolution of this print can be traced to Album B ('Brujas a 
volar') (fig. 52) and to the Suenos series (`Sueno 3. Bruja principiante') (fig. 53) 
where the titles clearly indicate that Goya had a witchcraft scene in mind. In `Brujas 
a volar' (fig. 52) the masters of ceremonies are seating on an altar, a pagan altar, in 
which deformed, grimacing faces are engraved; the macabre scene is completed with 
a skull, the only witness to this pagan ritual, which is lying on the ground. Skulls 
have multiplied in `Sueno 3. Bruja principiante' (fig. 53), the altar has been 
eliminated and replaced by a monstrous bird (a falcon, perhaps, suggesting not only 
the flying power of witches but also their predatory nature), and the technical image 
reversal common to the working process (drawing to print) has taken place; 
otherwise, the main elements of the composition remain the same. Although the 
caption of the final print does not make an explicit reference to witches or witchcraft, 
their practices are addressed in the manuscript commentaries. Among these, we find 
an ingenious reproduction of the words recited by the masters of ceremonies and the 
novice during this solemn ceremony: `i, Juras obedecer a tus maestros y superiores? 
Barrer desvanes, hilar estopa, tocar sonajas, aullar, chillar, volar, guisar, untar, chupar, 
ciocer, soplar, freir, y cada, y cuando se to mande. Juro. Pues hija ya eres bruja. Sea 
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enhorabuena' (Biblioteca Universitaria de Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Carrete Parrondo y 
Centellas Salamero, 1999: np). Other commentators point out in a more general way 
the vices being passed from master to disciple 
-`la ignorancia y la lascivia se hacen 
una profesiön solemne' (Calcografia Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and 
Centellas Salamero, 1999: np)- and some extend these vices to the Spanish nation as 
a whole, for the etching `shows a personification of Spain standing on the shoulders 
of ignorance, and humbly dedicating itself to the worship of Fanaticism and 
Superstition' (anonymous French-man cited in Glendinning, 1977: 64). 
Symbols of Christian, witchcraft and satanic rituals inscribed in the image tell 
the viewer that the novice could be a future priest or could join the forces of evil, that 
either psalms are being recited or spells are being chanted. It is as if the borrowing of 
symbols from one sphere might be used to explicate another. However, explanations 
are not that clear since the monstrous creatures and the monstrous ceremony 
represented in Capricho 70 (fig. 51) blur the boundaries between religion and 
witchcraft. The ritualistic practices of witchcraft and priestcraft are closer than we 
think. And it is to the religious imagery that I now turn. The mise-en-scene -altar, 
garments, props and body language- suggests a religious space. The masters of 
ceremonies' garments might be said to identify them with ecclesiastical figures; the 
episcopal capes and the mitres, in particular, are symbols of office and hierarchy. 
Other objects suggest that these two figures are inquisitors: the conical hats resemble 
the punishing hats worn by inquisitorial victims, while the presence of the pliers, 
instruments of torture, and the book (could this be the Maleus Maleficarum26 which 
described `sinful acts and procedural details useful to fellow Inquisitors and to judges' 
(Sayre, 1994: 70) in their condemnation of witches? ) contribute to this interpretation. 
The body language unmistakably communicates the ritualized conventions of 
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recitation and reply: open mouths reciting formulaic words, closed eyes conveying 
concentration and solemnity. The contact between masters and novices is achieved 
through recitation and repetition. Once again, as in the case of Capricho 37 `Si sabrä 
mäs el discipulo' (fig. 44) and Capricho 53 `iQue pico de oro! ' (fig. 19), Goya is 
criticizing models of learning. From his ordination, this novice is learning religion by 
rote. Thus far my analysis of Capricho 70 (fig. 51) has built upon, and expanded, 
those readings that regard the etching as a mockery of pagan and Christian rituals. 
Admittedly, it is religion and religious practices that are being challenged by Goya. 
What I would like to argue now in the final part of my analysis is that Goya is also 
challenging the cultural form which conveyed visually such religious beliefs and 
practices, the devotional print. The caption, `Devota profesiön', transports us to the 
world of religious worship or observance. A novice is devoting himself to the 
institution of the Church, affirming his allegiance to Catholic beliefs, and committing 
himself to rightful actions and behaviour; this future priest will be bringing the word 
of God to other devotees and acting as a mediator between divine grace and the 
believers through the action of administering the sacraments. As I indicated in the 
introduction to this section, specific devotions and sacraments were among the main 
subjects of devotional prints. The sacrament, a religious ceremony which is regarded 
as an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace, is a solemn oath - 
etymologically, sacramentum means solemn oath. Capricho 70 (fig. 51), as my 
preliminary description of the print argued, represents the act of ordination, one of the 
seven rites religious of the Catholic Church (the other six are: baptism, confirmation, 
the Eucharist, penance, anointing of the sick, and matrimony). We can revisit the 
scene now that we have established that this is not just a mere ceremony. It is, in fact, 
a sacrament: two senior members of the clergy are conferring the holy orders on a 
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novice taking the vows; the open book is the ordinary which lays down the order of 
divine service. What Goya represents is the monstrous sacrilege of a sacred moment. 
In 1789: Les Emblemes de la Raison (1973), Jean Starobinski devotes a 
chapter (1988: 99-124) to the emblematic value of the oath in eighteenth-century art, 
focusing in particular on the French revolutionary art of Jacques-Louis David (1748- 
1825). Starobinski argues that the political (and civil) oaths which took place in the 
year 1789 (1988: 102)27 were reflected in Jacques-Louis David's `Oath of the Horatii' 
(1784-85) and `The Tennis Court Oath' (1791). 28 The revolutionary oaths portrayed 
by David symbolized the new times; in contrast to the `traditional ceremony of the 
sacre, or anointing of the Kings of France', which `invested the monarch with the 
supernatural insignia of his power' (Starobinski, 1988: 102) received directly from 
Heaven, `the revolutionary oath created sovereignty' whereby `the separate will of 
each individual became generalized as all pronounced the words of the oath' (1988: 
102). Goya's print, produced in the turbulent context of the aftermath of the French 
Revolution, proposes a very different oath. The sacrilegious act depicted by the 
Spanish artist deviates aesthetically and thematically from the solemnity and 
truthfulness embodied in David's `Oath of the Horatii'. In Capricho 70 `Devota 
profesiön' (fig. 51) Goya creates, I suggest, an emblem of unreason, which 
symbolizes the presence of archaic (and aberrant) beliefs and institutional practices 
firmly and obstinately entrenched in late eighteenth-century Spain. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have seen how Goya's prints exposed the discursive 
formations that sustained privileges, uses and customs, and unmasked the rules and 
practices governing social constructions of knowledge. Goya's imagery takes issue 
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with the culturally constructed forms of knowledge mobilized from specific 
institutional locations. For the Bourbon regime the role of the visual arts was 
primarily utilitarian and propagandistic; for the Church visual imagery had primarily a 
religious and propagandistic function, too. The reasoned representation staged by 
Feijoo in `El caso de las florecillas milagrosas de San Luis' or the official propaganda 
programme emanating from the Bourbon court have been contrasted with Goya's own 
reasoned representations of the victims of the inquisitorial process (Capricho 23 
`Aquello polvos' (fig. 7) and Capricho 24 `No hubo remedio' (fig. 17)) or the 
populace (Capricho 11 `Muchachos al avio' (fig. 13) and Capricho 73 `Mejor es 
holgar' (fig. 47)). Ultimately all bodies, not just those of the Enlightened minority 
and the privileged classes (mostly men) compose the body politic. 
Through the analysis of Capricho 50 `Los Chinchillas' (fig. 10) as emblem, 
and Capricho 70 `Devota profesiön' (fig. 51) as a devotional print, I have examined 
how Goya explored the way in which these cultural forms relate to institutional 
power. He is attacking and subverting those very same cultural forms that help 
produce and reproduce power relations and specific views of the social world. His 
images show the influence and perversions of symbolic and emblematic traditions of 
representation; question the educational, moral and institutional values embedded in 
emblems and devotional prints; and deconstruct the ideological operations at work in 
these images. By borrowing and adopting both secular and religious imagery, the 
artist figures forth significations which point to the mechanisms underlying 
institutional power. Goya's epistemological critique of institutions (that is, social 
constructions of knowledge and the conceptual paradigms that sustain them) shows 
(monstrare) not only the workings of traditional institutions but also the 
insufficiencies of reformist institutions in eighteenth-century Spain, which failed to 
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subsume the authority of sacred institutions. This `desvelar', `mostrar', `denunciar', 
if we recall the meanings of the notion of desengano, is what makes his work radical. 
His work parodies the conventional and institutional forms of transmitting and 
diffusing knowledge, as well as their passive understanding, as my readings of 
Capricho 53 `iQue pico de oro! ' (fig. 19) and Capricho 70 `Devota profesiön' (fig. 
51) illustrate. 
Goya's interest in unruly bodies and institutional bodies would go beyond the 
publication of Los Caprichos and can be found in later works, as I have indicated 
throughout this chapter. It was in Los Caprichos where he laid the groundwork for 
his radical critique of Spanish institutions at the turn of the eighteenth century. 
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1 Critics have, of course, related this print to Goya's illness of 1792-93 which resulted in his deafness. 
Capricho 40 would represent the artist's indictment of the medical profession. Soufas reads it as a self- 
reference on the part of Goya `invoking not only illness in general but also "el mal franc6s", syphilis, 
of which Goya is alleged by many to have been a victim and which left him deaf (1986: 322). 
2 Compared to the advances of modern medicine in other countries, Haidt argues that in eighteenth- 
century Spain `the clinical Gaze was not even conceivable' (1998: 24). Haidt follows here Foucault's 
notion of the medical gaze, as developed in La naissance de la clinique (1983). 
3 For a detailed analysis of Capricho 1 `Francisco Goya y Lucientes, Pintor', the frontispiece to the 
collection, see Stoichita and Coderch (1999: 165-83). 
4 See `Goya and Benito Feijoo: the artist's liberation through the new sensibility' (Livermore, 1988: 
106-132) for an analysis of the affinities between Goya and Feijoo: `there is scarcely one of Feijoo's 
essays which does not offer a similarity at some point or other with one of Goya's sketches, drawings 
or paintings and the likeness includes aesthetic, historical, scientific, social, superstitious, religious and 
emotional topics' (1988: 106). Livermore's essay aligns itself with the projects of critics such as 
Helman (1963), Sayre and Perez Sanchez (1988) and Alcala Flecha (1988), who consider Goya's 
imagery as visual translations of contemporary literary texts. 
5 Subirats' exploration of Spain's problematic relationship with modernity is informed by Adorno's and 
Horkheimer's critique of the Enlightenment project in Dialektic der Aufklärung (1947), namely their 
discussion of the term disenchantment: `The program of the Enlightenment was the disenchantment of 
the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy' (1997: 3). 
6 See ` Un interludio autobiogräiico: la Ilustraciön insuficiente' (1993: 69-80). 
7 See Tomlinson (1992: 160-187) for an examination of Goya's painting in the context of the 
Restoration period and Wolf (2000: 77-81) for a discussion of Goya's representations of various types 
of Inquisitorial punishment. 
8 ` Auto de fe. Un vulgo de curas y frailes necios hacen su comidilla de semejantes funciones. Perico el 
cojo que daba polvos a los enamorados' (Ayala, Madrid, cited in Helman, 1993: 116). 
9 ` Los autillos, suelen ser el agostillo y diversion de cierta clase de gentes' (Calcografia Nacional, 
Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np). 
10 Heiman gives an account of an `auto de fe' which was described in the Memorial Literario, held in 
the Iglesia de Santo Domingo el Real in Madrid in 1784. She also traces a possible historical reference 
for Capricho 24, in this case Jovellanos' vain efforts as Minister of Grace and Justice to reform the 
Inquisition (1993: 118-19). 
11 Alcalä Flecha argues that, according to contemporary texts, the punishment that would be inflicted 
on the condemned would be flagellation: 'los penitentes sentenciados a este castigo eran montados a 
horcajadas sobre un asno, desnudos hasty la cintura, con un dogal al cuello y una capucha en la cabeza 
en la que se inscribia la indicaciön de su delito' (1988: 268). 
12 This phrase is taken from Foucault's words `in punishment-as-spectacle a confused horror spread 
from the scaffold' (1991: 9). 
13 See 'Real Life "Caprichos" c. 1798-1808' (Wilson-Bureau and Mena Marques, 1994: 271-299). 
14 See 'La estampa popular en el siglo XVIII' (Carrete Parrondo, 1987: 645-711) for an overview of 
this type of popular imagery. 
15 Heiman cites the figure of the outlaw Francisco Esteban, alias `El Guapo' (1993: 98-102). 
16 Other commentaries relate the print to the relationships between men and women (`Mäs agradable y 
fäcil es echarse una mujer a la briba, que desenredar madejas y trabajar en su casa' (Calcografia 
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Nacional, Madrid, in Carrete Parrondo and Centellas Salamero, 1999: np)) or family relationships 
(`Una familia viciosa dificilmente se sujeta a las ocupaciones honestas caseras. El bestia del marido se 
pone a tener la madeja, se enreda; la suegra la desenmarana y la mujer se cansa y manifiesta en sus 
ademanes que la tiene mäs cuenta echarse a la brivia' (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, in Helman, 1993: 
227)). 
17 See Alcalä Flecha (1988: 365-407) for an overview of this subject in the light of the literary figure of 
the `celestina' and contemporary texts by Nicolas Fernandez de Moratin and Cabarrüs. 
'8 Tomlinson's general comments do not refer to any specific etchings, though Capricho 7 'Ni asi la 
distingue', Capricho 17 `Bien tirada estä' and Capricho 22 `iPobrecitas! might illustrate her point. 
19 The mythical resonance of the spinning motif would have also brought into the image a more 
universal connotation: the Fates and the threading of human destiny. 
20 
`Uno estä echado en tierra y lleva un rosario en la mano derecha; el otro estä en pie y trae cenido un 
sable o espada; y 6ste, debajo de una especie de tabardo, Ileva algo que pende hasta rozar el suelo, un 
pliego grande de pergamino, tal vez, que seria su ejecutoria' (Heiman 1993: 190). See also Harris 
(1977: 205). 
21 Helman (1963) traces a literary connection to the comedy El dömine Lucas (Josh de Canizares) in 
which Chinchilla, one of the main characters, is obsessed by lineage. 
22 Klingender relates spoon-feeding to the image of the funnel which harks back to popular medieval 
imagery: `in Bosch's days the funnel was widely used in popular satire as a symbol for the lifeless, 
purely mechanical learning of the scholastics' (Klingender, 1948: 169). 
23 See Klein's 'Insanity and the Sublime: Aesthetics and Theories of Mental Illness in Goya's Yard 
With Lunatics and Related Works' (1998). 
24 This title was written over another original caption which read `Pesadilla 
... 
sonando que no me 
podia desenredar 
... 
de nobleza en donde 
... 
'. 
15 See Heiman ('Algunos suenos y brujas de Goya' (1987)) and Sayre ('Goya's Caprichos: A Sampling 
of Witches' (1994)) for a general overview of witchcraft imagery in Goya's work during the 1790s. 
26 The Maleus Maleficarum was published in 1487 by two Dominican Inquisitors, Heinrich Institoris 
and Jakob Springer. See Sayre (1994). 
27 `George Washington's oath of the allegiance to the American Constitution on April 30; the Tennis 
Court Oath on June 20 [... ]; and the oaths of the National Guards [... ] In the following year the civil 
constitution of the clergy required priests to swear loyalty to the Nation. After Mass had been 
celebrated by Talleyrand, bishop of Autun, the Feast of the Federation on July, 14,1790, became one 
immense taking of the oath. Marriages were often celebrated before the altar to the Patrie, thus 
combining the loyalties of the spouse and the citizen. And every flag, with its legend, "Liberty or 
Death", was a reminder of an oath' (Starobinski, 1988: 102). 
I Starobinski adds to David's representations that of J. H. Fuseli (1745-1825), `The Oath of the Three 
Swiss Guards' (1779-81). 
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Conclusion 
Let us return in the opening paragraphs of this Conclusion to the two 
exhibitions with which I opened this thesis, `Goya y el espfritu de la ilustraciön' and 
`Monstruos y seres imaginarios en la Biblioteca Nacional', in order to revisit the 
issues raised in the Introduction: the extent to which we can consider Los Caprichos 
as an Enlightenment work, and the relationship of Goya's inscription of monstrosity 
and monstrous bodies in Los Caprichos with the (Spanish and European) 
Enlightenment. Our historical location of Goya's collection of etchings in the 
political, cultural and ideological context of the Spanish Enlightenment demonstrated 
that not only the conflictive ideological positions between the reformers and the 
traditionalists but also those between moderate and radical reformers demanded a re- 
assessment of the artist's relation with the Ilustraciön and the ilustrados. As new 
work on the Spanish Enlightenment emerges (Die (1995), Haidt (1998)), our 
conceptions of Goya change and, by extension, so do our readings of Los Caprichos. 
The received and unquestioned identification of the prints with the political, social 
and cultural aspirations of the (moderate) Enlightened reformers, I argued, must be 
disturbed. My analyses of the etchings in Chapters 4 and 5 showed the apparent 
contradictions between the visible Enlightened ideals of the themes depicted in 
Goya's visual representations and the deliberate ambiguity inscribed in the series. 
My first approach to the analysis of monstrosity in Los Caprichos was through 
Capricho 43 `El sueno de la razön produce monstruos' (fig. 1) in Chapter 4. Its title, 
inscribed in the image, was interpreted as a statement of modem experience since in 
this emblematic etching Goya reveals how the rationalism of the Enlightenment mind 
betrays its own monstrous positioning. An analysis of both the inscription and the 
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iconographic elements of Capricho 43 (fig. 1) (namely, the figure of Minerva, the 
quartet of owls and the taxonomical monstrosity of the bats) established how Goya 
disrupted Enlightenment parameters of human perception and knowledge (ideals of 
continuity and claims to absolute knowledge and visibility). Within the specific 
context of the Spanish Enlightenment, Capricho 43 (fig. 1) was interpreted as a 
parodic and critically incisive representation of the use of Reason by reformers and 
traditionalist alike. The critique of Reason inscribed in Capricho 43 (fig. 1) was 
paradigmatic for our analysis of physical and institutional bodies in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Firstly, the plurality of meanings set in motion by the undecidable word `sueno' defies 
any attempt at fixing the image and points to the foundational instability of any sign 
system; as we have seen in our analyses of the prints, the visual undecidability and the 
conflicting readings embedded within the images challenge the Western metaphysical 
idea of pure vision. Secondly, and like the visitors to the exhibition `Monstruos y 
seres imaginarios en la Biblioteca Nacional', `El sueno de la razön produce 
monstruos' invited us to examine Goya's complex conception of monstrosity and 
complex production of monstrous bodies (physical, institutional, metaphysical). 
In our journey through the physical and institutional world of Los Caprichos 
we encountered not only the monsters haunting the Spanish eighteenth-century but 
also the monsters haunting modern society the modern imagination. Facing hybrids 
and grotesque bodies, supernatural and superstition-infused monsters, and monsters of 
the political body, we became aware of the dominant socio-cultural, discursive, 
philosophical and institutional norms shaping the bodies and minds of the people of 
eighteenth-century Spain. The hierarchies and privileges governing institutional 
practices, the discursive constructions of Catholicism, the archaic mentality of the 
population and the privileged classes alike, as well as the non-conflictive relationship 
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between the reforming movement and the status quo produced all kinds of monsters. 
The limitations and contradictions of the Spanish Enlightenment led us to consider 
Goya's position vis-ä-vis the reformist project of the Bourbon regime and his critique 
of concrete forces such as the Catholic Church and the Inquisition, social hierarchies 
(the privileges of nobility and clergy, the unenlightened populace), and the 
instrumental use of Reason. The Spanish Enlightenment, I have argued, was 
primarily technical and indoctrinating in its outlook and practices; the moderate 
reformers' policies were ultimately at the service of the State and did very little to 
shake the traditional power structures and social relations. My discussion of the 
notion of `desengano' via the work of Subirats' La ilustraciön insuficiente highlighted 
the paradoxical nature and limitations of Reason in the context of the Spanish 
Enlightenment and enabled me to establish Goya's radical critique of Spanish 
eighteenth-century society. Always aware of the metaphysical assumptions and 
epistemological implications underscoring traditionalist models of knowledge, and the 
reproduction of these very same institutional practices in certain reformist 
pedagogical models, Goya exposed and deconstructed those cultural forms that 
sustained the transmission and diffusion of Tradition and Authority (whether of a 
conservative or a reformist sign). His radical critique of institutions and traditional 
cultural forms at the service of Church and State also moved beyond the cultural and 
moral agenda of the moderate reformist project, since his use of radical imagery 
sought to dismantle traditional power structures and traditional social and cultural 
relations, while pointing to the insufficiencies of the Spanish Enlightenment. 
Central to my study have been Goya's views on the reform of the individual 
and society. The clash of traditionalist and reformist ideologies affected the 
individual and the collective body. As argued in Chapter 4, the body became central 
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in the construction and regulation of knowledge, identity and social order. There we 
discussed how historical transformations in behavioural codes and forms of affect 
control not only had an effect on the individual body but were also met with 
resistance by certain sectors of the population. I considered the reformist treatises of 
Campomanes and Jovellanos in the context of theories of the civilized body. Further 
engagement with Norbert Elias' work on the civilizing process might prove 
productive in readings of eighteenth-century manuals of deportment produced in 
Spain and their relationship to print culture. Indeed, Elias' ideas on volatile medieval 
bodies (1939), as developed by Mellor and Shilling (1997), enabled me to explore 
specific aspects of eighteenth-century Spanish culture, namely the formative power of 
the Catholic Church and the mentality of a population steeped in Medieval, Counter- 
Reformational and Baroque beliefs and practices. The volatile bodies of eighteenth- 
century Spain were physically engaged with religious imagery and superstition, and 
Goya poignantly inscribes these affective and empirical aspects in his images. Unlike 
the writings of the aforementioned Enlightened reformers Campomanes and 
Jovellanos in the second half of the eighteenth century or the monumental work of the 
Benedictine Feijoo, `the `desenganador de errores comunes', in the first half of the 
century, Goya's representations took into account the bodiliness of bodies (with their 
desires, anxieties, fears and uncertainties). In Los Caprichos, Goya not only exposed 
the vices and errors of Spanish society but also involved and implicated the beholder 
in that exposure / critique. The chasm between the reforming ideal and the social 
reality of Spanish eighteenth-century culture becomes manifest in the monstrous 
bodies populating Los Caprichos. Our rethinking of the monstrous body in Los 
Caprichos has involved a reconnection of the separated body and mind, and an 
investigation into the relationship of the body with its culture. The problem, as we 
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showed in Chapters 4 and 5, is that of (re)integrating reason not only with truth but 
also with the body. 
I have argued throughout this study that Goya's alternative accounts of the 
body in Los Caprichos are also a site of debate with issues of representation. His 
images engage with different artistic traditions and cultural forms such as pedagogical 
manuals, model books and anatomical plates, emblem books and devotional prints, 
tapestry designs and satirical prints. Likewise, his images draw on both high and 
popular culture, as well as on a local visual tradition rooted in Medieval, Counter- 
Reformational and Baroque imagery. The multiple traditions of representation at 
work in the series, the artist's constant experimentation with image-making (and 
monster-making), as well as the ambiguity inscribed in the series respond to the 
cultural transformations and epistemological shifts in perception affecting the 
eighteenth-century world. Such transformations and shifts required a radical way of 
representing the world, a new logic of seeing. Goya's deconstruction of classical and 
religious imagery teased out the political and cultural forces at play in the production 
of knowledge. However, an examination of the diverse, and divergent, artistic 
practices used by Goya has made us aware of the different patterns of reading and 
looking that the prints elicit. His working within and against artistic traditions 
engaged with the possibilities of institutions and the possibilities of subverting them. 
The relation of the visual to the ideological, crucial to our analyses of Los 
Caprichos, could be extended to other graphic works by Goya. As Nigel Glendinning 
pointed out some time ago, Goya's `most critical work is inevitably to be found' in 
etchings and drawings (1973: 526). The possibility of rapidly producing 
representations of everyday scenes and situations, the innovative and experimental 
possibilities of the language of engraving, and the qualities of the medium (a popular 
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art form, easily reproducible, with a rich educational, religious or propagandistic 
function) allowed Goya to display mercilessly and comment incisively on the 
changing world around him. My examination of the monstrous bodies populating Los 
Caprichos lays the groundwork for future explorations of the Goyaesque body. 
Further inquiry into the artist's representations of the body awaits, since his depiction 
of the body is always strikingly modern, as the mutilated bodies of The Disasters of 
War or the `freaks' and marginal characters appearing in his late drawings attest. 
By way of conclusion, let us look at a drawing from Goya's Album G 
(Bordeaux, ca. 1825-1828), `Mirar lo que no ven' (fig. 54). A certain irony can be 
detected in this apparently harmless genre scene, a depiction of a peep-show where 
Goya puts seeing and knowing in the context of popular culture. Still steeped in the 
old folk mentality of the fair, the title suggests that the viewers crowded around the 
apparatus see nothing, or at least nothing beyond the scope of amusement, a thwarted 
view-point implicitly shared by us as readers of the scene. Boxed, framed, the body is 
marked as a monstrous site, a strategic visibility serving to distance and differentiate 
it. Since the body is hidden from (our) view, however, what constitutes a freakish or 
monstrous body remains a moot point, ever subject(ed) to the gaze: the monster exists 
only to be read 
- 
as the Latin monstrare, to show, to make known, as well as monere, 
to warn, reminds us. What this image foregrounds is the arbitrary operation of the 
exceptional, of the monstrous. As Roland Barthes succinctly put it, `the monstrous is 
never based on more than a shift in perception' (1964: 15). It is as if Goya were 
saying that (the perception of) monstrosity ultimately lies in the beholder. Produced 
twenty-five years after Los Caprichos and during his exile in Bordeaux, `Mirar lo que 
no ven' illustrates Goya's recurrent preoccupation with representation, visuality, 
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bodies, figurality, and representation, issues which have concerned us throughout this 
study. 
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Fig. 1 Capricho 43 `El sueno de la raz6n produce monstruos' 
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fýýuanae Mandýttý. 
135 Seres Iunta sticos. Juan de Mandeville, Libra de las maravillas del muudo y de la Tierra Santa, Valencia, 
Jorge Castilla, 1521 
Fig. 2 Juan de Mandeville, `Seres fantästicos', Libro de las maravillas del mundo y de 
la Tierra Santa (Jorge Costillo, Valencia, 1521) 
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Fig. 3 Relaciön verdadera de un parto monstruoso (Valencia, 1634) 
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Fig. 5 Grandville, The Pursuit, 1844 
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Fig. 6 Capricho 42 `Tü que no puedes' 
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Fig. 7 Capricho 23 `Aquellos polvos' 
252 
Fig. 8 Capricho 4 `El de la Rollona' 
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Fig. 9 Capricho 39 `Hasta su abuelo' 
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Fig. 10 Capricho 50 `Los Chinchillas' 
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Fig. 11 Capricho 13 `Estän calientes' 
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Fig. 12 Capricho 79 `Nadie nos ha visto' 
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Fig. 13 Capricho 11 `Muchachos al avio' 
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Fig. 14 Capricho 18 `Y se le quema la casa' 
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Fig. 15 Capricho 29 `Esto si que es leer' 
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Fig. 16 Capricho 77 `Unos a otros' 
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Fig. 17 Capricho 24 `No hubo remedio' 
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Fig. 18 Capricho 52 `Lo que puede un sastre' 
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Fig. 19 Capricho 53 `iQue pico de oro! ' 
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Fig. 20 Capricho 55 `Hasta ]a muerte' 
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Fig. 21 Sepia Two, `Idioms Universal' 
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Fig. 22 Portrait of Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, 1798 
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Fig. 23 Capricho 65 `ZDönde va mama? ' 
Fig. 24 Matias de Irala, Modelos del cuerpo humano, 1730 
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Fig. 25 `Farnese Hercules', ca. 1770-1785 
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Fig. 26 Capricho 63 `Miren que graves' 
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Fig. 27 Capricho 51 `Se repulen' 
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Fig. 28 Capricho 62 `iQuien lo creyera! ' 
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Fig. 29 Capricho 75 `No hay quien nos desate' 
274 
///. 
/-tý'rllýt'G l 42i 
. 
Fig. 30 Capricho 49 `Duendecitos' 
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Fig. 31 Capricho 54 `El vergonzoso' 
Fig. 32 Rubens, Immaculate Conception, 1628 
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Fig. 33 Ribera, Virgin of the Immaculate Conception, 1635 
Fig. 34 Murillo, Immaculate Conception, ca. 1665-1670 
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Fig. 35 Capricho 48 `Soplones' 
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Fig. 36 Capricho 64 `Buen viaje' 
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Fig. 37 Capricho 67 `Aguarda que to unten' 
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Fig. 38 Capricho 19 `Todos caerän' 
283 
c 
. 
Jý 7/CL2?, 
-1 
. 
Fig. 39 Capricho 20 `Ya van desplumados' 
284 
% LIT.. 'I.. ( ?' /' ýý 
/ 
Fig. 40 Capricho 21 `Cual la descanonan' 
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Fig. 41 Capricho 59 `Y aün no se van' 
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Fig. 42 Capricho 2 `El sf pronuncian y la mano alargan al primero que llega' 
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Fig. 43. Capricho 14 `jQue sacrificio! ' 
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Fig. 44 Capricho 37 `Si sabrä mäs ei discipulo' 
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Fig. 45 Capricho 40 `LDe que mal morirä? ' 
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Fig. 46 Capricho 1 `Francisco Goya y Lucientes. Pintor' 
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Fig. 47 Capricho 73 `Mejor es holgar' 
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Fig. 48 `El resguardo del tabaco', ca. 1775-1780 
293 
SO- , A. 
, {(? ýgi ttC ;1 vI 4ii i" ri 
/; 
A 
- 
Ir. "77 
,., ýý 
Fig. 49 `San Fernando, icömo hilan! ', Madrid Album 
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Fig. 50 `La enfermedad de la razön' 
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Fig. 51 Capricho 70 `Devota profesiön' 
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Fig. 52 `Brujas a volar', Madrid Album 
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Fig. 53 `Bruja principiante', Suenos, 1797 
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